The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know (Paperback)

~ John Viega (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Product Description

If you think computer security has improved in recent years, The Myths of Security will shake you out of your complacency. Longtime security professional John Viega, formerly Chief Security Architect at McAfee, reports on the sorry state of the industry, and offers concrete suggestions for professionals and individuals confronting the issue.

Why is security so bad? With many more people online than just a few years ago, there are more attackers -- and they're truly motivated. Attacks are sophisticated, subtle, and harder to detect than ever. But, as Viega notes, few people take the time to understand the situation and protect themselves accordingly. This book tells you:

• Why it's easier for bad guys to "own" your computer than you think
• Why anti-virus software doesn't work well -- and one simple way to fix it
• Whether Apple OS X is more secure than Windows
• What Windows needs to do better
• How to make strong authentication pervasive
• Why patch management is so bad
• Whether there's anything you can do about identity theft
• Five easy steps for fixing application security, and more

Provocative, insightful, and always controversial, The Myths of Security not only addresses IT professionals who deal with security issues, but also speaks to Mac and PC users who spend time online.

About the Author

John Viega is CTO of the Software-as-a-Service Business Unit at
McAfee, and was previously Vice President, Chief Security Architect at
McAfee. He is an active advisor to several security companies,
including Fortify and Bit9, and is the author of a number of security
books, including Network Security with OpenSSL (O'Reilly) and Building
Secure Software (Addison-Wesley).

John is responsible for numerous software security tools and is the
original author of Mailman, the popular mailing list manager. He has
done extensive standards work in the IEEE and IETF, and co-invented
GCM, a cryptographic algorithm that NIST (US Department of Commerce)
has standardized. He holds a B.A. and M.S. from the University of
Virginia.

Product Details

• Paperback: 264 pages
• Publisher: O'Reilly Media; 1 edition (June 19, 2009)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0596523025
• ISBN-13: 978-0596523022
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.5 x 0.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (26 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #44,354 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A contrarian provides an interesting look at the information security industry, August 31, 2009

By	Ben Rothke "Author of 'Computer Security: 20 ... (USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is an interesting and thought-provoking book. Ultimately, the state of information security can be summed up in the book's final three sentences, in which John Viega writes that 'real, timely improvement is possible, but it requires people to care a lot more [about security] than they do. I'm not sure that's going to happen anytime soon. But I hope it does.'

The reality is that while security evangelists such as Viega write valuable books such as this, it is for the most part falling on deaf ears. Most people don't understand computer security and its risks, and therefore places themselves and the systems they are working in danger. Malware finds computers to load on, often in part to users who are oblivious to the many threats.

Much of the book is made up of Viega's often contrarian views of the security industry. With so much hype abound, many of the often skeptical views he writes about, show what many may perceive are information security truths, are indeed security myths.

From the title of the book, one might think that there is indeed a conspiracy in the computer security industry to keep users dumb and insecure. But as the author notes in chapter 45 -- An Open Security Industry, the various players in the computer security industry all work in their own fiefdoms. This is especially true when it comes to anti-virus, with each vendor to a degree reinventing the anti-virus wheel. The chapter shows how sharing amongst these companies is heavily needed. With that, the book's title of What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is clearly meant to be provocative, but not true-life.

The book is made up of 48 chapters, on various so called myths. Most of the chapter are 2-3 pages in length and tackle each of these myths. The range of topics covers the entire security industry, with topics spanning from various security technologies, issues, risks, and people.

While not every chapter is a myth per se, many are. Perhaps the most evocative of the security myth is chapters 10 -- Four Minutes to Infection and chapter 22 -- Do Antivirus Vendors Write their own Viruses?. But the bulk of the book is not about myths per se, rather an overview of the state of information security, and why it is in such a state.

In chapter 16, The Cult of Schneier [full disclosure -- Bruce Schneier and I work for the same company], Viega takes Schneier to task for the fact that many people are using his book Applied Cryptography, even though it has not been updated in over a decade. It is not fair to blame him for that. While Viega admits that he holds Schneier in high esteem, the chapter reads like the author is somehow jealous of Schneier's security rock star status.

Chapter 18 is on the topic of security snake oil, ironically a topic Schneier has long been at the forefront of. The chapter gives the reader sage advice that it is important to do their homework on security products you buy and to make sure you have at least a high-level understanding of the technical merits and drawbacks of the security product at hand. The problem though is that the vast majority of end-users clearly don't have the technical wherewithal to do that. It is precisely that scenario that gives rise to far too many security snake-oil vendors.

Perhaps the best chapter in the book, and the one to likely get the most comments, is chapter 24 -- Open Source Security: A Red Herring. Viega takes on Eric Raymond's theory of open source security that "given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." Viega notes that a large challenge with security and open source is that a lot of the things that make for secure systems are not well defined. Viega closes with the argument that one can argue open versus closed source forever, but there isn't strong evidence to suggest that it is the right question to be asking in the first place.

Overall, The Myths of Security: What the Computer Security Industry Doesn't Want You to Know is good introduction to information security. While well-written and though provoking, the book may be too conceptual and unstructured for an average end-user, and too basic for many experienced information security professionals. But for those that are interested, the book covers the entire gamut of the information security, and the reader, either security pro or novice, comes out much better informed.

While the author makes it clear he works for McAfee, and at times takes the company to task; the book references McAfee far too many times. At times the book seems like it is an advertisement for the company.

Viega does give interesting and often entertaining overviews of what we often take for granted. Some of the books arguments are debatable, but many more are a refreshing look at the dynamic information security industry. Viega has sat down and written his observations of what it going on. They are worth perusing, and the book is definitely worth reading.

8 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Since consumers don't care about security, why write a book like this for them?, August 13, 2009

By	Richard Bejtlich "TaoSecurity.com" (Metro Washington, DC) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Let me start by saying I usually like John Viega's books. I rated Building Secure Software 5 stars back in 2005 and 19 Deadly Sins of Software Security 4 stars in 2006. However, I must not be the target audience for this book, and I can't imagine who really would be. The book mainly addresses consumer concerns and largely avoids the enterprise. However, if most consumers think "antivirus" when they think "security," why would they bother reading The Myths of Security (TMOS)?

TMOS is strongest when Viega talks about the antivirus (or antimalware, or endpoint protection, or whatever host-centric security mechanism you choose) industry. I didn't find anything to be particularly "myth-shattering," however. I have to agree with two of the previous reviewers. Many of the "chapters" in this book could be blog posts. The longer chapters could be longer blog posts. The lack of a unifying theme really puts TMOS at a disadvantage compared to well-crafted books. I was not a huge fan of The New School of Information Security or Geekonomics (both 4 stars), but those two titles are better than TMOS.

If you want to read books that will really help you think properly about digital security, the two must-reads are still Secrets and Lies by Bruce Schneier and Security Engineering, 2nd Ed by Ross Anderson. I would avoid Bruce's sequel, Beyond Fear -- it's ok, but he muddles a few concepts. (Heresy, I know!) I haven't read Schneier on Security, but I imagine it is good given the overall quality of his blog postings.

If you want to shatter some serious myths, spend time writing a book on the "80% myth," which is stated in a variety of ways by anyone who is trying to demonstrate that insider threats are the worst problem facing digital security. If you're going to pretend to debunk open source security, why not back it up with some numbers? Studies have been published recently, and original research and results would be welcome. How about demonstrating that user awareness training wastes money, because enough marks fall prey anyway? I'd also like to see research showing that frequent password changes are worse for security, not better. Wrap all of that in a coherent manner with substantial chapters and you have a real TMOS book.

4 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The Plain Truth, August 6, 2009

By	Dennis Fisher "security writer" (Boston) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

John Viega has written the book about the security industry that has needed writing for a very long time. He exposes the plain (and often ugly) truth about the way that the industry works and why the state of computer and Internet security has continued to deteriorate over the last decade.

Viega is one of the smarter and more candid people in the security community and those two qualities come through loud and clear throughout the book. He's an industry insider who knows what's real and what's tripe, and this book will help even complete security newbies figure out what's what. With chapters with titles such as "Security: Nobody Cares!" (sad, but true) and "Is Apple Really More Secure?" (no), you know right away that Viega is not in this to make friends.

But this isn't just a hack job on the security industry (which, after all, wouldn't be very original). Viega takes the time to explain what's going wrong as well as what can be done to fix it. Still, the key thing to remember in all of this is that things are bad and they're likely going to get worse. Probably much worse. But as long as there are cats like Viega around to give us the real scoop, at least we'll be entertained while the ship goes down.