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24 of 25 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
The best summary yet of the Battle of Cowpens, December 25, 1998
For those with interest in the Battle at Cowpens, there is a real treat in store for you in Lawrence Babits' "Devil of a Whipping", a full length book on the battle which was released in early November 1998.Babits has made full use of all available sources and has made a very detailed analysis of the battle. Many of the ideas that have been fairly common to previous accounts and have been engraved on monuments at the park will henceforth be given a serious re-examination. I am reading "Devil of a Whipping" for my 2nd or 3rd time and far from my last! He commented that Tarleton correctly expressed the facts "if he knew them" and included him among his primary sources. Essentially he proves that Tarleton's estimate of number of militia was quite close to actual, and that Morgan had not counted them at all! And he explained why Morgan had not included them (fear of losing support for a regular army due to two quick local victories involving militia). He clearly makes the point that his work would not have been possible without the monumental work that Dr. Bobby Moss has done in wading through all the records of the individual participants. Dr. Moss has accounted for more Patriots at Cowpens than Morgan reported, despite the fact that, for most, *50 years* had passed before they had occasion to report their experience in applying for a pension. I noted that he said that the victory of the patriots can be explained by the better use of cavalry. This is notable since Washington had only had half as many as Tarleton and half of them were militia "stand-ins". Whenever W. used his, he used them *all* in the same place, always noticeably out-numbering the British cavalry he opposed. I understand him to say that Morgan's use of his forces was more skillful than he has been given credit for. I also understand him to say that the resulting battle fatigue and battle shock played a larger role than the tactics per se. As I read it, he does give Tarleton more credit for directing his forces than do most other accounts, and he also gives him credit for continuing the fight until it was beyond hope. I believe that he gives the militia a lot of credit. I understand him to say that *most* British casualties were inflicted by the main militia line of riflemen. He also credits them with protecting both flanks, driven back but gaining critical delays of a few minutes that allowed Washington to use his cavalry "en masse" on both flanks, key to the battle's outcome. They also played an effective role in the last infantry action of the battle when they attacked the 71st, as well as in pursuit of the fleeing British. I have never seen two maps of the battle that placed Brandon's SC militia regiment in the same place. This case is no different. Babits places Brandon on the *left* end of the line. Brandon's was the first regiment to fire their volley as well as the last. They fired two volleys; the others fired a single volley. Most of the existing maps and plans for the battle are heavily dependent on what Morgan planned in advance to do if a fight were forced upon him. The plan he followed, when additional militia forces continued to join him (and he *decided* to fight) was remarkably different from the earlier contingency plan. Babits clears up the nonsense about the militia crossing in *front* of the Continental line in their withdrawal. They went *through* the main line in openings prepared for that purpose. There is significant analysis of the types and locations of wounds reported by individuals. E.g., one only received a saber wound to the head if one were in contact with cavalry. He clears Tarleton of the charge of killing his Loyalist militia in the baggage wagon incident. He does refer to Waxhaw as "an atrocity", but does not dwell on it. I still do not recall his giving any explanation for the failure of the Legion cavalry (the reserves) to charge when Tarleton commanded them to do so. I don't recall Tarleton having an explanation either. He *does* explain the failure of the British infantry to press the assault (battle fatigue/shock) due to no food, no sleep, hard marching, cold weather, and the adrenaline rushes followed immediately by unexpected reverses. I thought it interesting that the British pointed out that the Patriots gave quarter, but "with regret". I'll have to go back to Cowpens, take the book and see if I can get fixed in my head where the "rivulet", the "swale", etc. lie on the field. This is a "must-read" for those interested in this battle. It will be the standard from this point forward.
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by Burke Davis
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