In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World War (Hardcover)

by David Reynolds (Author)
Key Phrases: desert war, military secretary, worst mess yet, Prime Minister, Houghton Mifflin, United States (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
For many, the fact that Churchill won his Nobel for literature comes as a surprise, but he was a prolific—and very well paid—historian and journalist. Awarded Britain's Wolfson History Prize, this highly readable book by Cambridge historian Reynolds supplies the backstory to Churchill's massive postwar publishing project: the epic The Second World War. As the author notes, he's writing "a book about personal biography and public memory," beginning with Churchill's crushing defeat in the July 1945 election and offering a unique perspective on WWII, the onset of the Cold War and Churchill's determination to write the history of the 20th century's signal conflict. But Reynolds's real achievement is his grasp of the motives behind that determination: "Churchill's sense of the fickleness of fame... impelled him to be his own historian." He quotes a 1944 letter to Stalin in which Churchill writes, "I agree that we had better leave the past to history, but remember if I live long enough I may be one of the historians." Packed with detail and vivid characterizations (but still clearly a scholarly, thoroughly researched work), it's a different take on one of the few men capable of both making history and writing it. 16 pages of b&w photos.
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From The Washington Post
"We are all worms," the young Winston S. Churchill confided. "But I do believe I am a glow-worm." In his spin on World War II, told over six volumes and nearly 2 million words in which he depicts himself as seldom guilty of a mistake, Churchill indeed glows. Between 1923 and 1931, he had published a six-volume history of World War I and its aftermath, The World Crisis, which A.J. Balfour, a former prime minister, described as "Winston's brilliant Autobiography, disguised as a history of the universe." In that vein, David Reynolds, a Cambridge University historian, adroitly dissects Churchill's second vast war memoir, illuminating how and why it was written and its worth as narrative and chronicle. Churchill used his epics to build and buttress his reputation; In Command of History dismantles it.

The 1953 Nobel laureate for literature comes off here as rather deficient as a historian and human being. Eight years in the making, The Second World War earned millions in syndication and royalties that Churchill drew on to facilitate his self-indulgent lifestyle. Still, he was motivated more by his zeal for vindication than by financial greed or necessity. Ousted from office a month before the surrender of Japan in August 1945 as voters registered reluctance about having him manage the peace, he wanted to manipulate the way "his" war would be remembered.

When Churchill became prime minister in May 1940, he began to order official documents and correspondence set in type for his personal file, anticipating the history he knew he would one day publish. Having already "done" one war, he knew that it was easier to exploit contemporary papers than to write retrospective history. Also, time pressed. In his seventies when the war ended, he had survived several strokes, but he itched to be back in Downing Street. The project had to be completed while he was still in the political wilderness. And he had a plan.

He wrote history, Churchill once remarked, "the way they built the Canadian Pacific Railway. First I lay the track from coast to coast, and after that I put in the stations." He set up a sequence to shape the content, then employed research assistants, whom he called his "Syndicate," to gather relevant material and even ghost-write many of the chapters, each elaborately padded with "key pieces of evidence." (For The World Crisis, he apparently only cherry-picked his own documents.) His team included experts drawn from government, academe and the army. Churchill tweaked their drafts into his Augustan rhetorical style. He also deleted "many of the embarrassing parts" about his failures, especially where public bravado concealed private doubt.

To his credit, Reynolds reveals some haunting -- and humanizing -- examples drawn from the Churchill papers at Cambridge. Returning in June 1940 from visiting his tottering allies in France, the prime minister confessed to his military secretary, Gen. Hastings Ismay (later one of the Syndicate), "We fight alone."

"We'll win the Battle of Britain," Ismay insisted.

Bleakly, Churchill replied, "You and I will be dead in three months time."

Recalling this episode in July 1946, Ismay appealed to his interlocutor not to use it: "I would prefer that this intimate heart to heart conversation were never given to the world." Reynolds gives it to us.

The ongoing texts were typeset into galleys so that Churchill could see how they looked in print, but the Syndicate had no professional proofreader. That led to the description in one volume of the prewar French army as "the poop of the life of France." (Churchill meant "the "prop.") The error was more accurate than intended, but thereafter he engaged a professional to oversee the books' spelling and grammar.

Although Churchill was incensed when Time magazine referred in 1948 to his "squad of helpers," the press hardly noticed. As with many hyped books, critics reviewed the celebrity author, not the work. In a rare exception, Michael Foot, a journalist and member of Parliament, derided the initial volume in the Labour-affiliated Tribune newspaper as Churchill's Mein Kampf. And when parts of Samuel Eliot Morison's history of American naval operations were lifted for a chapter on the war at sea, Churchill only "rewrote the opening and sharpened some phrases." Morison noticed; unawed, he demanded future credit.

In the study at his home, Chartwell, usually after a well-lubricated dinner, Churchill would dictate dramatic, often embellished reminiscences that became the most striking aspects of the volumes. Some recollections were so personal (and so self-serving) that the Syndicate could not validate their authenticity. Having it both ways, Reynolds asserts that while "factual inaccuracy was balanced by poetic truth," the history, especially those parts told in the first person, is "willfully inaccurate," replete with "attempts to deceive his readers" (as in falsifying his schemes to thwart D-Day) and blatant cover-ups. As always, the purpose was to "reposition the image of Churchill."

Several tactics contributed to this. Churchill's centrality is enhanced by concealment and distortion (as with the agreements at Yalta, the advance on Berlin and various Churchillian strategic fiascos). Also, 20/20 hindsight is employed through a plethora of "counterfactuals," retrospective cases for the "ifs" of history -- things that allegedly weren't done, despite his urging. Reynolds also cites the gross suppressions in these pages. British anti-Semitism and the Nazi extermination camps vanish. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union remains only on the margins of Churchill's vision: The sweeping work includes almost nothing about the German catastrophe at Stalingrad, while El Alamein -- a lesser British victory at about the same time -- is magnified as the hinge of the war.

As the volumes soldiered on, and as his Labour successors began faltering, Churchill was also situating himself for a comeback. Writing now not only to vindicate his past stewardship but also to foreshadow his return to Downing Street (which he again inhabited from 1951 to 1955), he pulled his punches about autocrats and allies whom he abhorred (including Stalin, Tito and de Gaulle) and watered down his wrangles with Eisenhower.

Although Churchill conjured an epic, he wound up creating "a complicated literary text -- not entirely Churchill's work and not simply memoirs." Reynolds does not think this diminishes Churchill's achievement and suggests a parallel in the field of science, "where it is the norm for a major figure to direct a research group." Yet in a scientific publication, associated researchers are identified along with the primary author. Here, as Churchill intended, he stands alone. Beyond his financial incentives, he was fighting and managing two wars -- the historical one in which he was a senior statesman and a meddling strategist, and the emerging historiographical one that questioned his leonine self-image. The memoirs furnish an opportunity for Reynolds to examine Churchill's reinvention of his wartime role and the mechanics of his egocentric revisionism. Ironically, that may be their ultimate value. The history he wrote now seems much less magisterial than the history he made!

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Reviewed by Stanley Weintraub
Copyright 2005, The Washington Post. All Rights Reserved.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 656 pages
• Publisher: Random House; 1st U. S. Edition edition (November 1, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0679457437
• ISBN-13: 978-0679457435
• Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.5 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.4 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars See all reviews (14 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #538,695 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Winston Churchill as Historian, September 4, 2006

By	Gilberto Villahermosa - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This is a brilliant book! It is extremely well researched and written and tells a powerful and interesting story.

"In Command of History" is the history of a series of books - Winston Churchill's monumental and authoritative "The Second World War", his six-volume narrative of Great Britain in World War II. "In Command of History" is also many other things, including a book about World War II, the Cold War,and Churchill himself.

Perhaps the underlying theme of this book is that histories and memoirs written by politicians are not to be totally trusted for their aim is not historical accuracy, but rather to enhance the own political and military reputations and to vindicate their leadership.

Author David Reynolds writes about Churchill with an honesty and insight that is refreshing, covering every aspect of the British leader and his work. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this book was the ability of Churchill to use classified documents that would not be available to historians for many years to come. Equally interesting are the many documents that were available but not used because they would have cast the author in an unfavorable light.

Certainly one of the most contentious issues that Reynold addresses is Churchill's resistance to Operation Overlord, the Allied Cross Channel invasion of the France. After the war the British leader expended a great deal of energy to show that he supported the invasion, but Reynolds research reveals this is not totally true. Also of interest to this reader was Churchill's decision to plan for an attack on Soviet Russia in 1945, "Operation Unthinkable."

As might be expected "The Second World War" highlights Churchill and Great Britain's many important contributions to the Allied victory in Europe.

Despite Churchill's many shortcomings, Reynolds makes it clear the British leader remains one of the greatest political figures of World War II and history. "In death, as in life," writes the author, "Winston Churchill continues to glow. He remains in command of history."

15 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Winston Churchill the Writer On The Topic Of Winston Churchill The War Leader, November 12, 2005

By	C. Hutton "book maven" (East Coast, USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Prime Minister Winston Churchill started his career as a twenty-something journalist covering the Boer War back at the turn of the century. As was his habit, he became the story when he was captured by and then escaped from the South African Boers -- his journalistic tale launched his political career. Mr. Churchill, an accomplished writer, repeated this pattern of either writing about himself or his ancestors constantly (mixed in with his histories of America/England) to support his family during a low paying political career. The need for cash to support his expensive life-style led to his multi-volume epic "The Second World War" and the Nobel Prize for Literature.

Anyone familiar with either William Manchester's or Martin Giblert's extensive biographies of Mr. Churchill is aware of his idiosyncratic and unique production of research and writing. After entertaining guests in the evening, he would either write or dictate through the night while leaving research of original sources to his devoted staff. He was a great synthesizer of information and a gifted writer who knew how to turn a phrase (see his speeches during World War II).

Mr. Reynolds covers the six year period when Mr. Churchill was out of political office and in his home office writing, essentially his wartime memoirs, while trying to cover the entire history of the War. Mr. Reynolds points out that the Prime Minister had a selective memory in favor of his own role -- in this regard he was no different from Mark Twain who told his audience the truth as he remembered it. With "The Second World War," Churchill was a second-tier historian and a first-rate storyteller. Mr Reynolds has extensively researched his own history of Mr. Churchill writing his history. "In Command of History" could had been trimmed down from its 600+ pages but when Churchill is front and center, it is a fascinating book for the reader.

11 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Forget Bill Clinton read Churchill!, November 27, 2005

By	Mike B (Montreal-Canada) - See all my reviews

When former President Clinton released his autobiography some months ago this was seen as a political and literary event. All this pales in comparison to when Winston Churchill published his 6 volumes of history on the Second World War from 1949 to 1954. These works are the subject of David Reynolds highly interesting book `In Command of History'.

Unlike Clinton, Churchill was hardly retired; he was leader of the opposition Tory party, giving significant speeches across Europe and North America, renewing his interest in painting and in 1950 he was also 75 years old. All Churchill's colleagues would remark on his boundless energy - particularly given the fact that he hardly took any regular exercise. Churchill was also a prolific author before World War II having written a history of the Great War, a volume on the Duke of Marlborough (his ancestor) and his `History of the English Speaking People's' had yet to be completed.

As soon as Churchill became Prime Minister in 1940 speculation was rising about the future book to be published. Towards the end of the war various publisher's were `frothing at the bit' and Cassell in England and Houghton Mifflin in the U.S. won. As well, there were serialization rights in major English newspapers and in the U.S. The New York Times and the now defunct Life magazine negotiated these rights in the U.S. and in addition provided working vacations for Churchill and his entourage in lavish resorts in France, Switzerland and North Africa - for enhancement of the writing process. Both Henry Luce of Time/Life and Arthur Sulzberger of the New York Times were internationalists who had long admired Churchill.

In his book Reynolds writes that Churchill was writing history within history. He was not writing about events of long ago in which the protagonists were long gone. The book is divided into 6 sections to correspond with the 6 volumes. It examines the era of the volume versus the time it was actually written in.
In England Anthony Eden was titular head of the Conservative party while Churchill was off writing and speech-making. Also Eden had long been foreseen as replacing the aging Churchill as head of the Conservative Party. This is reflected in the writings of the `Second World War'. Churchill claims to have been extremely distraught when Eden resigned as foreign minister from the Chamberlain government - was this really the case or was Churchill trying to over-play the emphasis Eden had on him? He needed Eden at the time of writing (1948-49) to substitute as head of the Conservative Party for him. At the time of Eden's resignation in 1938 they were not considered to be allies.
Another interesting fact Reynolds brings up is that the British parliament allowed Churchill to publish his own government war memo's (of which there were thousands). However, because of confidentiality, Churchill was not allowed to publish responses to these memo`s. It gives the impression throughout the 6 volumes of Churchill single-handedly managing the war. To some extent this is true - Churchill would involve himself in extreme detail much to the annoyance of those being probed.
There was `positive' or logical censorship in the volumes. Churchill could not divulge that England had broken Germany's war transmission codes - there was still a fear that Germany could rise again via ultra-nationalists groups who could use the code-breakers as another excuse that Germany had been unfairly beaten. When Eisenhower decided to run for president in 1952 some memos had to be doctored to remove less than complimentary remarks. However, scathing remarks about Australian Prime Minister Curtin's decision to remove his troops from North Africa were left in. But Curtin was out of the political picture and Australia was not power player like the United States in the 1950's.

Reynolds' also brings up documentary emphasis about Churchill's reticence to Overlord (the D-Day landings at Normandy in 1944). Before Churchill's volumes several books had already been published on the American side alleging this. Churchill deliberately manipulates his writings to attempt to prove that he was always in favour of the landings in France. He omits parts of his war memos that have a strong leaning favouring the extension of the war from Italy into the Balkans instead of pursuing Overlord. There were strong memories of the killing fields in France during World War I; perhaps this is one reason for this reluctance. D-Day is seen as success today - prior to the landings there was a vast unknown.

Interspersed in his memoirs' is a pet project of Churchill's to lure Turkey in the war with the Allies. Churchill in fact visited with Turkey's leaders in a futile attempt to persuade them to join in the `common cause'. This was all a part of his project of extending troops from Italy into the Balkans. Turkey would probably have been a burden in the allied camp - requesting endless military supplies. Reynolds does not inquire into the motives of using Turkey as an ally. Churchill general's said that he had `one hundred ideas a day - the problem was to decide what the good one was'.

I take issue with Reynolds' negative review of the 'Gathering Storm' - the first volume of the memoirs detailing the growing Nazi menace. Reynolds misses the point that Churchill was always a strong individualist never scared to express his own beliefs. Churchill took a tough stand against German expansionism and India's independence - but it is what he believed. He could also be remarkably prescient - he foresaw the futility of British involvement in the Spanish Civil War. Franco's Spain was neutral in the Second World War. Franco did not interfere with the Allied build-up in Gibraltar and distanced himself from both Hitler and Mussolini during the war years.

These six volumes of Churchill are probably the most significant work of the past century by a political and literary colossus. As a matter of fact it was only on the publication of his 6 volumes that the term `Second World War' came into acceptable and common usage.
This is what makes Reynolds examination so compelling.