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20 of 20 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
The philosophic and human implications of neuropathology, August 13, 2003
A blurb on the cover touts neuropsychology Professor Broks, author of this intriguing book, as "The new Oliver Sacks." While any writer on neuropathology would be flattered to be compared to the renowned Dr. Sacks, whose books include the fascinating The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat and other clinical tales (1987), I don't think such a comparison is fair to either man.While Broks and Sacks write about the sometimes bizarre consequences of neurological disorders, they do so from a different perspective. Sacks is more tightly focused on the patient and the pathology whereas Broks concentrates more on his personal experience as a neuropsychologist and the philosophic and emotional consequences of those experiences. Furthermore, while Sacks writes with an uncommon clarity and eloquence, Broks relies on a more literary style with excursions into memoir, story (sometimes reminding me distantly of Borges), Socratic dialogue, and dream sequence. Each chapter in the book is a personal experience essay. Some chapters recall patients with disorders, some do not. Some chapters are intensely personal, as is the final chapter on the experience of his wife's breast cancer. Others are almost completely philosophical. What can pathology, especially neuropathology, teach us about what it means to be human and to be self-aware is what Broks is asking in all of the chapters, sometimes directly, sometimes obliquely. His answer is equivocal and meandering; in short he isn't sure. I respect that because I'm not sure either, and I don't know anyone who is. Broks begins by experiencing the pulsating brain as raw meat. He is mesmerized by the "absolute conviction" that in the flesh "behind the face" being probed by the surgeon, "there's no one there." (p. 17) This leads him to reject the "Mysterian" position on consciousness and Cartesian dualism. He excises the ghost in the machine and comes to realize that the "I" of our experience is nowhere at all, but is an ever-changing, ever constructing presence among the modules of the brain. "Thoughts, feelings, and intentions produce me, not the other way around," is how he expresses it on page 80. He sees the "I" that experiences and reflects upon experience as "not a single thing, or a thing at all," but as "a principle of biological organization." (p. 100) This is a profound insight from modern neuroscience and philosophy as presented by people like Francis Crick and Daniel Dennett, whom Broks cites, and others. But Broks is neither completely satisfied with this unsettling point of view, nor is he complacent to leave it at that. In my favorite chapter of the book, "To Be Two or Not to Be," Broks presents a science fiction scenario in which one is teleported to Mars. One's body is exhaustively copied on Mars from information sent from Earth. Every single atom is replicated exactly as it appears in the original and then the original is destroyed, allowing one to travel at the speed of light. In effect this is a thought experiment asking the question "Who are you?" Are you the original or the copy? The copy assures us that he is the same continuous being that was on Earth and is now on Mars. He is the father of his children, the husband of his wife, and is the man who was once the child. He has all this in his memory. He certainly did not die. And besides he has done this a dozen times and is still alive. But Broks throws a monkey wrench into this scenario by having the original not destroyed. Now who is who? And if the original is now to be destroyed, how does he feel about that? What is different from the man on Earth and his identical on Mars? Absolutely nothing (although because of their now different environments they are beginning to change). Yet the original prefers that he continue living, as does the copy. This story really highlights the Buddhist idea that we do not exist as we think we do. There is no "self," no "ego-I"; we do not die because we were never living in the sense that we think we were. What exists is pure identification, so to speak, that everybody has identically. That does not die. It is always there in a sentient being. Broks acknowledges this Buddhist perspective, admits that in some sense he is uneasy about it; admits that in some sense, at some times, he is a Mysterian, who does believe in something non-material in ourselves. (See "Right This Way, Smiles a Mermaid" beginning on page 132.) Another point that Broks makes is that we do not exist in isolation. "The working brain has to be understood not only as part of a larger biological system (the rest of the body), but also as a component of the wider social system." (p. 102) I would add that we are also part of this planet and its systems, and in the most minute, but real sense, part of the cosmos. Broks believes that the familiar soul-body dualism from Decartes is hard-wired into our brains by the process of evolution. (p. 138) He also believes that "phenomenal consciousness--the raw feel of experience--is invisible to conventional scientific scrutiny and will forever remain so." (p. 140) I agree that the idea of a soul is adaptive in an evolutionary sense. It allows for us to have hope in many seemingly hopeless situations. It furthers the adaptiveness of the tribe which furthers the adaptiveness of the members of the tribe. I also agree that such phenomena as the taste of ice cream, the experience of the color red, etc., are not subject to scientific evaluation. Science is preeminently a social exercise in that, without peer review and confirming experiments by other scientists, would not exist as such. Consequently it is futile to expect something purely subjective to find scientific proof.
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