Idealism and Rights: The Social Ontology of Human Rights in the Political Thought of Bernard Bosanquet (Paperback)

by William Sweet (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Product Description
Idealism and Rights discusses the theory of rights of the British idealist political philosopher, Bernard Bosanquet. Bosanquet's political philosophy, like that of the British idealists in general, has long been subject to misunderstanding and prejudice. Yet its practical influence, in Great Britain and its empire from the late nineteenth until the mid-twentieth centuries, was profound.

About the Author
William Sweet is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

Product Details

• Paperback: 276 pages
• Publisher: University Press of America; 2nd edition (August 28, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0761832556
• ISBN-13: 978-0761832553
• Product Dimensions: 8.3 x 5.4 x 0.9 inches
• Shipping Weight: 11.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (1 customer review)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #6,723,762 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Bosanquet's ontology of rights, December 18, 1999

By	John S. Ryan "Scott Ryan" (Silver Lake, OH) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Idealism and Rights (Hardcover)

Bernard Bosanquet was, in his time, widely recognized as Britain's most important and influential living philosopher (with the possible and partial exception of fellow Idealist F.H. Bradley). Unfortunately both he and the "neo-Hegelian" tradition he represented have since been eclipsed by analytical philosophy -- Moore and Russell having undermined the Idealists' speculative metaphysics, and Karl Popper having quite unfairly tagged Hegelian thought as a statist enemy of the "open society."

But thanks to the efforts of William Sweet and a handful of other scholars, a renaissance in Idealist studies is afoot. And the present work is as fine a contribution to it as I have seen.

In this volume Sweet sets himself the task of recovering Bosanquet's doctrine of _rights_. That Bosanquet even _had_ such a doctrine may come as a surprise to anyone who knows of Bosanquet only through secondary sources, but he did indeed develop a fairly thorough account of rights in _The Philosophical Theory of the State_ and elsewhere. Since the table of contents of Sweet's marvelous work is helpfully listed on this page, I shall keep my comments brief.

Bosanquet's account of rights is thoroughly teleological: he holds that both rights themselves and their moral authority derive from their contribution to a common end which consists at heart of a society in which everyone is able to live a "good life." For him, the existence and action of the "state" are justified precisely insofar as they contribute toward this end. Central to this account is Bosanquet's doctrine of the "real will," of which Sweet provides an excellent exposition.

Basically, in my own paraphrase, one's "real will" consists of what one _would_ explicitly want, all things considered, if one were fully and completely rational. Sweet provides a thorough and careful explication of this centrally important concept (including an admirable account of why it should be called our "_real_" will).

This doctrine, which strongly influenced Brand Blanshard's similar account (in _Reason and Goodness_) of what he called the "rational will," has been attacked on any number of grounds (notably by Hobhouse early this century), and part of Sweet's concern is to defend it against contentions that it e.g. leads to statism, fails to assign the proper place to individual good, and so forth. He handles the task well, and to my mind makes a case that should be heard by libertarians and free-marketers of all stripes.

(My own view, for what it is worth, is that Bosanquet's teleological account of rights is essentially correct and with almost no modification can be invoked to provide the real basis of the libertarian society. I do not think statist conclusions follow from Bosanquet's premises at all; indeed, I think Austrian economics would benefit from placing its analysis of "market process" on such a philosophical foundation.)

Sweet's volume is enormously helpful for another reason: Bosanquet's own prose style has been found somewhat uncongenial by many readers. Despite a brilliance that repays close reading, he does at times stand in need of a more felicitous expositor who can make clear what Bosanquet himself leaves rather obscure. Sweet is a fine expository prose stylist and handles this task with clarity and skill.