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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Monopoly Politics, May 8, 2000
Conventional wisdom says that America needs tighter campaign finance rules to level the political playing field. A recent book suggests the opposite is true. Existing rules give enormous advantages to certain political players, and proposed campaign finance "reforms" would solidify their grip even further. "Monopoly Politics" (Hoover Press, 1999; 157 pages), by James C. Miller III, describes a system so stacked in favor of congressional incumbents that challengers have little hope of defeating them in the voting booth. More likely than not, the vast majority of congressional incumbents who run for re-election this year will win, and win big. In 1998, voters re-elected 98.3 percent of all incumbents who sought to remain in the U.S. House of Representatives. Three out of four of these incumbents won re-election with more than 60 percent of the vote. Believe it or not, that was fairly typical for a congressional election. Since 1950, incumbents seeking re-election to the House won 93 percent of the time. Senators fared nearly as well, winning 80 percent of their re-election bids. In explaining these overwhelming percentages, Miller juxtaposes political markets with commercial markets. In the latter, anti-trust laws exist to prevent businesses from colluding to keep new competitors from entering the marketplace. But in the political marketplace, elected officials routinely engage in monopolistic practices with impunity. After all, Congress writes the election laws. Miller, who once served as chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, and who was himself a challenger in two Senate primaries, believes incumbents often win re-election because they have access to the formidable resources of their political offices. For instance, incumbents routinely bombard their home districts with mass mailings at taxpayer expense. They have free use of the Capitol's television and radio studios. They use the appropriations process to lavish their districts with pork-barrel spending. They provide "constituent services" to the voters who will ultimately decide their political fates. Few challengers can easily overcome such advantages. Federal election laws also provide congressional incumbents with a substantial edge. For example, the law allows incumbents to maintain multi-million-dollar "war chests" from one election cycle to the next. These discourage would-be challengers from entering the race. And because incumbents with large war chests are thought more likely to win re-election, many challengers find it difficult to raise money for their underdog campaigns. Reform-minded readers will enjoy Miller's lengthy discourse on campaign finance reform. Although several reform proposals are competing for Congress' attention, most are based on the assumption that money has corrupted the political marketplace. Predictably, the leading reform proposals would further restrict a candidate's ability to raise or spend campaign money. Miller advocates an entirely different point of view. He believes the political marketplace is suffering not from too much money, but from too little competition. While incumbents are generally well-known in their home districts, most challengers must spend an inordinate amount of time and money to introduce themselves to the electorate. Further restricting a congressional candidate's ability to raise or spend campaign money would only make it more difficult for challengers to become known in their districts. "Monopoly Politics" offers 15 specific recommendations for increasing competition in the political marketplace. Among other things, Miller would eliminate the legal ceilings on campaign contributions and require campaigns to disclose their contributions fully. He would impose term limits, eliminate "pork" in the budget, prohibit war chests, and end the free use of Capitol television and radio studios. Some of Miller's recommendations are more practical than others. (Indeed, fiscal conservatives have tried unsuccessfully for decades to purge wasteful pork projects from the federal budget.) But on the whole, Miller's recommendations would likely inject much-needed competition into the political marketplace. For that reason, expect incumbents to offer fierce resistance. As interesting as Miller's book is, even more interesting have been the reactions to it. Inside the Washington Beltway, people nod in agreement with Miller's description of how politicians engage in anti-competitive behavior, as though that is the way the system is supposed to work. Outside the Beltway, people have trouble seeing what the controversy is all about. They could care less about competition among politicians. After all, aren't politicians pretty much the same? In fact, politicians aren't all the same. But if we don't change the system, we might never be sure. (James Carter is an economist with the U.S. Senate. Patrick Chisholm is managing editor at KCI Communications, an investment newsletter publisher.)
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