Science as Social Knowledge (Paperback)

by Helen E. Longino (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review
Helen Longino has written a timely book that fills a critical gap in the existing literature between philosophy of science and the social studies of science. Her exposition of scientific inquiry as a context-laden process provides the conceptual tools we need to understand how social expectations shape the development of science while at the same time recognizing the dependence of scientific inquiry on its interactions with natural phenomena. This is an important book precisely because there is none other quite like it.
(Evelyn Fox Keller, author of "Reflections on Gender and Science" )

Product Description
Conventional wisdom has it that the sciences, properly pursued, constitute a pure, value-free method of obtaining knowledge about the natural world. In light of the social and normative dimensions of many scientific debates, Helen Longino finds that general accounts of scientific methodology cannot support this common belief. Focusing on the notion of evidence, the author argues that a methodology powerful enough to account for theories of any scope and depth is incapable of ruling out the influence of social and cultural values in the very structuring of knowledge. The objectivity of scientific inquiry can nevertheless be maintained, she proposes, by understanding scientific inquiry as a social rather than an individual process. Seeking to open a dialogue between methodologists and social critics of the sciences, Longino develops this concept of "contextual empiricism" in an analysis of research programs that have drawn criticism from feminists. Examining theories of human evolution and of prenatal hormonal determination of "gender-role" behavior, of sex differences in cognition, and of sexual orientation, the author shows how assumptions laden with social values affect the description, presentation, and interpretation of data. In particular, Longino argues that research on the hormonal basis of "sex-differentiated behavior" involves assumptions not only about gender relations but also about human action and agency. She concludes with a discussion of the relation between science, values, and ideology, based on the work of Habermas, Foucault, Keller, and Haraway.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 280 pages
• Publisher: Princeton University Press (February 1, 1990)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0691020515
• ISBN-13: 978-0691020518
• Product Dimensions: 9 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 3.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #127,511 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

10 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars A Class Review, March 22, 2004

By A Customer

This review is from: Science As Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Hardcover)

This was one of the required readings for Rice University's Philosophy of Science Spring 2004 class. The following is a brief account of the book by various members of the 40 person class:

PROs: ~ Chapters one through four and chapter ten
~ The discussion of objectivity as a social process in chapter four.
~ The focus on the differences among the various branches of science: hard sciences (physic & chemistry) vs. moderate sciences (psychology) vs. soft sciences (sociology and anthropology)

CONs: ~ Chapters five through nine
~ The writing style (too philosophical, too much time spent discussing other views as opposed to the authors)
~ Too little said about the hard sciences
~ Pushing feminist agenda
~ Critical discussion on scientific studies unpersuasive

Despite the CONs the professor (a philosophy professor with a specialization in logic) still believes that, in comparison to other books on similar topics, this one does the best job of presenting the material. The class was a little more skeptical and recommends to future readers to focus on chapters one through four and ten and pay little attention to the remainder.