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27 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A history of philosophy with philosophical implications, March 8, 2002
Lectures given by Etienne Gilson in 1936 at Harvard. Gilson defines the coming war, World War II, as a philosophical war of two different heads of Hegelianism. Communism, which is inspired by a look forward, into what will be, and helping it along (all conjecture of course); and the Hitlarian (Romantic) looking to the past. Thus Hitler's paganism and his desire to rid Europe of all nonindigionious elements, especially Semetic. Christianity, after all, is a conquering force upon the natural purity and indigoniousness of Europe. It is a glorification of what man, or more importantly, a nation (peoples) would be had they been left in their natural state uncorupted by foreign elements. A Darwinian, Rousousian, Kantian mix (among others) that created the ultranationalistic Romanticism. Gilson defines these misguided principles (still the dominant principles of today) as leading to a future tragic bloody war. But it also explains why Japan, in WWII, wished to be rid of Americanism in their culture, and of any foreign influences. Anyway it leads to extreme nationalism that is just an end result of Romanticism. The problems with defining the truth of Hitler to modern minds is we are not far removed from the thesis and antithesis of his metaphyiscal plain. The most important thesis of the book, however, is Gilson's defense that philosophy and more importantly metaphysics is a process and not a conclusion. Once one has made metaphysics a conclusion it ceases to be Metaphysics. Metaphyics can supose a greater truth, like an octagon being closer to a circle than a hexagon, but to incompus all truth is at least a human impossibility. However there have been many cycles in the history were postulations of a "metaphysical" entirety of truth have lead to philosophical cycles of argumentation, sometimes with real physical consequences. These cycles have turned into philosophical battles between true metaphyics and the false. The most recent false metaphicans have been Hegel, Kant, Carte, Hume, Descartes, and William of Ockham, plus their various disciples. The first cycle, Gilson defines, is that of Thales, 2,600 years ago, claiming all is an absolute of everything being air, followed by Anaximenes claiming everything was not air but water, and then Heraclitus caliming all is fire, then the first synthasis of this absurdity was Anaxaimander saying that the common things of all this stuff was indeterminable. Gilson spends most of his effort, 99% of it, in defining the modern and medieaval cycles of metaphysical certatude and the resulting problems. Any summary of it would not do it justice. The importance of this book to historians and pilosophers and historians of philosophy is immense. I don't know of any other book which so vividly paints a picture of modern thinking and how "it" got here than this book. Although I must admit I got hopelessly lost in the discriptions of Descarte's postulations, but the thesis of Descartes was made clear. One could go on forever about this book it is a cornicopia of ideas for further study and expansion. Highly recommended for any student of history or philosophy. Gilson brings a view that cannot be ignored. The question I have for Gilson, if I could ask it, is does Gilson agree that error illuminates the truth, as Aquinas did, and further, if error is good. Gilson convincingly argues that there is unity to the philosophical experience and this experience is illuminating on the nature of man and perhaps more.
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by Etienne Gilson
by Etienne Gilson
by Jacques Maritain
by Etienne Gilson
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