Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (Hardcover)

by Robert D. Kaplan (Author)
Key Phrases: counterintelligence guys, middle level officers, narco terrorists, Special Forces, World War, Green Berets (more...)

Editorial Reviews

Amazon.com Review
It is the dawn of the 21st century, and the United States has appropriated the entire Earth. So journalist Robert Kaplan writes in his paean to the American fighting man and woman, Imperial Grunts. The U.S. has quietly--with little public debate--forged an empire that is "ready to flood the most obscure areas of it with troops at a moment's notice," writes Kaplan, a correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly magazine who has written 10 earlier books on foreign affairs and travel, including the acclaimed Balkan Ghosts. Imperial Grunts is Kaplan's account of his travels to the frontiers of the U.S. imperium. From the dustbowl of northern Yemen to the coca fields of Colombia and the insurgent hotbed of Fallujah, Kaplan takes readers to the war-torn edges of the U.S. empire and visits with front-line grunts who guard it and try to expand its reach.

"Welcome to Injun Country," is the catchphrase Kaplan hears from all the U.S. soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors we meet. In the view of American troops, they are taming an "unruly" frontier in the tradition of General George Custer. We all know what happened to Custer and, later, to the Native Americans whom the 7th Cavalry was sent out to pacify. But far from criticizing that mission or finding in the analogy any cautionary lesson, Kaplan is an enthusiastic cheerleader for what he baldly calls "American imperialism." He sees it as "humanitarian" and "righteous" and seems to never meet a Green Beret or marine he does not idolize. To Kaplan, U.S. imperialism is unquestionably selfless and heroic, trying only to bring a little taste of freedom to the huddled masses of the world. Imperial Grunts works well as a travelogue but fails to provide deeper insights--or opposing views--about the complex and fascinating places he explores. --Alex Roslin

From Publishers Weekly
America is no less an imperial power than Britain and Rome in their times, claims veteran journalist Kaplan (Balkan Ghosts, etc.)—one that is backed by the same sort of enforcers. To illustrate, he travels to seven nations and describes how American troops are, if not ruling the world, working to persuade it to follow our lead. The author joins elite units (generally marines or special forces) sent to shore up friendly governments, win people's hearts, train security forces and defeat terrorism—an increasingly vague term that includes narco-guerrillas, local warlords, unruly tribes and criminal gangs. Living among working soldiers, Kaplan makes no secret of his admiration for their camaraderie, practicality and rational if politically incorrect views. All roll their eyes when our leaders proclaim that defeating terrorism requires democratic governments; according to Kaplan, they believe this is nonsense in Colombia, Kenya, Yemen and the Philippines—all democracies. Forbidden to fight in these countries, Americans are building infrastructure and gathering intelligence as they instruct local units, hoping American-trained leaders will eventually rise to positions of authority. Military buffs will prefer the chapters on Iraq and Afghanistan, where the soldiers are slugging it out. Stabilizing all these nations may take decades, these men and women say—except in Iraq, where it may take longer. (On sale Sept. 13)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Hardcover: 448 pages
• Publisher: Random House (September 13, 2005)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1400061326
• ISBN-13: 978-1400061327
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.2 x 1.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (84 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #405,270 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

133 of 148 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Admiring of Grunts, Deep Between the Lines Slam on Washington, October 3, 2005

By	Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)

Most important in this book is Kaplan's documentation of the fact that transformation of the U.S. military is NOT taking place--Washington is still enamored of multiple layers of rank heavy bureaucracy, the insertion of very large cumbersome task forces in to every clime and place; an over-emphasis on technology; and a lack of appreciation for the urgency of providing security, food, water, and electricity IMMEDIATELY so as to start the cycle of counter-insurgency information collection from volunteers. The author is brutal in his indictment of the bureaucracy for failing to provide the linguistic skills, four years after 9/11, that are far more important to transformation than any weapons system. He is also brutal on the delays in approving operations in the field that are associated with layered bureaucracies that come with joint task forces, and completely detrimental to fast moving tactical success at the A Team level.

Key here is the conclusion that American power can only be exercised in a sustained way through discreet relationships at every level from neighborhood and village on up to provinces and tribes. The emphasis here is on discreet, humanitarian, tangible goods and services including security. When America introduces major forces, it spikes resistance and delays the achievement of its very objective. What jumps out is the need to change how the US achieves its presence around the world. The author recommends a change in the State Department model of embassies focused on countries--State tends to be co-opted country by country and loses sight--if it ever had it--of regional or tribal nuances. The author also recommends a sustained peaceful presence at the provincial and village level around the world, through a combination of modern civil affairs and humanitarian assistance cadres and retired military given leave to choose a place they get to know and stay there to finish out their careers and then be "on tap" for retired reserve plus up.

A third theme in this book, one that Ralph Peters also makes in "NEW GLORY," is that a lot of these countries are NOT countries and should not be countries. Many borders imposed by colonialism are simply lunatic when taking into account historical and geographic and related ethnic realities. It *makes sense* to have regional summits that re-locate borders in a manner that respects historical, geographical and cultural realities, and to do so with a massive Berlin Airlift/Marshall Plan application of the benefits of peace. Ceding southernmost Thailand and the insurgent southern part of the Philippines to Malaysia, and establishing an Indonesian-Malaysian Muslim Crescent, makes sense. Similarly, in Africa and in the Middle East, there is good that could come of a deliberate recalculation of borders.

A fourth theme, and I share his admiring view of Special Operations and the Marine Corps, is that of the separation of the military ethos of service and dedication to mission, from that of the Nation at large, where Tom Friedman in "The World is Flat" declares that we are suffering from a new generation that is, in a word, apathetic. We need to return to universal service, with options for serving in the Peace Corps or the local constabulary at home. America has lost its civic integrity.

A fifth theme, one that corrected a misimpression I have shared, was of the rather special nature of the National Guard elements of the U.S. Special Forces and the Army civil affairs teams. They come out in this book as being among the best of the best.

Sixth, I found the author's field appreciation of citizen militia in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere to be quite illuminating. Washington is wrong to rush the transition to a centralized Army in places where tribes and militia still hold sway and can be used to provide provincial stability. We ignore the possibilities of unconventional indigenous forces at our peril.

Seventh, as on page 230, the author highlight those occasions when our unconventional warriors point out that Toyotas are better than Humvees, commercial cell phones are better than military communications alternatives. Across the book, a few good men and women with independent authority and cash resources to do instant compensation and instant aid authorization come across as vastly superior to Washington-style contracting and major joint force insertions.

Eighth, throughout the book, force protection mania is killing us and gutting our counter-insurgency potential. This comes out especially strongly in Colombia, where A Teams are forbidden to go tactical with the forces they are training, and are limited to training within safe encampments only. Force protection is a modern variation of the Soldier's Load-we are so nuts about force protection and heavying up that we are shackling our troops and our small unit leaders and completely avoiding the military value of "fast and furious."

Ninth, national and military intelligence are not meeting needs of front-line grunts. Bottom-up intelligence collection, including passive collection from observant civil affairs teams and foot patrols, is what is really working. We appear to need a whole new concept of operations and a whole new doctrine for field intelligence, one that floods areas with non-official cover and overt personnel, one that puts analyst and translators heavy-up into the front lines.

Sidenotes include great admiration for SOUTHCOM, accustomed as it is to getting along with the short end of the stick; and derision for PACOM, "twenty years behind the times, afraid of messy little wars and of a transparent humanitarian role for SF." The author regards the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as a convenient "set up" for a future war with China, not something I agree with but evidently a perception within the military that has specific outcomes from day to day. Other side notes include a brutal indictment throughout of "Big Army" and also of the US Air Force which is obsessing on more super-bombers and unwilling to fund what really works well, long-haul transports, AC-130 gunships (Puff the Magic Dragon), and more air controllers in the field with the grunts.

Super book! NOTE: I have the sense that some in the SF community have taken an intense dislike to Kaplan, and vote against the review as a way of voting against Kaplan. Fair enough, but for what it's worth, the review is a good summary intended to be helpful to all in appreciating what I take to be some pretty useful themes.

104 of 119 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Great insight on special ops., September 23, 2005

By	Gaetan Lion - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Robert Kaplan spent the second half of 2003 touring with special ops counterinsurgency US military teams in the Philippines and Afghanistan. Given their under cover nature, these special ops interventions are not covered by the press. Thus, Kaplan brings a huge amount of intelligence and insight on this nearly mysterious subject.

The book is fascinating on a couple of levels. The first one is that the U.S. military contrary to what everyone believes has a rather effective counterinsurgency apparatus. Since 9/11 we have all read about the ineffectiveness of our lumbering military complex. Many have recommended the military develops small, flexible teams that could be rapidly deployed where they are needed at a much lower cost than sending aircraft and tank fleets. But, these experts are recommending something that already exists: our nearly unknown counterinsurgency teams. And, these teams will play an increasingly important role in fighting the Islamic insurrection and terrorism.

The second insight that is most interesting is the strange profile of the men who staff these teams. They look like buffed up thugs. But, they are well educated with college and occasional masters degrees in engineering, linguistic, and political science. They are anti-establishment and love their independence from the Pentagon bureaucracy. They have beards, and do not wear soldier's helmets, but caps instead. They feel the helmets don't protect them anyway, so they would rather be comfortable. Finally, they are Christians. They explain their maverick profile by stating that in general the more educated the more risk averse one becomes. This is unless one has religion. Their religion allows them to have a sense of mission greater than themselves and to take on risk that secular people would not take. Finally the beard thing is to fit in with the local Muslim population. This is because their goal is to befriend the local population, assist them in building infrastructure including schools and hospitals. And, by doing so attempt to isolate the violent fundamentalist elements.

Not all is perfect with these teams. Kaplan mentions they suffer from lack of linguistic skills that hinders their integration with locals. That's not a surprise. Pashto, Persian and Arabic dialects are not readily taught in the U.S. Nevertheless, after reading this book you feel that the political return on investment on these special ops is far greater than in investing in more tanks.

If you liked this book, I also recommend Robert Kaplan's "The Coming Anarchy," Thomas X. Hammes's "The Sling and the Stone," and van Crevald's "The Transformation of War." All these books focus on the changing nature of military conflict in the 21st century. Of the three books, van Crevald's is especially prescient as it was written nearly a decade before 9/11. While the others were written after.

18 of 18 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fascinating fieldwork, credible conclusions, January 16, 2006

By	Kenneth Posner (NYC) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Kaplan starts with the premise that the US is de facto an empire, and he argues that we can best understand the outlines of this "ambiguous process" by observing the beliefs and actions of soldiers in the field. Some may disagree with this opinion or may distrust Kaplan's admiration for the military people he encounters. But few of us are likely to grab a backpack and head out into the field the way Kaplan does. We can learn a great deal by following him in his travels.

And he takes the reader on a tour of some very tough and distant places, like Yemen, the Horn of Africa, Columbia, the Phillippines, Afghanistan, and the China/Mongolian border. The narrative concludes in Iraq, where the author follows a Marine battalion into combat as it attempts to expel insurgents from the town of Fallujah.

Along the way, we learn something about the people and culture of the US military. Among the Green Berets, Kaplan meet a succession of tough, smart, and dedicated individuals. We discover something about the influence of Christian fundamentalism and southern culture in their ranks. It is clear that Kaplan respects them. But he is critical of what he perceives as an excess of gung-ho attitude and a shortage of linguistic and cultural skills.

We also learn something about the intractable problems of fighting terrorism in third-world countries: the deep hold of tribal politics, the prevalence of corruption, poverty, the sway of vicious criminal organizations, like FARC, which kidnaps children for its ranks threatening to kill their families if they run away. Or the impossible geography of places like the Phillippines, Yemen, or Columbia, where central governments cannot physically project power much beyond the capital. Much of the world falls under a "Hobbesian state of affairs."

As a result of his travels, Kaplan comes to certain conclusions about the application of military power. He is critical of the bureaucracy of the US military, which appears "still organized for World War II and the Korean War, with too many chiefs at massive rear bases and too few Indians at the edges." He comes to this conclusion after visiting the posh facilities of the Bagram support base in Afghanistan, then finding special forces operators held back from aggressive patrolling tactics by multiple layers of oversight. Rather than nation-building, Kaplan also favors narrow objectives and an "off camera" strategy, i.e., quietly training and developing relationships with indigenous soldiers (the traditional Green Beret mission).

I devoured the book in two days, completely enthralled by the exotic and dangerous landscapes through which the author journeyed, the interesting personalities he encountered, and the deft weaving of his narrative together with an explanation of the history and current affairs of these regions. As I closed the cover, I thought to myself that, whether we think of the US as an empire or not, we ought to be very careful in choosing the missions for our dedicated military people. The threat is endless, but our resources are not.