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Editorial Reviews
From Publishers Weekly
While the U.S. First Infantry's invasion of Normandy was ultimately successful, the division suffered terrible casualties notoriously so even compared to battles in the 55 years since. Retired U.S. Army Major Adrian R. Lewis, assistant professor of history at the University of North Texas, combs primary source material for Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, and finds that most of the leaders on the ground opposed the plan, which was then imposed on them from higher up. A dual Main Selection of the History Book Club, this clearly written, carefully argued and well-researched account offers a still-valid lesson in the importance of communication up and down the chain of command, and on bravery.
From Library Journal
Lewis (history, Univ. of North Texas) argues that the D-Day invasion of Omaha Beach was an extremely costly victory for the Allies. Most of the previous "lessons" of amphibious operations were disregarded, while some were not even considered. The British had previous experience with the Dieppe raid, and even the United States had several invasions under its belt by this point in the war. Yet the assault on Omaha did not take these experiences into account, and, as a result, many men were needlessly sacrificed. While local commanders have traditionally been blamed for the heavy losses at Omaha Beach, the author provides convincing evidence that the blame should rest on the shoulders of the strategic planners. He has built a very strong case by using primary evidence, such as army archives and memoirs of the commanders involved. Historical specialists and scholars will be interested in the book, but it may not have the wide appeal of such previous invasion books as Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day: June 6, 1944. Recommended for both public and academic libraries. Mark Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.
See all Editorial Reviews
While the U.S. First Infantry's invasion of Normandy was ultimately successful, the division suffered terrible casualties notoriously so even compared to battles in the 55 years since. Retired U.S. Army Major Adrian R. Lewis, assistant professor of history at the University of North Texas, combs primary source material for Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory, and finds that most of the leaders on the ground opposed the plan, which was then imposed on them from higher up. A dual Main Selection of the History Book Club, this clearly written, carefully argued and well-researched account offers a still-valid lesson in the importance of communication up and down the chain of command, and on bravery.
Copyright 2001 Cahners Business Information, Inc.
From Library Journal
Lewis (history, Univ. of North Texas) argues that the D-Day invasion of Omaha Beach was an extremely costly victory for the Allies. Most of the previous "lessons" of amphibious operations were disregarded, while some were not even considered. The British had previous experience with the Dieppe raid, and even the United States had several invasions under its belt by this point in the war. Yet the assault on Omaha did not take these experiences into account, and, as a result, many men were needlessly sacrificed. While local commanders have traditionally been blamed for the heavy losses at Omaha Beach, the author provides convincing evidence that the blame should rest on the shoulders of the strategic planners. He has built a very strong case by using primary evidence, such as army archives and memoirs of the commanders involved. Historical specialists and scholars will be interested in the book, but it may not have the wide appeal of such previous invasion books as Cornelius Ryan's The Longest Day: June 6, 1944. Recommended for both public and academic libraries. Mark Ellis, Albany State Univ., GA
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.
See all Editorial Reviews
Product Details
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