Most Helpful Customer Reviews
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The Island Hopping Campaign Begins, December 10, 2002
After the successful capture of Guadalcanal, the United States forces began to drive up the Solomon chain and into the Bismarcks. Rather than attacking each island individually, it became the policy of the United States to "hop" over some of the islands, thus leaving the defending Japanese to "wither on the vine". In effect, they were completely cut off from reinforcement and resupply. An excellent example of this tactic was employed against the great Japanese base at Rabaul. With over 100,000 Japanese troops defending the area, the Americans simply captured the islands surrounding Rabaul and strangled it to death. This excellent work by Samuel Eliot Morison tells the heroic tale of the battles fought in and around the Bismarcks. Some of these battles included the battle of the Bismarck Sea, where the Japanese lost a dozen ships, thousands of men, and a large amount of aircraft, while the Americans lost only 5 planes. Admiral Yamamoto's last flight is told in vivid detail, and the other invasions are brought to life, as well. Interestingly, this campaign was fought largely without aircraft carriers. Destroyers, Cruisers, and PT boats helped win the day for the Americans. As with other volumes in this series, this book contains helpful charts and maps to help the reader. I knew very little about this particular area of the Pacific campaign, but Morison's book opened a new chapter in the Pacific for me. I highly recommend this book. Its very helpful in describing the beginning of the long road toward Tokyo and final victory.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Naval and Military History of the Highest Quality, October 7, 2003
... For a multitude of reasons, this book can be considered the best of the 15 volumes in this series - and that's high praise considering the quality of research and writing throughout Morison's masterpiece. A prior reviewer stated a number of sound reasons why such an assessment should be accepted, and I will not reiterate them. If the student of military history is interested in understanding why the war in the Pacific has been correctly described as having been fought "on a shoestring" in terms of men and materiel, however, no single text in my memory brings the subject home with greater eloquence, or provides such a wealth of depth and detail, than does this volume of Morison's. Before the Pacific Fleet could roll across the watery eastern boundaries of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, and stand on the Japanese doorstep with Operation Downfall in train, the enemy's offensive operations had to be decisively broken. Here we see a superb and economical detailing of the ways in which limited resources were matched against strategic exigencies by commanders whose work can only be described as plain damned operational genius. Here you will find the turning point of World War II in the Pacific. The battles of Coral Sea and Midway were wholly defensive in nature, as was the Guadalcanal campaign. It was only in the breaking of the Bismarks Barrier that the United States and our allies truly went over to the offensive, ensuring not only that Imperial Japan could not win the war but that the Empire's defeat was absolutely inevitable. No one has yet done a better job of making this picture plain than has Morison's research and writing team, and here you will find the finest single example of their work.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
The great Japanese base at Rabaul is neutralized, October 31, 2008
Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier is volume VI of Morison's fifteen volume History of United States Naval Operations in WWII, and the fourth of nine on the Pacific theater. In it Morison tells the story of how the Bismarck Islands, and most prominently the great Japanese base at Rabaul on New Britain, were finally rendered impotent and then bypassed, leaving the garrison of more than 100,000 Japanese to wither on the vine.
Three main trends emerge in the advance up MacArthur's New Guinea-Mindanao axis. These are land based air power, bypassing or leapfrogging of Japanese strong points, and vast improvements in U.S. surface tactics.
The first of these, the dominance of land based air power, is highlighted by what is known as the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, where in early March 1943, General Kenney's land based planes assaulted and destroyed a Japanese convoy out of Rabaul that was attempting to reinforce Lae in New Guinea. Unlike Nimitz's central Pacific thrust which depended exclusively on carrier air forces, the New Guinea-Mindanao axis was within reach of land based air power, with telling effect.
The second trend, that of leapfrogging Japanese strong points, begins in the advance up the Solomon chain, where New Georgia and Bougainville are invaded, but other islands like Kolombangara are bypassed. The bypassing climaxes with the encirclement of Rabaul itself, and the establishment of U.S. bases on the Admiralty Islands beyond the Bismarcks, while never attempting to actually take Rabaul, which would have been wasteful of men, time and resources.
The last shows the vast improvements in U.S. surface destroyer tactics, thanks to improvements in radar and torpedo technology and lessons learned the hard way in the Guadalcanal campaign. These improvements can be no better demonstrated than by the Battle of Vella Gulf the night of August 6-7, 1943 where Commander Moosbrugger's squadron of six destroyers met four Japanese destroyers of the "Tokyo Express" from Rabaul, sending three to the bottom with torpedoes, with no losses of their own.
Morison demonstrates at the end of this volume the merging of the trends, when U.S. destroyers actually get close enough to the formerly dreaded Rabaul to bombard it, without fear of Japanese air power intervening. The war itself then bypasses Rabaul, and the frustrated garrison remains there for the remainder of the conflict, cut off from logistical support and forced to remain passive spectators.
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