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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Amazing Courage, Questionable Strategy, May 31, 2000
Indo-Burma Front 1942: After being tossed out of Burma the same year, riven internally by arguments with their allies the US and the Chinese on the best strategy to persue, the British opt for a strategy of supporting the American push in North Burma. But with resources lacking they opt for a strategy of Long Range Penetration. The British will carry the war to the enemy by supporting columns of up to 200 men in 6 seperate columns. They will march through plain and jungle (most of it at night) and launch a series of hit and run attacks hundreds of miles behind Japanese lines --- they will be called Chindits after a mythical beast of Burma. In theory this strategy seemed both efficient and strategically sound; small amounts of men getting a lot of bang for your buck. In reality the results were disasterous; columns first start to loose one or two people to the elements, then things get worse very quickly indeed; food drops from airplanes do not go as planned; encounters with the "Japs" lead to long marches to lose them; crossing rivers miles across leads to more loses for men who cannot swim. Columns split into ever smaller units until there are just 6-man units left. These then break into a free-for-all with all units told to do everything possible to survive. In Fergusson's column alone almost half died or ended up as POWs (almost as bad as dying). Those that survived came into allied lines over the course of months. Some even found it easier to hike to China than to cross back into India --- and all for the result of blowing a single small steel span railway bridge that the Japanese no doubt repaired so the next train could cross safely on time. All of this said the men who endured this trauma of marches in jungle, hidden ambushes, the possibility of a lonely deaths on a deserted trail next to the bones of others who went before them (many of their graves still unknown) is one of the more harrowing tales of bravery by men and a testimony to what men and women will endure when forced to endure. There was no evacuation for the wounded, one either coped or one was left behind on the trail for either unfreindly natives, the Japanese or both. The mere prospect makes one shiver. It is also a good testiment to the mettle of British and Commonwealth Forces and their ability to stick together under one command. The Chindits were made up of men from the English country regiments, the Ghurkas, African Regiments but most all the members of the latter stages of the English Empire were represented in some form or other on this front from Canadians to Pathans from present day Pakistan. The one bright thing that emerges is the mutual respect and admiration of the Chindits for the, mostly American pilots who braved every kind of weather to support the men on the ground. This feeling was reciprocal and as such represents one of the few examples of cooperation in a theatre that become notorious for irrascable incidents between the Americans and the British while fighting a common enemy. There are many of my veteran friends that would disagree with me (especially those who served with the Chindits) but the fact remains that the strategic lessons of the Chindits remains limited in the extreme. What they teach us in courage however is rich and as such one will find it hard to put this book down.
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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Turkey Shoot, May 1, 2006
This book was first published in 1945 as `Beyond the Chindwin: Being An Account of the Adventures of Number Five Column of the Wingate Expedition into Burma, 1943' (Collins: London). The sub-title has been changed for later editions, but the term 'adventures' in the original has deep meaning and should not be forgotten.
`Beyond the Chindwin' is a class-conscious, born-to-rule account of a military farce. Bernard Fergusson reminds me of those who `led' the disastrous Allied campaigns of the First World War. At least he does not say he did much damage to the Japanese in Burma; but he could not make such a claim, as it was no secret that the Japanese harassed the British, not vice versa. The occasional self-deprecation seems shallow, in particular his pangs of conscience about leaving half his force on a river sandbar, to be shot or captured because they couldn't swim and were too short to wade, while he made his own escape. A decent leader would have stayed on the sandbar or riverbank for at least a few more hours to encourage his men to cross. Some of his officers wanted to stay but were overruled. Why? Perhaps they were of good British stock and might be needed for another glorious campaign. Perhaps Fergusson knew he would look bad if other officers could induce the men to cross the river or were captured with them. In his Boys Own (see the book's subtitle) account of the mayhem he depicts himself as an aristocrat showing pluck under duress while the rabble succumbs. It would be interesting to read accounts of Fergusson's role by his officers and lower ranks. (Are there such records?)
In what must be some of the most shameful writing in military history, Fergusson says:
"Before pushing on, we counted heads. Our strength was reduced to nine officers and sixty-five men; in other words, forty-six men had either been drowned or left on the sandbank. Of these the latter were certainly the vast majority. It is a matter of fact that those who had crossed and were with the column included all the best men, and the men whose behaviour throughout the expedition had been the most praiseworthy. It does not absolve me from my responsibility for the others to say so, but it was and is a comfort to me that among those whom I thus abandoned were few to whom our debt, and the debt of their nation, was outstanding. There were two or three whom I particularly regretted... There were two more who, had they got out, would have had to face charges at a court-martial" (174-5).
The last sentence in Note P at the end of the book says more about Fergusson than he intended: "Over 65 per cent of the force got out safely." Tally-ho! How about "35 per cent of the force did NOT get out safely"? Moreover, he is referring to the 1943 Wingate Expedition overall, but for his group (Number Five Column) the figures were more like 50-50.
Would Fergusson himself have been court-martialled had it not been for his breeding and connections? For instance, he was protege of Field-Marshall (Viscount) Wavell, Viceroy of India, who wrote the foreword to `Beyond the Chindwin'. Fergusson was promoted, then knighted a few years later. Like Papa and Grandpapa, he became Governor-General of New Zealand; as a peer he called himself Lord Ballantrae of Auchairne and the Bay of Islands. Then there was the monocle: "His father, a First World War General, had refused to allow Bernard to go to Sandhurst [after Eton] wearing spectacles ... and insisted that he joined [sic] that august Academy wearing a monocle. That monocle probably ranks as the most famous of its kind and, when he was serving with the Chindits in Burma, it was necessary to have an air drop of monocles to make good his supply" (Geographical Journal, Vol. 47, Part 2, July 1981, p. 274). Spare me faux-eccentrics like Fergusson (and Wingate) who strive to create legends of themselves. If you want to see photographs of a monocled turkey, do an internet search for 'Photographs of Sir Bernard Edward Fergusson'. When you see the feathers in one shot, `pluck' will come to mind, Old Boy.
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5.0 out of 5 stars
Outstanding account of Chindit operations behind the Japanese Lines in WW2, February 14, 2007
"Beyond the Chindwin" is the account of the adventures of Number Five Column of the Wingate Expedition (otherwise known as the "Chindits") into Burma, 1943. For those that don't know a great deal about the Chindits, they were the largest of the allied Special Forces Units of WW2, formed and lead by Major-General Orde Wingate. In 1942, following the successful Japanese attack on Burma, the British War Office offered Wingate's services to General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief India. It was thought that there would be a role for Wingate in Burma with his proven guerrilla expertise having previously carried out guerrilla operations in Palestine and Abyssinia with great success. Wingate put forward his theory that formations of troops supplied from the air could operate for long periods in the jungle. The troops would be organised into columns, each large enough to inflict a heavy blow to the enemy but small enough to evade action if outnumbered. The columns would march into enemy territory to disrupt the Japanese army's communications and supply lines and to create havoc behind its lines.
A brigade was formed from a number of different units who then trained themselves for two enemies, the jungle and the Japanese. Keep in mind that up until this time, the British had been singularly unsuccessful in jungle warfare against the Japanese - the jungle was a completely unfamiliar environment to the British soldier, one that was scary, completely foreign and in which they weren't trained to fight. One of the reasons why both Malaya and Burma had fallen to the Japanese so rapidly. Wingate set out to familiarize his soldiers with the jungle as well as using the jungle to advantage in fighting.
The original plan was that the Chindits would be part of an offensive into north Burma but this offensive was cancelled. Wingate then proposed that the operation should still proceed, but now alone, to test the theory and gain vital experience of such jungle operations, and to test the Japanese and disrupt their planned offensives. General Wavell agreed to this and the Chindits were ordered into Burma from Imphal in early 1943. The campaign was given the code name Operation Longcloth and a force of 3,000 men operated deep behind enemy lines in North Burma, for two months living in and fighting the japanese in the jungles of occupied Burma, totally relying on airdrops for their supplies. In late March, Wingate was ordered to withdraw.
By then the Chindits had penetrated to the extreme range of their air supply and the Japanese were moving larger numbers of troops to pin them down and cut them off. Despite the obstacles of both Japanese Army units and the terrain and climate, all Chindit units returned by one means or another. Of the 3,000 officers and men that went into Burma, 2,182 came back four months later. Wingate had proved that his theory worked, that allied troops could raid effectively behind enemy lines and that air supply could maintain such operations in the jungle. Additionally, the Chindits were the first troops to fight back after the defeat in Burma and the operation showed that British troops could take on the Japanese and win. The Japanese had been thought to be invincible jungle fighters, the Chindits proved that this was not so. The legend of the Japanese superman was dealt a savage blow. This had a tremendous effect on the morale of troops in India.
Subsequently, a second and much larger expedition was launched in March 1944, with a a force of 20,000 soldiers with air support provided by the 1st Air Commando USAAF. The mission was successful and started the rot, which led to the Japanese surrender. That's the history lesson and what the military histories tell you. This book is the story of one Chindit column in the first expedition, Number Five, which was led by the author. It's an antidote to the military histories and tells you what it was really like. Ferguson's column lost half its men in casualties in the course of the expedition. Supply drops were missed, little in the way of military objectives were achieved, the column broke down into smaller and smaller groups. Despite this, the morale of the survivors was high, the boost to the British was far in excess of the military accomplishments at the time and the Japanese plans for the next offensive were disrupted. Casualties were high, but no higher than other units experienced on this front experienced in fighting the Japanese on this front.
The book is a classic account of it's kind, well-written, readable and with many lessons which can still be learnt from. Not least of which is that the book was a best seller at the time it was published - a time when the survivors of the various Chindit operations were in a position to criticize the leadership of the author had they seen cause to. They didn't, which speaks volumes in itself for his leadership and personality. Ferguson led under fire and from the front, with his soldiers, taking the same risks that they did. He was from all accounts an inspiring leader and one with a certain amount of flamboyance whom his men respected and followed.
I was a boy in New Zealand when Ferguson was Governer-General there and had the honor of meeting him - I still have the copy of this book that he autographed for me. He was well-respected in NZ at the time - a time when a high proportion of NZ men had served in the NZ Army overseas. NZ being a country with no respect for posers, Ferguson wouldn't have cut the grade if he'd been an upper-class British twit. His leadership and the strength of his personality were apparent to me as a youngster and come through strongly in both this book and in "The Wild Green Earth." Read, enjoy, and respect the efforts of those who did their best to fight for the freedoms that we enjoy today.
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