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54 of 59 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Driving forces of societys development, November 19, 2001
This is a striking book. When one is past the formative years, it rarely happens that a single book can substantially change one's view of the world. For me the "Evolution of Civilizations" influenced my understanding of history more than anything I've read in many years.The most important author's contribution to historical analysis is identification of the growth mechanism - "instrument of expansion", which can be quite different in different civilizations. It must include two necessary conditions - generation of surplus output, and its investment in productive economic activities. Later, this "instrument of expansion" becomes institutionalized, when surplus is spent on maintenance of status quo of ruling elites and various vested interests, and a society enters "Age of Conflict". One of the distinctions, which Quigley attributes uniquely to the Western civilization, is that it passed through the "Age of Expansion" and reached the "Age of Conflict" three times in its history. First - during Middle Ages (he specifically puts dates 970-1270) with the feudalism as an instrument of expansion, which became institutionalized as chivalry and municipal mercantilism. The second period is the Renaissance era (1440-1630), with the commercial capitalism as instrument of expansion, which ended in the "Age of conflict" of the brutal Thirty Years War, absolutism, and state mercantilism of the emerging nation-states. The third "Age of Expansion" is associated with the Industrial Revolution, beginning in the second half of the 18-th century. It had the industrial capitalism as an instrument of expansion, which became institutionalized in the monopolistic capitalism and imperialism. Quigley puts the end of the third "Age of Expansion" specifically in 1929, with the Wall Street crash and the beginning of the Great Depression. This is an americentric view; in fact the process of institutionalization and monopolistic excesses can be traced to late 19-th century, and by early 20-th century they were plainly evident. Western economies still expanded, but financial crashes, increasing in frequency and magnitude, underlined new fragility due to the exhaustion of the expansionary mechanism. In this sense the WWI was a typical "Age of Conflict" war, similar to the Hundred Years War and the Thirty Years War of the previous "Ages of Conflict" in Europe - not a clash of civilizations, or the conflict between the old and the new. Instead it was pointless, horrible slaughter underlying the conflict between vested interests of various elites and countries belonging to one civilization, and largely devoid of irreconcilable ideological differences. Yet, contrary to the author, it is unlikely that the Western civilization is unique in this sense. The ascendance of every civilization includes several distinct stages. In fact it is more historically consistent to talk about the probability of the civilization's survival after a period of crisis, brought by institutionalization of the "instrument of expansion" and solidifying status quo. One can argue, for example, that the Islamic civilization experienced at least two distinct "ages of expansion" - the first centered at times of Abbasid Caliphate, the second - during the ascent of the Ottoman Empire, in 14-16th centuries. In the case of Orthodox Christian (i.e. Russian) civilization Quigley puts the "Age of Expansion" in the interval 1500-1900, and then - a new one beginning with the Soviet era. In fact, just like Western civilization, the Orthodox one experienced three very distinct stages of expansion before 20th century. The first one was Kievan Rus, which flourished along the North-South trading routes between the Baltic and Black seas (hence the duality of the most important cities - Kiev in the south and Novgorod in the north), which entered the "Age of Conflict" near the end of 12-th century and was conquered by Mongol invasion. The next period of expansion probably began around 1350 (its first show of strength was the victory over Mongols in Kulikovo Pole in 1380) and was centered around Moscow. It lasted probably until institutionalization of the part of the boyar elites loyal to Ivan IV (Grozny), around 1560. Its instrument of expansion was oriental-style autocracy, based on the ideas of civil and military administration borrowed from China, Golden Horde and Islamic countries. The subsequent "Age of Conflict" included terrible repressions of later-stage Grozny period, "Time of Troubles" in early 17-th century, and early period of the Romanov dynasty. The next stage began with Peter the Great, and was associated with St. Petersburg period. Its instrument of expansion was European-style absolutism, with westernizing aristocratic elite and bonded peasantry. It reached its zenith around 1815 with the victory over Napoleon, and began to stagnate around 1830. I would argue that Quiglean interpretation of the subsequent period included unsuccessful attempt at the new instrument of expansion (western-borrowed industrial capitalism) in late the 19-th and early 20-th century, which was aborted and instead a new civilization was born. This socialist (or atheistic) civilization rapidly expanded to about the third of the globe and exerted strong influence on the western world. Its "instrument of expansion" included Communist party as an organization responsible for investing economic surplus (which later became institutionalized in "nomenclatura") and social engineering, which allowed rapid industrialization and development of education and health care. It reached its zenith in victory over Hitler, launch of the Sputnik and Gagarin's flight. This civilization entered its first "Age of Conflict" around 1965, apparent in progressing economic stagnation, intra-civilizational tensions with China (including a small war in 1969), one of the first manifestations of its crisis was defeat in the Moon landing race. Soviet regime collapsed around 1990, but the civilization did not, which is evident in strong economic performance in China throughout 90-s (which can be viewed as Quiglean "geographic circumvention") and the fact that Russia, despite some religious revival, remained overwhelmingly secular and didn't revert to many previous monarchic and religious traditions. After a period of painful reforms it will have the potential for the new "Age of Expansion", probably based on some western and some of its own ideas.
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