Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (Paperback)

by James K. Beilby (Editor)
Key Phrases: Naturalism Defeated, New York, Alvin Plantinga (more...)

Product Details

• Paperback: 283 pages
• Publisher: Cornell University Press (April 2002)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0801487633
• ISBN-13: 978-0801487637
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 14.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (4 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #738,545 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

30 of 31 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars A Bit Narrow in Scope but Well Done, January 23, 2006

By	Reader From Aurora - See all my reviews

Edited by James Beilby Naturalism Defeated is a collection of essays responding to Alvin Plantinga's thesis that human rationality is unlikely in light of purely Naturalistic Evolution (NE), or in other words, if our cognitive faculties developed in an entirely undetermined manner it is unlikely that our reason is reasonable. This argument has been put forth by Plantinga previously in Warrant and Proper Function. I offer the following thoughts for potential readers.

The discussion is structured in a common format for these types of book-length philosophical examinations. Initially, Plantinga provides an overview of his argument. This is followed by a collection of essays discussing and criticizing his thesis. These comments are then followed by Plantinga response to the various contributors. Often in this style of discussion the principle author is allowed to interact individually with each critic. In the present volume, given the number of contributors, a single comprehensive response at the end appears to be the best approach to minimize redundancy.

Plantinga continues to set the stage for much of the discussion within the philosophy of religion and is arguably one the most capable contemporary philosophical thinkers. His handling of the N/E - rationality question is characteristically powerful, clear and clever. Given its sweeping repercussions the perceived success or failure of the various commentators will in significant part be determined by the readers' worldview. For instance some atheists may find Plantinga's contention unpalatable irrespective of its logical and intellectual rigor. Whereas, certain theists may be presupposed to gloss over challenges to Plantinga's proposition. From my perspective despite some overlap amongst the different contributors the essays were generally solid (with perhaps the exception of those by Fodor and Fales). The efforts by Alston and Talbot were particularly note worthy.

Although many interesting definitional and semantic issues were discussed, two interesting points were raised by several of Plantinga's critics. First, the development of reason was as implausible under a theistic construct as it was in an atheist model, and second, the self evidence of rationality boded well for its truth value. The first point which attempts to turn the tables on theists - while an interesting rhetorical move - appears to be still born. Complicated Bayesian probability calculations are not required for most people to recognize that rationality is indeed considerably more likely under a theistic view than a purely NE approach. I agree with the latter point (and I sense Plantinga would also) that reason seems to be an almost unassailable brute fact. As noted by Alston, however, this only serves to shift the arguement to an equally daunting question for the NE supporter. Is NE's probable given its apparent incompatibility with a brute fact such as human reason?

Overall the book is an outstanding work. Comments from a broader range of philisophical positions might have added even more value. Prior exposure to philosophical thought and this argument in particular may make the discussion more fruitful and interesting to the reader.

42 of 50 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Naturally Irrational, December 23, 2002

By	Nathan Cline (Canada) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Naturalists are usually seen as paragons of rationality while theists are thought to be at the edge of crazy. Alvin Plantinga's argument challenged this identification questioning even the possibility of holding to Naturalism and trusting the cognitive faculties. This book begins with challenges to the evolutionary argument against naturalism and ends with a response to the challenges by Alvin Plantinga.

The eleven critical essays here are divided into four sections each one dealing with a separate set of objections to the evolutionary argument against naturalism. The argument itself is briefly presented in the beginning and then re-presented even more briefly by each of 'Beilby's cohorts'. There is some repetition in the book, which is not so bad when you're looking for clarification on the most contentious points under discussion.

The main areas of criticism in the book are from Science (Evolution), Skepticism, Conditional Probabilities/Confirmation Theory and the Nature of Epistemic Defeat.

Prior to reading this book I had thought Plantinga's argument was very strong -- so I was basically looking for objections that I was unaware of and answers to those objections; I found a lot of both. If you already agree with Plantinga you will probably find clarification and strengthening of the argument; if you don't already agree, well, then, I don't know what you'll find maybe shock/horror? Actually, most of the book is critical and provides ammunition for dissenters. But, in the end I think the worst that could be said about the argument is that it was 'bloodied but unbowed' (Plantinga).

I found William Alston's comments very helpful -- they suggest a different way of formulating the argument -- something like a Reductio ad Absurdum I think.

1 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Naturalism Inadequately Defended, January 6, 2009

By	Eugene R. Walker "[e-mail]" (Ketchikan AK, USA) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

In *Naturalism Defeated?: Essays on Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism*, Plantinga restates his original argument, followed by eleven essays critical (or not very critical) in varying degrees, and capped by Plantinga's response.

Though the topic is important (four stars?), the book is disappointing (two), so I rather arbitrarily gave it three. The critics are all academic philosophers of various types, but except for Jerry Fodor, none seems to show much depth in science. If only Richard Dawkins, or better yet Daniel Dennett, had been aboard.

To illustrate a way that naturalism plus evolution would not lead to cognitive reliability, Plantinga uses this example:

*So suppose Paul is a prehistoric hominid; a hungry tiger
approaches. Fleeing is perhaps the most appropriate behavior.
I pointed out that this behavior could be produced by a large
number of different belief-desire pairs. To quote myself:
Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when
when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better
prospect, because he thinks it unlikely that the tiger he sees
will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place
so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way
of true belief.* [Followed by three equally goofy scenarios.]

One can only imagine the guffaws this bizarre fantasy would (or should) provoke. However, they are largely absent from the book. The critics are much too genteel. Maybe academic philosophy is the wrong place for dealing with this; a better venue would be a barnyard, with a great big shovel.