|
|
10 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
An Excellent Collection of High Quality Papers, August 6, 2005
The human brain is the result of a long and complex evolutionary trajectory. Evolutionary psychology attempts to use this fact to understand the human brain's particular capacities and limitations. Evolutionary psychology has provided many key insights into human behavior. First, since the human brain is extremely costly to nurture and maintain, its general contribution to human fitness must be high, and hence the brain must be an adaptation to the particular conditions under which our species evolved. Therefore, understanding these conditions may shed strong light on human psychology. Second, the human brain's information processing capacities are likely to be closely associated with the particular adaptive needs of our species, rather than being a simple, general purpose information processor. Thus, rather than being infinitely malleable, humans are predisposed to behave in certain ways in the sense that under a very broad range of environmental conditions some behaviors will be virtually universally exhibited and others will be extremely rare, while behaviors to which we are not predisposed will be exhibited either not at all, or only in a very restricted set of environmental circumstances. In short, evolutionary psychology holds that a consideration of our evolutionary history is extremely powerful in generating plausible hypotheses concerning human psychology that can be tested using the standard tools of experimental research.
Those who reject evolutionary psychology in the general form stated above are generally either ill-informed or have a political or religious agenda that clouds their scientific judgment. Creationists, for instance, cannot accept evolutionary psychology. Nor can Marxists or extreme cultural determinists, for whom human nature either does not exist, or takes the form of infinite cultural malleability.
Evolutionary psychology, then, is simply one more tool (albeit an unusually powerful tool) in the behavioral scientist's repertoire. However, a small but highly creative and extremely influential group of evolutionary psychologists, including D. Buss, J. Tooby, L. Cosmides, D. Symons, S. Pinker have constructed a version of evolutionary psychology that includes key assertions that are highly contentious and many believe are incorrect. These thinkers appear to many scientists (myself included) to form a sort of scientific cult: they always agree with each other, they reject any outside criticism, their message never changes, and they recruit by directly training new members rather than having their ideas accepted by the general scientific community. To distinguish this group from evolutionary psychology in general, I will call their doctrine EvPsych (the book under review calls them "narrow" evolutionary psychologists, a particularly poor choice of words, since they are anything but narrow, and Kluwer, the bureaucratic and infinitely stuffy publisher, true to form, insists on an identically worded disclaimer at the head of each chapter of book, saying that by "narrow" they do not mean "narrow.")
EvPsychers believe that (a) human culture is an effect of human genetics, and culture explains nothing important concerning human behavior; (b) human behavior in general is an adaptation to the specific conditions of the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation (EEA) in which our species emerged from other hominid species; (c) the human brain is a highly modular organ, each module having emerged to solve a particular evolutionary problem; (d) for this reason, the human brain lacks all the characteristics of a general information processor, and cannot solve any problems other than those that challenged our existence in our dim evolutionary past. In particular, we are doomed to apply old, generally ineffective, methods to the solution of new problems. This is the tragedy of the human condition.
EvPsych is wrong in each of the above assertions, and everyone knows this except the EvPsychers themselves. Moreover, they have hindered the general integration of evolutionary psychology into the repertoire of behavioral science with their tendentious and outlandish claims. The book under review is an important contribution towards restoring evolutionary psychology to its rightful place in the behavioral sciences. It's main attraction is that the editors, Steven Scher and Fredrick Rauscher, recognize that the best critique is a cogent alternative, and this is exactly what the various chapter of the book provide for us. I do not have the space to comment on each of the thirteen chapters, but a few prominent themes emerge.
First, several authors challenge the coarse-grained modularity assumption of EvPsych, using our contemporary neuroscientific and developmental knowledge of the structure of the brain. This includes especially stunning contributions of Steven Quarts, William Bechtel, and Jennifer Mundale. These authors present the state of the art understanding of the neurological development of the human brain from embryo to adult form, and argue for a "developmental evolutionary psychology" in which the brain has a fine-grained modularity that results from the dynamic interaction between organism and environment during growth and maturation of the individual.
Second, several authors challenge the "gene-centered" view of evolution, which the EvPsychers borrowed from Dawkins, Hamilton, Wilson and other biologists who dominated evolutionary theory in the 1960's and 1970's. Thus Linnda Caporeal argues for "repeated assembly," which is a form of what is commonly known as gene-culture coevolution, and David Sloan Wilson points out the errors in reasoning that lead gene-centered theorists to reject truly altruistic (other-regarding) behavior in humans. Sarah Blaffer Hrdy exposes the sexual stereotypes of the gene-centered approach by reviewing the evidence on female mate choice.
Several chapters are philosophically-motivated critiques of EvPsych. I do not believe that philosophers ever contribute by criticizing scientific theories, and I think my view is confirmed by this book.
I quite recommend this book to those who are new to the field. There is some excellent material here. A major drawback is the publisher, Kluwer. The book is grossly overpriced, there is no index or general bibliography, and the typeface is cramped and low resolution.
|