America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq (Paperback)

by James Dobbins (Author) "Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has invested significant military, political, and economic resources into conducting operations in the aftermaths of..." (more)
Key Phrases: former warring parties, capita assistance, departure deadlines, United States, New York, World War (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Review
Essential reading among Washington's bureaucrats and in all six American war colleges. There is outstanding wisdom in this book. -- Washington Times, February 17, 2004

James Dobbins has long been one of those troubleshooters who never seem to miss a crisis. -- New York Times, November 21, 2003

Policy recommendations contained in this study should be taken to heart and then further researched and refined for future use. -- International Affairs, January 2004

Product Description
America's Role in Nation-Building is a nearly 50-year review of U.S. efforts to transform defeated and broken enemies into democratic and prosperous allies. The authors identify key determinants of success in terms of democratization and the creation of vibrant economies. Seven case studies are examined: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Presents lessons learned from each of these operations and draws implications for future U.S. nation-building operations, including Iraq. The authors conclude that rebuilding Iraq will be difficult but possible, and use historical perspective to illuminate today's headlines.

Product Details

• Paperback: 290 pages
• Publisher: RAND Corporation; 266th edition (July 27, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 083303460X
• ISBN-13: 978-0833034601
• Product Dimensions: 8.8 x 5.8 x 0.6 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12.8 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.4 out of 5 stars See all reviews (5 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #252,670 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

23 of 25 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Excellent Policy Analysis with Congenital Defect, November 3, 2003

By	Yehezkel Dror (Jerusalem Israel) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This book present an excellent policy analysis of USA-led enforced democratization. Based on historic-comparative study of seven such cases (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosova and Afghanistan), striking policy recommendations are derived on military and police presence over time, humanitarian help, economic reconstruction, building of civil society, holding of elections and more, as as to maximize success in democratization. In all these respects the book is outstanding, in terms of method and substance alike, as is to be expected from a RAND Corporation study. However, the book also demonstrates a widespread cultural blinder of USA policy thinking, namely underrating of cultural factors and over-optimism in respect to making the world democratic. Paradigmatic is the following statement, put forth without any reservations (on page 204) "democracy is transferable to non-Western...societies", followed by a definite statement that "there is no reason why Iraq cannot be democratized and establish democratic institutions and a pluralist polity". Little wonder that this frame of thinking, as applied in the book to Iraq, failed to foresee, at least as a contingency, what is now happening there, the idea of persistent and increasingly effective armed resistance against USA and other Western "democratizisers" after "victory" not being taken serious enough. If what is probably the best strategic Think Tank in the USA suffers from such misunderstanding of realities that do not fit into Western perceptions of "the other", there is much that USA policy makers and policy planners have to learn so as to enable the leading country of the West to fulfill is increasingly crucial role as the leading guardian of Western civilization and security.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars For the interested reader and the expert, August 10, 2004

By	J. M Quirk - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This is one kind of pre-war analysis for post-war Iraq that the Bush administration is accused of ignoring. (Iraq-specific background is the other.) Indeed, the back cover attributes to CPA head Paul Bremer, "...a marvelous how-to manual...I have kept a copy handy...since my arrival in Baghdad."

The book uses seven case studies in search of lessons for post-conflict reconstruction: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Each case study examines the challenges (security, humanitarian, civil admin, democratization, and reconstruction), the U.S. and international roles, what happened, and lessons learned.

Overall conclusions include: of the many variables, the level of effort in time, manpower and money is perhaps most important; security must precede reform; political reform needs to be "legitimized" by economic growth; there are tradeoffs between multilateral and unilateral efforts; and having good neighbors helps.

These conclusions are not earth-shattering, but the comparative effort is useful in itself and the lessons ought to have been helpful in Iraq. Compare this book with Orr's Winning the Peace (CSIS, 2004).

2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Good Background on Democratic Nation-Building, July 20, 2006

By	Steven A. Peterson (Hershey, PA (Born in Kewanee, IL)) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

This is one of the portfolio of books exploring what it takes to create successful democratic nation-building--From German to Iraq (as the subtitle notes). It is also one of the better volumes among such works.

The RAND report goes into considerable detail, providing an operational definition of democratic nation building by looking at the commonalities in seven such interventions (Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan). The report seeks to establish those factors associated with success or failure. Among those linked to success were the use of force "to underpin a process of democratization" (Page 1), occupation, peace enforcement, stabilization, and reconstruction. Success is (Page 2) ". . .the ability to promote an enduring transfer of democratic institutions."

The RAND report suggests a number of prerequisites, including military presence over time by the occupying country, international police presence over time, reducing postconflict combat-related deaths, timing of elections, dealing with refugees and internally displaced persons, initial external assistance, external per capita assistance, external assistance as a meaningful percentage of GDP, and changes in per capita GDP. This obviously entails a commitment to provide substantial resources to the redevelopment effort, to be willing to invest considerable time to nation building, to make sure that appropriate security arrangements are made. In short, the process cannot successfully be done quickly or "on the cheap."

Unhappily, the conclusions of this book--if accurate--surely raise questions about the ultimate success of the American involvement in Iraq.