See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Paperback)

~ (Author) "AS INSTRUCTED, I reported to Fred Turco's office right at nine..." (more)
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Editorial Reviews

Review

?See No Evil is a compelling account of America?s failed efforts to ?listen in? on the rest of the world, especially the parts of it that intend to do us harm.?
?Wall Street Journal

?Robert Baer was considered perhaps the best on-the-ground field
officer in the Middle East.?
?Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker -- Review

Review

“See No Evil is a compelling account of America’s failed efforts to ‘listen in’ on the rest of the world, especially the parts of it that intend to do us harm.”
–Wall Street Journal

“Robert Baer was considered perhaps the best on-the-ground field
officer in the Middle East.”
–Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 320 pages
• Publisher: Three Rivers Press; First Edition edition (January 7, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 140004684X
• ISBN-13: 978-1400046843
• Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6.1 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (216 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #14,466 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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  #28 in	Books > Nonfiction > Current Events > Terrorism
  #70 in	Books > Biographies & Memoirs > Leaders & Notable People > Political

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

514 of 529 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Straight Talk from Patriot--Should Testify at 9-11 Hearings, January 31, 2002

By	Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)

Amazon Verified Purchase

This review is from: See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Hardcover)

As a former clandestine case officer, leaving the Agency in 1988 after unsuccessfully chasing terrorists for a few years, I knew we were in bad shape but I did not realize just how bad until I read this book. The author, working mostly in the Near East (NE) Division of the Directorate of Operations, and then in the Counter-Terrorism Center when it was just starting out, has an extremely important story to tell and every American needs to pay attention. Why? Because his account of how we have no assets useful against terrorism is in contradiction to what the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) told the President and his top advisors at Camp David on Saturday 15 September. According to the Washington Post of 31 January 2002, page A13, on the 15th the DCI laid out an ambitious "Worldwide Attack Matrix" and told the President that the United States had a "large asset base" from its years of working the terrorism target. One of these two men one is closer to the truth than the other. In my judgement, I believe Baer has three-quarters of the weight on his side. This discrepancy warrants investigation, for no President can be successful if he does not have accurate information about our actual capabilities.

There are four other stories within this excellent book, all dealing with infirm bureaucracies. At one level, the author's accounting of how the Directorate of Operations has declined under the last three leaders (as the author describes them: a recalled retiree, an analyst, and a "political" (pal)) is both clearly based on ground truth, and extremely troubling. The extraordinary detail on the decline and fall of the clandestine service is one that every voter should be thinking about, because it was the failure of the clandestine service, as well as the counterintelligence service (the Federal Bureau of Investigation) that allowed 9-11 to happen...at the same time, we must note that it was a policy failure to not have investigated similar incompetencies when a military barracks in Saudi Arabia, two Embassies, and a naval destroyer were attacked, and it was clearly known in open sources that bin Laden had declared war on America and had within America numerous Islamic clerics calling for the murder of Americans--all as documented in an excellent Public Broadcast Service documentary.

At a technical level, the author provides some really excellent real-world, real-war annecdotes about situations where clandestine reporting from trusted operations officers has not been accepted by their own superiors in the absence of technical confirmation (imagery or signals). As he says, in the middle of a major artillery battle and break-out of insurgent elements, screaming over the secure phone, "its the middle of night here". We've all known since at least the 1970's that the technical intelligence side of things has been crushing human sensibility, both operational and analytical, but this book really brings the problems into the public eye in a compelling and useful manner.

At another level, the author uses his own investigation for murder (he was completely cleared, it was a set-up) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and at one point by the Secret Service, to shed new light on the complete break-down of internal security processes within the CIA. At its lowest point, he is pressured by DO management with a psychological evaluation to determine his fitness for duty--shades of Stalinism! I know this technique, of declaring officers unfit for duty based on psychological hatchet jobs, to be a common practice over the past two decades, and when Britt Snider was appointed Inspector General at CIA, I told him this was a "smoking gun" in the 7th floor closet. That it remains a practice today is grounds for evaluating the entire management culture at CIA.

There is a fourth story in the book, a truly interesting account of how big energy companies, their "ambassadors" serving as Presidential appointees within the National Security Council, and corrupt foreign elements, all come together. In this the spies are not central, so I leave it as a sidenote.

In my capacity as a reviewer of most intelligence-related books within these offerings, I want to make it clear to potential buyers of this book that the author is not alone. His is the best, most detailed, and most current accounting of the decrepit dysfunctionality of the clandestine service (as I put it in my own book's second edition), but I would refer the reader to two other books in particular: David Corn's "Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the CIA's Crusades"--its most memorable quote, on covert action in Laos, being "We spent a lot of money and got a lot of people killed, and we didn't get much for it."--and Evan Thomas' "The Very Best Men--Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA"--its best quote: "Patriotic, decent, well-meaning, they were also uniquely unsuited to the grubby, necessarily devious world of intelligence." There are many other books, including twelve (12!) focused on reform and recommended by the Council on Intelligence.

The author is a brave man--he was brave on the fields of war and clandestinity, and he is braver still for having brought this story to the public. We owe him a hearing.

37 of 38 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Where Did We Go Wrong? Baer Tells Us, March 17, 2002

By	A. Wolverton (Crofton, MD United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

This review is from: See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Hardcover)

'See No Evil' documents Robert Baer's career as a CIA field officer, but it also does much more. It shows us how intelligence in this country has drastically changed since the Cold War and the tragic consequences we as a nation are paying for those changes.

At the beginning of his career, Baer describes himself as an extremely unlikely candidate for the CIA. He relates experiences of his training and facts from many events that we just _think_ we know about. Baer's story makes for very interesting and exciting reading as he describes the thrills and dangers of his first several years as a field officer. It was an incredibly tough and dangerous job, but a necessary one, as the author adequately demonstrates.

Excitement quickly turns to anger for both the author and the reader. As the Cold War ends, the reader will learn how the CIA took a dramatic turn, seeking to gain intelligence from satellite surveilance rather than from agents in the field. Why not? The technology is available and fewer lives will be lost. Sounded like a good idea at the time, but not to Baer. You'll read about how terrorists in the Middle East and in other parts of the world were quickly ignored after the Cold War in favor or special interests in Washington. You'll also see how close we really were to putting an end to Saddam Hussein forever. You'll read about many other events that will surprise you, shock you, and make you mad as hell. 'See No Evil' made me experience all those feelings and more. How could the CIA have fallen to such a level as Baer describes in this book? What a terrible price we as a nation have paid and continue to pay for our lack of top-notch intelligence.

I'll admit that twenty years ago I pretty much ignored all the fighting and disputes going on in the Middle East. I ignorantly thought that it didn't concern me, so I didn't give it much thought. The country was doing well, I was doing well, and that's all that mattered. I won't make that mistake again. I hope that Baer's book is read by millions of Americans and especially the big boys in Washington. This is not a book to be swept under the rug. It's a book to be read and heard by America, screaming at the top of our lungs, if need be.

43 of 45 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars HOW THE CIA WAS ONCE SUCCESSFUL AND A WARNING, January 21, 2002

By A Customer

This review is from: See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism (Hardcover)

Robert Baer provides a very interesting read and and warning for the future. He shows us how the old CIA operators in the Operations Division were trained to gather intelligence from human sources, who most of the time remained on the American payroll for years. This is the way we won the Cold War. But now, Baer tells us, the CIA has been eviscerated and is a shell of its former self, more preoccupied with political correctness and telling senior leaders what they want to hear. The human agent has been replaced by total reliance on satellites, electronic eavesdropping and other technology we have had for many years, but which are no substitute for a human being. He calls the failure of our intelligence networks regarding 9/11 a disaster and makes a compelling case that if we do not go back to the human element of intelligence gathering, such tragedies will become more and more frequent. Anyone interested in our national security should read this book.