Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War (Hardcover)

~ (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

In 1999, an Iraqi refugee, soon code-named Curveball, told German intelligence agents of his work on an ongoing Iraqi program that produced biological weapons in mobile laboratories. His claims electrified the CIA, which had little good intelligence about Saddam Hussein's regime and was fixated on the threat of Iraqi WMDs, which later became a centerpiece in the Bush administration's case for invading Iraq. It was only after American occupation forces failed to find any mobile germ-warfare labs—or other WMDs—that prewar warnings about Curveball's heavy drinking and mental instability, and the nagging gaps and contradictions in his story, were taken seriously. In this engrossing account, Los Angeles Times correspondent Drogin paints an intimate and revealing portrait of the workings and dysfunctions of the intelligence community. Hobbled by internal and external turf battles and hypnotized by pet theories, the CIA—including director George Tenet, whose reputation suffers another black eye here—ignored skeptics, the author contends, and fell in love with a dubious source who told the agency and the White House what they wanted to hear. Instead of connecting the dots, Drogin argues, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. (Oct. 16)
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Product Description

Curveball answers the crucial question of the Iraq war: How and why was America’s intelligence so catastrophically wrong? In this dramatic and explosive book, award-winning Los Angeles Times reporter Bob Drogin delivers a narrative that takes us to Europe, the Middle East, and deep inside the CIA to find the truth–the truth about the lies and self-deception that led us into a military and political nightmare.

In 1999, a mysterious Iraqi applies for political asylum in Munich. The young chemical engineer offers compelling testimony of Saddam Hussein’s secret program to build weapons of mass destruction. He claims that the dictator has constructed germ factories on trucks, creating a deadly hell on wheels. His grateful German hosts pass his account to their CIA counterparts but deny the Americans access to their superstar informant. The Americans nevertheless give the defector his unforgettable code name: Curveball.
The case lies dormant until after 9/11, when the Bush administration turns its attention to Iraq. Determined to invade, Bush’s people seize on Curveball’s story about mobile germ labs–even though it has begun to unravel. Ignoring a flood of warnings about the informant’s credibility, the CIA allows President Bush to cite Curveball’s unconfirmed claims in a State of the Union speech. Finally, Secretary of State Colin Powell highlights the Iraqi’s “eyewitness” account during his historic address to the U.N. Security Council. Yet the entire case is based on a fraud. America’s vast intelligence apparatus conjured up demons that did not exist. And the proof was clear before the war.

Most of the events and conversations presented here have not been reported before. The portrayals–from an obdurate president to a bamboozled secretary of state to a bungling CIA director to case handlers conned by their snitch–are vivid and exciting. Curveball reads like an investigative spy thriller. Fast-paced and engrossing, it is an inside story of intrigue and incompetence at the highest levels of government. At a time when Americans demand answers, this authoritative book provides them with clarity and conviction.

Just when you thought the WMD debacle couldn’t get worse, here comes veteran Los Angeles Times national-security correspondent Drogin’s look at just who got the stories going in the first place…Simultaneously sobering and infuriating–essential reading for those who follow the headlines. 
--Kirkus Reviews

In this engrossing account, Los Angeles Times correspondent Drogin paints an intimate and revealing portrait of the workings and dysfunctions of the intelligence community.
--Publishers Weekly

Enter Bob Drogin's new book… an insightful and compelling account of one crucial component of the war's origins… Had Drogin merely pieced together Curveball's story, it alone would have made for a thrilling book. But he provides something more: a frightening glimpse at how easily we could make the same mistakes again…The real value of Drogin's book is its meticulous demonstration that bureaucratic imperative often leads to self-delusion.
--Washington Monthly

Drogin delivers a startling account of this fateful intelligence snafu.
--Booklist

But, again, the intelligence community was disappointing the Bush administration… Los Angeles Times correspondent Bob Drogin lays out the whole sorry tale in his forthcoming book, "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War." --Newsweek

By the time you finish this book you will be shaking your head with wonder, or perhaps you will be shaking with anger, about the misadventures that preceded the misadventures in Iraq. This book is so powerful, it almost refutes its subtitle: The man called Curveball did not cause a war; he became a pretext -- one among many.
-- George F. Will
There used to be an old rule that *real* journalists lived by: 'All governments are run by liars, and nothing they say should be believed.' We've come a long way from those days, to a media that has been cowed into submission and accepting the 'official story.' Thank God for Bob Drogin and his refusal to believe. It's journalists like him and books like CURVEBALL that give many of us a sliver of hope that we can turn things around. --Michael Moore, Director of "Fahrenheit 9/11," and "Sicko"
Curveball is the factual equivalent of Catch 22. It is impossible to read this book and then look at our world leaders without thinking, "F*ck. Oh f*ck. Oh my God, oh f*ck."
--Mark Thomas, comedian and political activist

…the biggest fiasco in the history of secret intelligence over 500 years.
--Frederick Forsyth, author of The Day Of The Jackal, The Odessa File and The Afghan

Bob Drogin struck journalistic gold in this story of a conman who told his intelligence handlers exactly what they wanted to hear. If this twisted tale could be read simply as a thrilling farce it would be pure delight -- but much more importantly, it is a history of our time.
--Philip Gourevitch

Bob Drogin is a brilliant reporter. In Curveball, he has produced a riveting and important investigation, full of startling and carefully documented detail, laying bare the anatomy of an intelligence failure and its contribution to a catastrophic war.
--Steve Coll, author of GHOST WARS: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001

Bob Drogin accomplishes what only the best reporters can; he forces you to wonder how he could possibly know that! If you want to know how the CIA could have possibly been so wrong about Iraq, here is a big part of the answer.
--Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk Down

A crucial study in the political manipulation of intelligence, understanding how Curveball got us into Iraq will arm us for the next round of lies coming out of Washington.
--Robert Baer, author of See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism

Here we go again: the self-deception, the corruption of intelligence, and the abuse of authority, amid a full cast of the usual suspects in the White House and the Pentagon. It's a crucially important story, and it comes wonderfully alive in Curveball. It would be almost fun to read if the message wasn't so important–and so devastating to the integrity of the American processes.
--Seymour M. Hersh, author of Chain of Command: The Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib

Curveball is a true story, marvelously reported, about a descent into the netherworld of deceit and duplicity, where the lies of a single man in an interrogation cell in Germany grew like a malign spore in the dark. When it emerged, on the lips of the President and the Secretary of State, it infected the course of world events.
--Jonathan Harr, author of A Civil Action and The Lost Painting.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 368 pages
• Publisher: Random House; 1 edition (October 16, 2007)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1400065836
• ISBN-13: 978-1400065837
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.3 x 1.3 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.7 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (19 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #298,683 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

15 of 17 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Another tale of American intelligence failures in Iraq, October 26, 2007

By	Steven A. Peterson (Hershey, PA (Born in Kewanee, IL)) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

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Bob Drogin's "Curveball: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man Who Caused a War" is an examination of the refugee from Iraq, code named "Curveball," who contended that he had been involved in WMD biological warfare research and development. It is also another story of serious mistakes by American intelligence in the run up to the Iraq invasion after 9/11.

In 1999, the Iraqi refugee ended up linking up with German intelligence. As the agents worked with the man who became code named "Curveball," they were convinced that he must be telling the truth about knowledge of biological weapons developed by Iraq. He was an engineer and, he claimed, had been involved in the development of systems to deliver biological agents in warfare. The details convinced the Germans; they communicated with American and British intelligence, but tended to jealously guard their source and not let other intelligence services get near him. However, over time, the German intelligence team began to wonder more and more about his veracity.

After 9/11 and as the Bush Administration looked more closely at the possibility of regime change in Iraq, Curveball's story became an integral part of the case being developed against Saddam Hussein and justifying invasion. The threat of WMD was a key part of the justification for war. And Curveball's reports were accorded great weight in the United States.

The book is written well. Its dependence on sources, some anonymous, who may have axes to grind is obviously something that readers must keep in mind. However, this is yet another in a series of books that clearly suggests that the Administration actively sought out information to support its already made decision to invade Iraq. And even though there might be axes to grind, the momentum of Drogin's historical account seems to be pretty well supported.

Drogin concludes by observing that many criticized American intelligence and law enforcement agencies for not connecting the dots before 9/11. However, he claims (Page 281), "In this case, the CIA and its allies made up the dots. Iraq had never built or planned to build any mobile weapons labs. It had no other WMD. The U.S. intelligence apparatus, created to protect the nation, conjured up demons that did not exist. America never before has squandered so much blood, treasure, and credibility on a delusion." Harsh words. Also, was he actually the person who, as per the title, "caused a war"? It appears that the Administration had already made up its mind and Curveball's "intelligence" was simply one more argument in favor. Readers must decide if the author accurately makes his case.

13 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Good but not that well-sourced itself, October 27, 2007

By	maskirovka (Alexandria, Virginia) - See all my reviews

The Curveball saga is a watershed in the history of the American Intelligence Community. Despite multiple blinking warning signs about the credibility of this "source," the IC wound up using the "intelligence" provided by him with the end result of the IC looking very, very foolish.

Drogin's book is a pretty good recounting of that sad little saga. He sheds particularly interesting light on how the Germans handled Curveball and the poisonous relations between the CIA and the Bundesnachrichtungdienst (German Federal Intelligence Service).

Beyond that, Drogin's book does not tell much more than what the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the WMD Commission reports (issued in 2004 and 2005 respectively) do. Both of those reports are available on the Internet and are written with remarkable clarity.

In my opinion, the book suffers from the fact that Drogin has only talked with some of the players in this particular fiasco ...namely David Kay and Tyler Drumheller. Both of them are out of government and have some axes to grind. In contrast, some of the people who they locked horns with are still in government and would find themselves in deep trouble if they went on record with Drogin.

I also think that Drogin's book suffers from a remarkable flaw given the fact that it is such a devastating critique of the IC's inept use of sources. He doesn't document his own research very well in the book. For example, there is a twelve-page section of the book that doesn't have a single endnote (he uses endnotes instead of footnotes or chapter notes). There are many other parts of the book where I found myself wondering where Drogin got a particular piece of information or interpretation and found the endnotes singularly unhelpful. Now, I suppose some of this is because Drogin is protecting sources "that must remain anonymous," but why not say that instead of leaving the reader scratching his or her head? I work in the IC, and in the aftermath of the Iraq WMD debacle, failure to source one's analysis (which is what Drogin is guilty of in many cases) is simply unacceptable.

I also think that Drogin and some of the reviewers of this book are too eager to blame the Curveball fiasco on Bush and the top tier of the administration. My feeling is that Curveball got into the system and got upheld because of faults within the bureaucratic layers of the IC, not because of political machinations at the top.

This being said: it's a good read, and I think that people will learn from it. But they ought to take the hard lesson that the IC learned from this sorry episode to heart when evaluating some of the author's un-sourced stuff: namely, just because it sounds good doesn't mean it's true.

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Curveball as a Sucker Ptich, November 9, 2007

By	Retired Reader (New Mexico) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)

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This book, rather like Caesar's Gaul, is divided into three parts. The first part explains how an Iraqi defector given the cover name `Curveball' ended up in Germany and how the German national intelligence service (BND) choose to exploit him. The second part concerns how the CIA reacted to the claims of Iraqi bio-warfare capabilities made by Curveball. The third part concerns the fruitless search for any indicators of viable Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or facilities to produce them. The book is quite well written and provides a lot of information about the whole sorry Curveball affair. Yet a word of warning is in order. Its author is a reporter not an intelligence operative, his windows into the secret world of intelligence are provided by informants who were or are on the inside of that world and who, like Curveball himself, have their own agendas. The book is enlivened by pieces of supposed dialogs and personal characterizations which may or may not be accurate. Drogin is too good a reporter not to know this, but too good a writer not to include them. They add drama and verisimilitude to his story.

The book is a good read, but also supports a number of other accounts of the incredible ineptitude of CIA's Directorate of Intelligence. Apparently the WMD team at CIA (WINPAC) had (has?) no idea of how to transform information into intelligence. They made the leap of logic that since the second hand reports of Curveball's debriefings (codenamed the `Hortensia' series) appeared internally consistent they constituted solid intelligence. They by all accounts made no real effort to verify or enhance these reports by other means and dismissed imagery information that did not support Curveball's assertions as Iraqi denial and deception. They also made no effort to consider if Curveball's assertions really made any sense given the nature of weaponization of biological agents. Late in the game they did provide the Bechtel Corporation with reproductions of Curveball's drawing of what he claimed were mobile production facilities (18Wheeler Trucks) and were reassured that yes they could be used for that purpose. What they did not ask and Bechtel did volunteer was what else could they be used for and how practical would it be run trucks full of bio-toxins over notoriously bad road. Finally they apparently made no effort to determine if Iraq had been seeking the technologies associated with bio-toxin production (e.g. containment technologies, vaccines, or protective gear). The National Intelligence Council (NIC) that produced the infamous pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) clearly did not know the difference between information and intelligence either. This is a sorry state of affairs indeed and not likely to be improved by the cosmetic reforms that have been undertaken by the U.S. Intelligence System since 9/11.