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8 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Insightful and compelling, February 22, 2003
Herbst does not contend that political geography is the sole determinant in explaining the precarious state of contemporary African nations. Rather he asserts that precolonial social and political norms as well as post-colonial adherence to an imposed state system (reified by the Addis rules) have contributed most to the Continent's current plight. He emphasizes that throughout history, African rulers have had a perpetual disregard for consolidating power in the hinterlands. By means of rational cost-benefit analysis, African rulers historically concluded that the costs of extending formal political authority into the hinterlands pointedly outweighed the purported benefits. Instead, African rulers focused their attention on the capital city and its immediate environs. This precolonial practice soon became a leit motif in African politics. Rulers in contemporary African states continue to focus their attention on the political consolidation of urban centers. When the independence-era African rulers acceded to inheriting the colonial boundaries, Herbst suggests these leaders may have become even less wont to broadcasting their writ of authority. Territorial integrity and the inviolabliity of borders (two salient precepts of the first OAU summit at Addis) convinced African leaders of the futility of broadcasting power past the capital. With no external security threat it seemed pointless to extend political control. Factors such as national design, political geography, and lack of infrastructure (esp. roads) are all strictures exacerbating the sense of alienation and disaffection hinterland populations experience as physical isolation is coupled with political disenfranchisement. These externalities also contribute to many African leaders' reassertion that the travails of broadcasting power are too costly. Consequently, the political ambit of African states remains modest and the prospect of significantly increasing the scope of political authority in contemporary African nations remain dim. Herbst has devised a cogent, compelling, and provocative analysis of state consolidation in sub-Saharan Africa devoid of the many fictions tied to the putative European model. An amazon review cannot do this book proper justice (there is much more I have failed to touch on). I only wish to convey that Mr Herbst has afforded us an indispensable opportunity to enhance our understanding of an intriguing phenomenon. States and Power in Africa is a truly outstanding book.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
States Make Wars, Wars Make States, December 3, 2005
The scholarly literature on state creation and consolidation usually fails to account for the African experience. The central idea of this literature is that the high population density of Europe made land relatively scarce and valuable to control, particularly from the late Middle Ages onward. This and technological change in the methods of warfare (e.g., more sophisticated battle tactics and firearms) drew states into continual conflict. But warfare is costly, and early modern states required resources to attack and defend. To get money for wars, kings had to build bureaucracies, gather information, and map their territory and people. They also had to make concessions- such as creating regular parliaments where citizens could have a voice. All these things were necessary to survive. If a state did not become "stronger", then typically it became extinct. This process created the modern system of nation states with their familiar institutional infrastructures that consolidated in Europe in the nineteenth century.
Herbst's argument is that this process has not taken place in Africa. It did not take place historically in the precolonial era, it did not take place during the colonial epoch, and it is not taking place since or now. Why?
Africa is different because the structural conditions that led to the path of state formation and institution building in Europe were absent in Africa. Unlike in Europe, land was and is not scarce in Africa. Rather, labor was scarce. Thus in the precolonial period, states did not fight over land, but rather people. This meant that precolonial states had vague borders and were often very "weak". Without the constant necessity of defending a well-defined territory, states did not need to invest in bureaucracies, censuses of their populations, tax collectors, or permanent militaries.
This absence of external threats coupled with low population densities persisted. During the colonial period there was little fighting over borders between the colonial powers. The conference of Berlin in 1885 largely determined which European power would have which bit of Africa. This meant that, like the precolonial polities, European colonial powers had little incentive to develop state institutions. Instead they focused on commercial exploitation and outright plunder of the mineral and natural wealth.
Following independence, the situation could have changed but did not, because the international state system and the United Nations decided to enforce the colonial boundaries that had largely determined the form that the new nations took. This trend was reinforced by Cold War politics. Thus African states were still able to survive without having to engage in the type of institution building that occurred historically in Europe.
Herbst argues that the lack of development of African state institutions helps explain many aspects of modern Africa. Since states never had to fight to survive they never had to build effective fiscal institutions. Therefore they have no tax bases and instead have to engage in highly distortionary methods of raising taxes (such as taxing trade) or redistributing income (for example via employment in parastatals). Foreign aid or rents from oil and minerals also allowed them to stay in power without having to develop indigenous channels of accountability. States never had to make political concessions to their citizens, hence the lack of functioning domestic political institutions such as parliaments and the completely unconsolidated nature of democracy in Africa. Moreover, the lack of these institutions can help explain the extent of venality and state corruption in Africa since these institutions provide key checks on such abuses.
This book discusses not only the history and politics of state creation and consolidation, but also evaluates policy alternatives that might address some of the fundamental political challenges Africans states face today. Its contention that the international community should stand ready to accept partition or the redrawing of borders is likely to keep fueling debates in the years to come. But although the potential costs of anarchy and chaos that a territorial restructuring of Africa could bring about are legitimate concerns, they need to be weighted against the current ongoing decay that prevails in several parts of Africa and that has already ignited a process of territorial reshuffling. We may have to accept the fact that in twenty years, the map of Africa is unlikely to look like that of today and of forty years ago.
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3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Realism for Africa, September 12, 2005
Smart and insightful - a realistic look at the causes of many of Africa's problems today, without the usual shallow laying of blame on colonialism or traditional African society. Beyond that, it makes one take a critical look at state formation and the limitations and assumptions that go with it, coming as a welcome respite from the European models of state formation that are too often foisted on the rest of the world. Others outline the content well, so I won't bother. Just to say I highly recommend it. A book of practical realities.
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