Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Hardcover)

by Michael Ignatieff (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
The past decade has kept London-based journalist Ignatieff busy exploring ethnic nationalism and ethnic war. This latest work (portions of which have appeared in the New Yorker and elsewhere) completes an unplanned trilogy that took shape around current events. Like the trilogy's previous two titles (Blood and Belonging and The Warrior's Honor), this book critiques the West's selective use of military power to protect human rights and the failure of Western governments to "back principle with decisive military force"--but here Ignatieff pushes this critique a step further, attempting to explain the paradox of the West's moral activism around human rights and its unwillingness to use force or put its own soldiers at risk: war, he suggests, has ceased to be real to those with technological mastery. Whereas Kosovo "looked and sounded like a war" to those on the ground, it was a virtual event for citizens of NATO countries--it was "a spectacle: it aroused emotions in the intense but shallow way that sports do." In other words, the basic equality of moral risk (kill or be killed) in traditional war was replaced by something akin to "a turkey shoot." In a series of profiles of major players in the Kosovo crisis (including American negotiator Richard Holbrook and war crimes prosecutor Louise Arbour and Aleksa Djilas, a Yugoslav opposed to the bombing), as well as in other writings--including a fine, concluding essay--the author presents a strong argument on the need to avoid wars that let the West off easily and don't have clear-cut results. Ignatieff offers an original analysis of the nature and repercussions of NATO's Kosovo campaign. Only when we have recognized the seductiveness and failures of virtual war, he warns, can we truly assess the risks and benefits of decisive action. This is a timely and provocative book for the politically astute reader. Author tour.
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal
Timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the 1999 war in Kosovo, these works represent a worthy first draft of history. Freelance correspondent Judah explores the historical context underlying the Kosovo conflict and explains why NATO went to war in the misguided belief that a brief air campaign would force Slobodan Milosevic to buckle. He attributes the outbreak of war largely to human error on both sides: Serbian leaders refused to admit that their position in Kosovo was untenable, while the West sacrificed its credibility by repeatedly issuing empty threats of force and drastically underestimated the resolve of Belgrade to withstand a few days' bombardment. Ignatieff, a BBC commentator and eyewitness to the war, examines the troubling aspects of what he calls "virtual" war. Modern technology has made the West virtually unbeatable on the battlefield, while evolving notions of human rights have legitimized intervention in the affairs of sovereign states. Yet the detachment of Western citizens from recent wars, compounded by the widespread revulsion for casualties, dictated an ineffective military strategy in Kosovo. Allied aircraft delivered their munitions from 15,000 feet in order to prevent the loss of aircraft and crews. Thus, NATO military operations never addressed the political objectives justifying the war--notably, protecting Kosovar Albanians from Serb forces in the province. Ignatieff's thoughtful analysis helps explain why the West has seldom been able to back its lofty ideals with decisive force. Both works are strongly recommended for all libraries.
-James R. Holmes, Ph.D. Candidate, Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy, Belmont, MA,
Copyright 2000 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 176 pages
• Publisher: Metropolitan Books; First American Edition edition (May 1, 2000)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0805064907
• ISBN-13: 978-0805064902
• Product Dimensions: 9.6 x 6.9 x 1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.1 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 2.7 out of 5 stars See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #2,132,961 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

46 of 48 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Putting a Brave Face on a Fiasco., April 30, 2000

By A Customer

A year on from the bombing of Yugoslavia much of Nato's rhetoric has been revealed to be at odds with the reality coming to light about events before, during and after the bombing. If Nato won any victory it was in the area of spin - and that only briefly. Michael Ignatieff has played his small part in that one. The early parts of this book which set out Nato arguments for bombing consequently have a dated air about them. What makes this book interesting, and worth its three stars, is that it is a well written attempt by an apparently informed commentator on Balkan affairs to present the facts and moral arguments in support of the bombing campaign. Unfortunately the arguments are based on 'facts' that are at best contestable, if not occasionally plain wrong, and on the ommission of information, one might have assumed he was aware of, that doesn't support his case. Perhaps his advocacy of internationalism over national sovereignty clouded his view. A debate , included here, about the rights and wrongs of humanitarian interventionsm with Robert Skidelsky, bears out this impression. In the long run his adversary, unburdened by an internationalist agenda, had a better grasp of the issues involved. Kosovo in March 1999 must have appeared as a good place to exercise the new doctrine of "humanitarian interventionism". Nato could prove, in time for its 50th anniversary bash, it still had relevance in the post cold war environment. Drawing the wrong conclusions from the bombing of the Bosnian Serbs prior to the Dayton agreements, Madeline Albright and the other advocates of bombing thought it would be over in a few days. Milosevic chastened, Nato vindicated, a new precedent created for intervention in sovereign states, etc. If it had gone to plan Ignatieff's book, like Nato's birthday party might have been a more triumphal affair. If he starts by banging a drum for intervention by the end he is ambivalent. After 78 days of bombing Nato, in its targetting of the civilian infrastructure had effectively blown apart the arguments Ignatieff lays down as a prerequisite for a moral campaign. Nato credibility had a higher priority than humanitarian objectives. If they were prepared to go to war for the Kosovo Albanians they weren't prepared to die for them. The simple fact Nato was prepared to seed the very environment the Albanians were to return to with radioactive dust from depleted uranium munitions, and with unexploded cluster bombs ( 25,000 at last count) in order to force a victory over the Serbs illustrates the distance between intentions and actions. To his credit Ignatieff visits Belgrade after the bombing to face some of his former Yugoslav friends; notably Aleksa Djilas, son of dissident Milovan Djilas, who are now on the other side of the divide. His long essay 'Virtual War', at the end of the book,is a sober assessment of the practice of waging war with apparent impunity in the age of precision guided munitions. As an initial advocate of the bombing he at least has the courage to face up to the consequences.

3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars An interesting series of essays, April 21, 2003

By	Graymac "graymac" (Applesauce, MO) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Paperback)

I bought this book a couple of years ago but did not get around to reading it until last week, shortly after the war in Iraq ended (more or less). I was curious to see what kind of perspective it would offer not only on the Kosovo campaign but on the war in Iraq. I found it both a useful refresher on a very different battle, the 79 day air campaign against Serbia, and an interesting meditation on modern war.

The front end of this book consists of a series of snapshots of different aspects of the war, along with a couple of arguments Ignatieff has with fellow intellectuals. Several reviewers on this site wrote that they couldn't see the connection between these bits of reportage with the latter half of the book, which is an extended essay on aspects of modern, "virtual" war. I think they're perhaps not trying very hard, as the longer essay quite obviously tackles in a disciplined fashion the themes raised in the reportage--international law, the revolution in military affairs, values, societal support or the lack thereof for political decisions to move toward war.

Ignatieff is often clear-thinking. It is a bit startling to read this book, written in 1999-2000, talking about the merits of regime change in places like Iraq and Serbia/FRY. He is likewise prophetic in noting how the revolution in military affairs created an incentive for the Saddams of the world to seek a countervailing military threat in the form of chemical and biological weapons.

Where he is perhaps a bit less far-sighted is in failing to see that the precedent of a "virtual war" in Kosovo--by which he means a zero-casualty, low-cost war (for the attacking side only, of course), that is not legitimised by international law or blessed by the kind of domestic support that must be whipped up to permit a high-cost, full mobilization "real war", with real casualties on both sides--could be used to support not only human rights' causes but narrower interests.

Overall this is a book well worth reading. I'd recommend it to anyone interested in understanding what goes into a modern war.

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

2.0 out of 5 stars You've got to be kidding, July 19, 2005

By	Michael Green "mrclay2000" (OKLAHOMA CITY, OK United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Paperback)

Before going on, it is important to point out that Ignatieff is a journalist, NOT a historian. While both are required to check their facts for accuracy, the journalist permits personal opinion and argument to fill in all the holes, something to make the historian dissociate himself from friends in the press.

Let me quote two arguments in the book. "Democracies may well remain peace loving only so long as the risks of war remain real to their citizens." (p. 179) "We keep waging war, not because we want to, but because we have seeded a doubt about our seriousness which only a concerted display of violence. . can eradicate." (p. 205)

If these sentiments seem cogent, this book is for you.

The ex-Yugoslavia is past stomping grounds for Ignatieff, so the conflicts here are dear to his heart. He blames the massacres in Bosnia on "Presidential inaction" rather than on local warlords. His take on Kosovo was to prescribe immediate militarization but then to blame ministers and presidents for side-stepping legislatures and to proceed without UN mandates for this militarization. He calls the bombing of Baghdad in the Gulf War "a light show" and the bombing campaign a "video-arcade game." This idea was the darling of the press in 1991, but the notion is a direct affront to alliance pilots who needed only to look out their windows to see anti-aircraft fire trying to shoot them down. Ignatieff himself speaks of NATO pilots being forced to fly above 15,000 ft and feeling the concussions of near-misses from anti-aircraft fire. Are such realities like a "video-arcade game?" Ignatieff ignores this to paint his warped notion of a "virtual" war.

Ignatieff demanded intervention for Kosovo but then blames how it was carried out. He says the laser-guided bombing was ineffective in stopping Milosevic and so it was. He says how "virtual war" is virtual both to the people dropping the ordnance and those fleeing the bombs. To quote one pilot about Iraq's "no-fly zone" who said that the occasional anti-aircraft shot was the sole thing that reminded him he was "at war" (i.e. a "virtual" notion). Ignatieff fails to realize that once the coalition dominated the skies and knocked out dozens of SAM sites that shots from below were likely to die down. He says of "virtual warfare's victims" that the occasion is like a "spectator sport" (out of the minds and hearts of democracies), something worthy to commemorate by "buying a postcard."

On the whole Ignatieff states a case and then contradicts or refutes himself earlier or later. His rationale is consistent only in isolation. The more he enlarges on his views, the deeper the hole he digs for himself.

This book is not about technology or the way the military fights modern war (per se). It's about disliking fewer casualities, disliking sophisticated weapons, disliking the detachment of commanders and soldiers who are now engaged only at the perimeter, and so on and so on. Pyrhhus and MacArthur and all history's other commanders would gladly tell Ignatieff (who eventually tells himself) that inflicting hurt on the other army without receiving ourselves is only proper tactics. Pity Ignatieff cannot have all wars be his way.