None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam (Hardcover)

~ (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

Few Americans knew more about the inner workings of American Vietnam War policy over as long a period of time as Allen did. A WWII navy veteran, Allen went to work as a midlevel civilian defense department intelligence analyst after the war. In 1964, he switched to the CIA, where he served in a similar capacity until his 1979 retirement. Allen spent virtually all of that time in Vietnam and Washington compiling firsthand intelligence about the French and American wars; he tells (what seems like) all in this wide-ranging, illuminating memoir. One message shines through this recounting of more than three decades of American policy-making in Vietnam, what Allen calls the "unwillingness of U.S. officials to confront reality in Vietnam." Allen names the names of those officials. They included the three top Army generals sent to South Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s (Joseph "Lightning Joe" Collins, Samuel T. "Hanging Sam" Williams and Paul Harkins); the ambassador to South Vietnam in 1964-1965, Maxwell Taylor; and Johnson administration heavies Walt Rostow, McGeorge and William Bundy and Robert S. McNamara. Those men and many others preferred to make their own strategic and tactical decisions, nearly all of which were doomed. Allen makes a strong case that the "failure" of the book's subtitle was not one of misreported or incorrect analysis; it was of not being able to convince the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon administrations that they were pursuing the wrong course in the Vietnam War. (Sept. 14) Forecast: While this is not the less technical analysis most lay readers will want, historians and other pundits will add it to their arsenals in the continuing re-evaluation of the war and its aging and departed players.
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.

From Library Journal

The author, who specialized in Vietnam during his 30 years (1949-79) in military intelligence and the CIA, lays the blame for America's tragic failure in that country squarely on the heads of top policymakers in Washington, DC. He argues that in their frantic search for victory over communism, they ignored professional experts at home and in Indochina who offered opinions and information contrary to what the White House wanted to hear. Allen does believe that the government has learned from that giant mistake and is now more likely to incorporate intelligence into its deliberations. This manuscript was originally written over 20 years ago but has been revised and updated since. It is essentially correct in its arguments but could have been better documented (some footnotes are included, although one might have expected more references). It is also not entirely original, though it does give an insider's view. Other works in this category include Frank Snepp's Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End (o.p.), Sam Adams's War of Numbers: An Intelligence Memoir (LJ 4/15/94), Warner Smith's Covert Warrior: A Vietnam Memoir (o.p.), and James E. Parker's Last Man Out: A Personal Account of the Vietnam War (LJ 3/15/97). Suitable for public and academic libraries. (Index and maps not seen.) Daniel K. Blewett, Coll. of DuPage Lib., Glen Ellyn, IL
Copyright 2001 Reed Business Information, Inc.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 320 pages
• Publisher: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher (October 25, 2001)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1566633877
• ISBN-13: 978-1566633871
• Product Dimensions: 9.7 x 6.1 x 1.1 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.3 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.9 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (9 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #833,388 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

20 of 21 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Balanced Deep Trustworthy View of Policy-Intelligence Gaps, February 8, 2002

By	Robert D. Steele (Oakton, VA United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 50 REVIEWER)

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This book is destined to be a classic. There is no other person who spent over 17 years focused on intelligence about Viet-Nam, and very rare is the person who can say they have spent over 50 years in continuous intelligence appointments, 20 of them after retirement. It is a personal story that I consider to be balanced, deep, and trustworthy. While it has gaps, these are easily addressed by reading, at least on the intelligence side, such books at Bruce Jones' "War Without Windows", Orrin DeForest's "SLOW BURN", Douglas Valentine's "The Phoenix Program", Jim Witz's "The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War", Tom Mangold & John Penycate's "The Tunnels of Chu Chi", and the Viet-Nam portions of Jim Bamford's "Body of Secrets."

I mention these books in part to emphasize that George Allen has produced a book that will stand the test of time and should be regarded as an exceptional historical, policy, intelligence, and public administration case study. It is truly humbling and sobering to read such a calm, complete, and broad treatment of the history of both American intelligence in relation to Viet-Nam, and the consistent manner in which policy-makers refused to listen to accurate intelligence estimates, while their Generals and Ambassadors steadfastly "cooked the books." The manipulation of truth from the Saigon end, and the refusal to listen to truth on the Washington end, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, Vietnamese, Loatian, Cambodian, and American, as well as allied nationalities.

This book is gripping. I could not put it down. It is one of the most serious personal accounts I have ever read where the vivid realities of intelligence, ignorance, and policy come together. The author excells at painting the details in context, and his many specific portraits of key individuals and situations are superior.

This book is relevant to today's war on terrorism. Many of the same issues prevail--rather than enumerate them, I will give this book my very highest mark, and simply say that you cannot understand intelligence, or the intelligence-policy relationship, without having absorbed all this author has to say.

He's hit it out of the park. Every voter who wonders what it will take to hold politicians accountable for "due diligence" in decision-making, needs to read this book.

12 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars There Was No "Intelligence Failure", September 28, 2004

By	Samurai - See all my reviews

An outrageously good book! George Allen offers us a look into the notoriously secretive world of intellence analysts. What is stunning is that just as I suspected, there was no "failure" on the part of the Intelligence Community in Vietnam. The CIA predicted,prior to US involvement, that we could not stop the spread of Communism in Vietnam. As far back as the Indochina War, intelligence analysts, like George Allen, had observed the French struggle against a Viet Minh insurgency that was determined, well-supplied, and well-led. The almost endless supply of weapons flowing in from China (and Russia?) meant that the Viet Mihn could outlast us. All this was communicated to the higher ups including "the best and the brightest". But Hubris (sound familiar?) got in the way. Good intelligence was ignored. Rosy, upbeat reports were printed by Washington to coverup a fiasco. Career obsessed generals placed too much confidence in technology and forgot about man's Darwinian capacity to adapt and thus survive. Reading this book was like reading a memoir on the Iraq War. Let's hope Iraq is not another Vietnam. However, I'm haunted by Hegel's famous line: "History shows us that people don't learn anything from History."

10 of 11 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Amazing book on US involvement in Vietnam, June 21, 2003

By	Frank (Stockton CA) - See all my reviews

I have read a number of books on the US involvement in Vietnam, some of them quite good. This is the best, the ONE book you should read if you're limited to one book. Other recommended books are _To Bear Any Burden: The Vietnam War and Its Aftermath in the Words of Forty-Seven Americans and Southeast Asians_ by Al Santoli, and _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.
With first-hand knowledge -- not just reading from second-hand sources or going through one general's papers -- George Allen describes what happened in Vietnam from before Dien Bien Phu through the fall of Saigon. He has detailed information on the US side, and informed accounts of what the North Vietnamese strategy was. He introduces us to the personalities and events so important to the way Vietnam happened, all in a very engaging and readable style.
One of the most fascinating parts of the book is the listing of the many times the US took action without a full examination of the complete situation. Allen writes, "In foreign affairs and national security matters, there is no substitute for thorough, conscientious, and objective analysis of all the factors bearing on a decision, of alternative courses of action, and of a weighing of the consequences -- domestic as well as foreign -- of all the options available." This was rarely done in Vietnam. Among the hasty decisions the US made were to consider the northern Vietnamese as part of a monolithic Communist threat, to aid the French in maintaining their empire, to take over the French role in Vietnam, to give the green light to the Diem coup, to not realize the problems the lack of post-Diem leadership would create, to not encourage South Vietnam to develop an effective political message and a stable appealing government, to appear to favor Thieu as a candidate (by proclaiming neutrality), by failing to build an effective intelligence system in south Vietnam, by US in-country personnel repeatedly lying to their superiors by exaggerating US success and minimizing enemy strength (thus depriving themselves of the needed resources to meet the real threat), by the false "light at the end of the tunnel" PR campaign (setting the government up for an even bigger fall when Tet '68 came), by giving South Vietnam false assurances of our post-withdrawal support, etc. etc.
These just touch the surface. Allen explains how even minor decisions like insisting ARVN units included artillery support, and not replacing ONE incompetent colonel, possibly had very significant bad effects. I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in Vietnam, recent American history, or politics. It should be required reading for US policy-makers.
Hopefully someday we'll have someone the caliber of George Allen tell the true story of 9/11, Afghanistan and Iraq.