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7 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Lincoln: The "Extraordinary Outreach of National Authority", July 6, 2001
As the title indicates, this is not a biography of Abraham Lincoln. It is, instead, a narrow, but detailed and incisive study of Lincoln's exercise of executive power between his election in 1860 and his assassination in 1865. This is important because, as author Philip Shaw Paludan explains: "No president had larger challenges than Abraham Lincoln." And Paludan proceeds to state the obvious, that Lincoln was "responsible for two enormous accomplishments that are part of folk legend as well as fact. He saved the Union and he freed the slaves." No other president did so much in so little time, and Paludan explains why. As a result, within its limited confines, this book is excellent! Paludan demonstrates in the chapter entitled "Assembling the Cast: Winter 1860-61," that Lincoln, as president-elect, was a shrewd politician. According to Paludan: "Lincoln could be effective only if he unified the six-year-old Republican party," so one of his first appointments was "his strongest party rival," William Seward, Senator from New York, as secretary of state. As political payback for delivering Pennsylvania to the Republicans in 1860, Lincoln was obliged to appoint the notoriously-corrupt Simon Cameron Secretary of War. To counter that stench, Lincoln named as his secretary of the navy Connecticut newspaper editor Gideon Welles, who "had a glowing reputation for honesty." Within a year, Cameron also proved to be incompetent, and, in 1862, Lincoln replaced him with Edwin Stanton, who proved to be not only a man of great integrity but a very capable manager as well. It proved to be one of the most talented cabinets in American history, although Paludan makes clear that its operations were not always harmonious, most notably during the "cabinet crisis" of December 1862. With most of the executive departments in capable hands, Lincoln "involved himself actively in matters of strategy," claiming "`war power' authority to use his office to the limits." Lincoln's focus on military affairs was essential because the Civil War generally went badly for the Union for the first year. Paludan ably demonstrates that even while Lincoln struggled to find generals who had both the talents and temperament to be successful, the Union was "forging the resources of war," which eventually proved decisive. Gen. George McClellan was a brilliant military administrator but proved much too cautious in the field, appalled by the "mangled corpses and the poor suffering wounded. Lincoln eventually lost confidence in McClellan, and he had to be replaced. One of McClellan's eventual successors, Gen. George Meade, won the great victory at Gettysburg in July 1863, but the Union did fully gain the initiative in the field until Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, who won an equally great victory at Vicksburg, Mississippi almost on the same day, was appointed general in chief in March 1864. Lincoln's original war aim was merely to restore the Union. But the costs, human and material, of the war's first two years, made eradication of slavery a necessity. Following the battle of Antietam in September 1862, which was a "tactical draw but a strategic victory" for the Union, Lincoln announced the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. The issue then became: What was to be done with the former slaves? In December, Lincoln proposed a constitutional amendment for the federal government to pay to colonize any blacks who wished to emigrate, but blacks "rejected it, abolitionists had condemned it," and this "doubtful solution" was beyond the practical realities of the time. Even while the war continued to rage, the prospective problems of reconstruction never were far from Lincoln's mind, and, according to Paludan, this difficult issue increasingly divided the president from radical Republicans. Paludan writes that, while the radicals favored confiscation of land which had prospered from slave labor, Lincoln believed in "peaceful, gradual, compensated emancipation." Lincoln opposed the harsh remedy of confiscation and believed that the Constitution permitted him to free the slaves only "in places where war was being made." The Emancipation Proclamation of January 1, 1863 potentially freed 3 million slaves but did not mention colonization or compensated emancipation. Nevertheless, the emancipation issue proved controversial. Solidly Republican New England remained largely committed to the war, but, according to Paludan: "Especially in the regions of the Middle West settled from the South and in cities where job competition existed between the races, people resented the idea of fighting in order to free blacks." Equally controversial was the Emancipation Proclamation's "arming of black freedom fighters." According to Paludan, "Lincoln and his party clearly were committed to Union and to emancipation and to the belief that the two were linked indissolubly by the need for black soldiers." Almost 180,000 black troops were serving in Union armies by the end of the war. Lincoln was very conscious of the importance of maintaining the national moral, and, in Paludan's view, northern whites increasingly recognized the benefits of having black soldiers defend the Union. According to Paludan, the Union's victory was in large part a result of Lincoln's "devotion to and mastery of the political-constitutional institutions of his time." Some Civil War buffs and many general readers are likely to find this book rather dry because it focuses on the science of politics. But, as Paludan writes, the preservation of the Union "was achieved chiefly through an extraordinary outreach of national authority." This book is an exceptionally thoughtful account of the exercise of executive power during the most serious crisis in American history.
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