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13 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The WalMartization of Retailing -, August 3, 2009
Bentonville and Rogers, Arkansas are home to 750+ branch offices of Wal-Mart's largest vendors; P&G alone has a staff of more than 250 there. Another nerve center of its global supply network is Guangdong Province on the southern coast of China. There you'll find more than 15 million migrant workers and tens of thousands of export-oriented factories. GDP in the region leaped from $8 billion in 1980 to $351 billion in 2006, while the population jumped 20X. Ten percent of its output goes to Wal-Mart. Besides low costs, China's attractiveness includes a stable currency, fast customs-clearance and loading (half the time as L.A.), and supportive government.
Lichtenstein begins with Walton's early retailing experiences, including the frustrations at higher-ups that would not support his push for self-service and discount retailing. Confident in his thinking, and after observing early moves in that direction (eg. E.J. Korvette, etc.) Walton struck out on his own and opened his first store in 1962 using money from his wife's parents.
Other early innovations included phasing out jobbers, mandating use of bar-codes (faster checkouts, easier inventory tracking), satellite communications (faster communications with Bentonville, faster credit-card approvals), strict prohibitions against accepting gifts from vendors, going to electronic ordering.
Walton liked to recruit managers internally (76%), from the military, churches, college graduates who were members of "Free Enterprise" groups on campus. Demands were harsh - constant improvement, and even in the booming 1980s, 10-155 of all managers were demoted each year. (The goal was to increase staff by less than the increase in sales - not as hard as it might seem, given inflation.) Assistant managers earned about $40,000, worked 48-80 hours/week (highest during Xmas season). Few layers meant few opportunities for meaningful promotion.
Overtime was banned, and dodged via numerous corporate shells that fell under sales-limit exemptions. Turnover in 1999 reached 70% in urban areas. Unionization efforts were met with a flood of Wal-Mart specialists, grievance corrections, management re-education or firings, false propaganda, and threats. Wal-Mart has also refused to buy unionized locations when making acquisitions, and once quickly closed a freshly unionized store in Canada.
The average large corporation gives away over twice that of Wal-Mart, based on earnings. On the other hand, it provided excellent community support after Katrina.
Berkeley researchers found Wal-Mart wages about 31% less than the average for large retail establishments, resulting in Wal-Mart employees drawing considerable aid from public safety nets. Other firms have emulated Wal-Mart's tactics (eg. Target), and others have stiffened resistance against their unions as a result (eg. Southern California grocers) - thus, there is a significant "Wal-Mart effect."
Wal-Mart claims its profits/associate were $6,400 in 2007 - hence, raising pay $2/hour would eliminate two-thirds of that amount.
The author sees[...] as a company that pays and treats its employees much better, and as an example to be emulated. On the other hand, he also points out that the average [...] customer has a family income in the $100,000+ range - considerably higher than Wal-Mart, and presumably less focused on getting the absolutely lowest price.
My one quarrel with the author is that he believes the world would be better if Wal-Mart paid its employees better, and offered better health coverage - forgetting that this would take away billions in earnings from its shoppers. Further, it doesn't address the root cause of employees being willing to accept Wal-Mart positions - massive job losses due to outsourcing and illegal aliens.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
A decent Wal-Mart compendium, September 25, 2009
Lichtenstein's book is both a compendium of Wal-Mart's various sins on our work force, tax system, and local economies, as well as a polemic. People who have followed Wal-Mart's genius in logistics and their squeezing of employees and suppliers will find little that is new, but will appreciate how Lichtenstein has pulled together a useful history of the company, which highlights some of its lesser known successes, like reducing inefficiencies and costs in the supply chain. As a polemic, the book runs out of gas at the end and he could have done a better job of discussing Wal-Mart's possible futures and what may happen to retail labor. The main subtext here is that Wal-Mart has always done its best to undermine labor rights and to avoid compliance with labor law. They occasionally have improved the wages of some of their hourly employees, such as truckers, but generally they have led the race to the bottom, in terms of retail wages. An important point in the book that deserved more space than it was given involved the paltry amount of profit margin that it would take to raise Wal-Mart wages and benefits to those of more generous competitors. Similarly, it's evident that the public subsidizes Wal-Mart's prices through social welfare benefits to underpaid employees and tax breaks for the construction of new stores. Also is evident is Wal-Mart's willingness to lose enormous amounts of money in unsuccessful foreign ventures and to spend money on public relations ventures such as recent efforts to "go green". The chain seems willing to do anything to appear progressive except recognize unions or, until recently, make any meaningful strides in the areas of wages or benefits. Lichtenstein notes that the deflation of wages by Wal-Mart has finally reached the point where it has become a threat to the chain's long-term volume and profit growth.
Lichtenstein's main interest is labor, but he fails to tie together the challenges facing Wal-Mart, beyond some bland consideration of how the chain's business model has hit a wall and that upward mobility for managers was slowing. He is probably correct that the chain risks the fate of Sears, which has limped along for years, but doesn't go much further than this. Unlike Sears, Wal-Mart has managed to create enemies among main street merchants, organized labor, citizen's groups, politicians, and many potential suppliers. It's a business that talks loyalty but tramples the loyalty of workers and suppliers and probably has alienated potential employees in places where it is a dominant part of the local economy. The remaining markets without Wal-Marts are more expensive places in which to operate and to enter. The need of Sam Walton's heirs and Wall Street to increase yields over time is likely to undermine some of the current model and perhaps lead tinkering with its success. Already, Wall Street has prodded the chain to builder smaller stores. It seems likely that unsuccessful ventures like Sam's Club or the stores in Japan may be sold at some point. The chain also may need to grant more autonomy to store managers and show more flexibility in supplying stores. The chain also may need to rethink its low margin, non-growth areas that have been used to drive store traffic: CDs/DVDs, books, toys, and food. besides being low profit sources of revenue, they also represent the only areas where Wal-Mart still changes less than competitors on a wide range of items. Over time, the chain has focused on volume building items to underprice the competition, while many general merchandise lines cost the same as at other chains. Wal-Mart is reaching a point where ambitious early management employees who reaped the greatest benefit from bonus plans are ready to retire. It's clear from Lichtenstein's book that innovation has come from outside the company and the loss of ambitious early risk takers may weaken management further. Moreover, managers represent perhaps the one workforce where Wal-Mart could cut costs in the future, such as through reductions in bonuses and other compensation. Wal-Mart will be around for a long time, but it may be in a more or less debilitated state, with more or less influence on labor practices and store-supplier relationships. The current recession has proven to be a boon to Wal-Mart, but it's unclear how long that will last. As for labor, it's unclear whether it will ever be successful in organizing Wal-Mart or forcing long-term changes in the way that it's employees are treated and compensated. The neo-feudal Southern cultural roots of the chain (well documented in this book) may be too difficult to change beyond some token non-opposition to minimum wage laws.
Lichtenstein's history of retailing has a number of misconceptions. There had been efforts at mixing food and general merchandise going back to the 1950s and involving chains as diverse as DC's Giant, Grand Union, Meijer, and even laggard National Tea. In addition, supermarkets had grown continuously from the 1950s to the 1970s, when even less aggressive chains typically built new stores in excess of 20,000 square feet, and often had stores of over 30,000 square feet. Finally, SS Kresge had been particularly aggressive in entering post-WWII suburban shopping centers, although these stores were the first to go when that chain began its waves of store closures in the 1960s. Kresge had favorable long-term leases on its urban and small town downtown stores and these locations were unlikely to face direct competition from K-Marts. The weak history of retail and the lackluster analysis at the end knocked off a star, but I think this is still worthwhile reading even for people already familiar with Wal-Mart's effect on retailing and beyond.
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9 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The first and last word on Wal-Mart!, August 1, 2009
This is a most amazing history and insightful study of this retail giant. But the author goes beyond the focus on Wal-Mart in his analysis of the past, present, and obvious future of economic developments in the U.S. and throughout the world. Very enlightening, and also most frightening. Very highly recommended!!!!
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