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17 of 18 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
An Excellent Survey of the Subject, May 22, 2001
Armstrong's book is what it promises: an opinionated introduction to the problem of universals, which in the most general terms is the problem of how to understand philosophically the phenomenon of similarity or resemblance between different things. Resemblance between things is the basis of classification and generalization, and it is presumably by noticing similarities among numerically distinct things that we form many abstract concepts and general terms. A realist about universals holds that similar things get to be similar by having some entity in common--repeatable features that are present identically in all of them, either as a constituent of the particular or as "instantiated" or "exemplified" by it in some mysterious way, without being in it. These repeatable features he calls "universals"--general things, as it were, to correspond to general terms, as names of particulars correspond to them. A nominalist denies that there are universals, and seeks to account for similarity without positing them. Armstrong spends most of the book comparing the relative merits of five different metaphysical accounts of similarity: natural class nominalism, resemblance nominalism, a realist "bundle theory" of particulars, a realist substance-attribute theory (his own favorite), and finally theories of tropes (that is, particular or non-repeatable properties and relations). Natural class nominalists take the notion of a "natural class", that is, a set of noticeably similar things, as primitive or undefined, and seek to account for similarity in terms of membership in a natural class. Resemblance nominalists take similarity among particulars as primitive instead, and seek to account for similarity among a class of things by way of resemblance to paradigm cases of such things. Both approaches suffer from serious defects, as Armstrong points out, not the least of which is that these are very awkward primitives to have. Next comes the extreme realist, who thinks universals are all there are, and that particulars are nothing but bundles of universals. This theory also has its share of difficulties, not the least of which is that it seems to be unable to explain what the bundling relation is. Next there is the substance-attribute realist, in which camp Armstrong belongs. Such a realist faces the problem of analyzing similarity in terms of identity of universals. Among particulars this is straightforward; the more universals they have in common, the more similar they are. But what about the universals themselves? Isn't the color red, say, more like orange than it is like green? Armstrong says he is working on this problem, but gives little indication how to solve it. Finally, there is the doctrine of tropes, that is, particular properties and relations which are in themselves simple, the doctrine I favor. The trope nominalist can readily substitute for universals equivalence classes of exactly resembling tropes. (No problems analyzing resemblance; unlike the realist, I don't think there is any hope of doing that, and trope nominalism doesn't attempt it.) These will do all the work without having the bizarre problems that beset universals, problem which Armstrong mentions but to which he does not, in my view, give fully satisfying solutions. But whether you agree or disagree, the book is well worth the time of any student of metaphysics.
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11 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A lucid introduction to a neglected subject., October 12, 1999
D.M. Armstrong has written a charmingly opinionated introduction to a topic that is very much alive despite its seeming neglect: the problem of universals. ("Universals" are repeatable features of reality. The "problem" is: are there any? And if not, why do we seem to think there are?)Armstrong has devoted a good deal of attention to this topic already (see his earlier work), but in this slim volume he makes some important additions and corrections to his previous views. It is a tribute to his clarity and organizational skills that he manages to do so _while_ he is providing a highly readable introduction to this subject. For it _is_ highly readable; Armstrong has a gift for clear exposition, and his presentations of all the relevant positions are accurate and eminently fair. The reader may not agree with all of Armstrong's "opinionated" conclusions (I don't), but I don't know of a better introduction to the issues Armstrong is drawing those conclusions _about_. Another nice volume to place alongside this one is the collection _Properties_, edited by D.H. Mellor (and also available through Amazon). The two together are the equivalent of a thorough undergraduate- or beginning-graduate-level course in the theory of universals. For a more general introduction, try Michael Loux's _Metaphysics_. And, for a much-neglected attempted solution to the problem of universals, see Brand Blanshard's _Reason And Analysis_.
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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Readable Introduction, January 5, 2004
If, like many people, your first introduction to philosophy came through the writings of Ayn Rand, you might have a significant amount of "unlearning" to do. Although Rand had some interesting things to say (generally limited to culture and politics), her writings in purely technical areas of philosophy are highly problematic and at times grossly ill informed. Her discussion of the "problem of universals" is paradigmatic.The problem of universals is, contrary to Rand, a problem of metaphysics, not epistemology. Why's that? Because it concerns the nature of reality and whether or not there exists something beyond "particulars," something which "instantiates" these particulars. For example, there are many objects (particulars)that are red. But where (if anywhere) is "redness" (a universal)? That's a metaphysical, not an epistemological question. And, contrary to Rand, there are only two theories of universals: nominalism and realism. (Alternative theories, such as conceptualism, are versions of nominalism, generally speaking.) Rand's theory, it turns out, is best seen as a version of moderate nominalism. I don't know of an introductory work on this subject that is suited for someone without much knowledge of philosophy. However, D.M. Armstrong's UNIVERSALS: AN OPINIONATED INTRODUCTION is a good place to start if you have some background in philosophy (or are willing to work a little harder than usual). I've also purchased J.P. Moreland's UNIVERSALS which is even more advanced and takes issue with Armstrong on certain points.
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