Mao: A Reinterpretation (Paperback)

by Lee Feigon (Author)
Key Phrases: rectification movement, new youth, encirclement campaign, Cultural Revolution, Soviet Union, Great Leap (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal
In recent years, with newly released official documents and insights from those who knew Mao Zedong personally, China scholars have written biographies of Mao for general consumption. Two such books are Jonathan Spence's Mao Zedong and Philip Short's Mao: A Life. In the present biography, Feigon (China Rising) presents what most China scholars undoubtedly will consider an incorrect portrait of Mao-as a man who cared deeply about his family, tried to implant Stalin's ideas in the Chinese mind, and, upon realizing his mistake in doing that, led the nation into the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which Feigon asserts was truly responsible for carving the current path toward economic advancement in China. He posits that Mao, not Deng Xiaoping, was open to establishing a relationship with the United States. Though Feigon's interpretation is wrong, he develops innovative ideas about how to understand the man's life. For example, scholars generally agree that Mao was committed to education-but how does that play out in practice against political struggles in China? Although Feigon constantly points out that Mao was "different from" Stalin, he does not follow through with convincing analysis. Perhaps a review of both leaders' activities within their respective cultures and bureaucracies (see Klaus Mehnert's classic study, Peking and Moscow) would provide a starting point. An optional purchase.
Peggy Spitzer Christoff, Library of Congress
Copyright 2002 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From Booklist
When alive, Mao had no shortage of admirers among Western intellectuals, from Edgar Snow in the 1930s to French existentialists in the 1960s; in death, Mao may count China scholar Feigon among his friends. Positive adjectives about Mao ("prescient," "levelheaded") recur in Feigon's biographical narrative, whose thesis is that Mao bloomed late as a Marxist theoretician; established the People's Republic of China along Stalinist lines; and ruing that, tried to dismantle Stalinist bureaucracies. Noting the Stalin-style establishment of the PRC in the early 1950s, in which more than five million Chinese may have been executed, Feigon is less censorious about the death tolls of Mao's movements, such as the Great Leap Forward (about 30 million) and the Cultural Revolution (about a half million). That's because he's impressed with the educational, cultural, and even economic achievements he argues occurred during these times. Readers less inclined to take a detour around mass murder may not be so impressed with the provocative arguments Feigon advances. A controversial biography that may generate requests at the circulation desk. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

• Paperback: 240 pages
• Publisher: Ivan R. Dee, Publisher (September 25, 2003)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1566635225
• ISBN-13: 978-1566635226
• Product Dimensions: 8.2 x 5.3 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 9.6 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (3 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #1,504,574 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4.0 out of 5 stars Mao - Stalinist totalitarian, populist rebel, or both?, December 7, 2002

By	Brian K. Turner (Florida) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Mao: A Reinterpretation (Hardcover)

Lee Feigon's book is not an in-depth analysis of the underlying Chinese and western political philosophies that influenced Mao. (For intro into that, see the outstanding _Maoism and Chinese Culture_ by Zongli Tang and Bing Zuo for the diverse Chinese philosophic influences; Maurice Meisner's and Nick Knight's writings for two opposing takes on the nature of Mao's Marxism; Stuart Schram for a general overview; Anita Andrew and John Rapp for an argument that Mao's ruling style was native autocracy). Feigon chooses to focus on the narrower questions--Was Mao China's Stalin, and his intra-party opponents always more benevolent? Was the Cultural Revolution simply a repeat of Stalin's purges of the late 1930s, or was their some other purpose?

In the 1970s, it was trendy to uncritically praise Mao's China as a new kind of society where everyone selflessly struggled for the common good and avoided the usual social blights associated with development. Even those with a more balanced view still understated the repressive side. Through the mid-1980s a more ambivalent view prevailed. Now, the common view is that Mao was a monster like Stalin who pushed more reasonable leaders like Liu Shaoqi out of the way in the process of destroying China. Some even say Mao was much worse than Stalin. Feigon's purpose is to argue against this new popular view. He does so well, but the book lacks balance, which is a significant flaw, and the fact that others like Jung Chang, Jasper Becker, Zhengyuan Fu or Steven Mosher are polemical in the other direction is no justification, nor is the fact that most people have heard that side repeatedly already. For this kind of subject matter, one should write assuming the book may be the only book on the subject for a particular reader.

Half of this book is a biography of Mao and a history of the Chinese revolution up to 1949. It seems directed at those with only a moderate degree of knowledge about 20th century China. Yet for the well read, a few conventional wisdoms are debunked. For more detail on this period, see Philip Short's biography.

For the post-1949 period, Feigon argues that: a) Mao and the PRC were Stalinist through 1957, after which Mao tried to break with Stalinism b) The break with Stalinism left an important residual impact that indirectly contributed to the struggle for democracy and modernization.

Feigon describes the establishment of a Soviet-style state in the early to mid-1950s, and how the 1956 "Hundred Flowers" period was a minor and very limited break with this model. The party pressured Mao to let them silence those daring to criticize the infallible Leninist vanguard. Unsurprisingly, Mao caved and endorsed the "anti-rightist" witch hunts of 1957-58, led with great relish by Deng Xiaoping. The "pragmatists" used the campaign to silence intellectuals and repress workers, even though Mao had insisted that workers be free to strike (later having it written into the constitution, which Deng removed in 1982).

In the Cultural Revolution chapter, Feigon argues that Mao, realizing how entrenched and elitist the party's bureaucracy had become, came to believe only a period of (managed) mass rebellion could shake things up enough to prevent the permanent Sovietization of the PRC. Though Feigon concedes that the CR did not leave any lasting new institutions that could serve as even a basis for future democratic reforms, he argues for two positive political legacies of the CR: 1) a weakened bureaucracy 2) permanent infusion into the political culture the idea that the people have a right to criticize or rebel against autocratic or corrupt officials. Even the exiled dissident intellectual Fang Lizhi acknowledged the latter (though doesn't give Mao credit). The CR also wiped out a lot of rural illiteracy, bridged the rural/urban health care gap, and left a basic industrial base for the reformers to build on.

This argument has some validity, but is oversimplified. There was a lot of bottom-up populism, and the conservative (party-defending "red class") red guards were different from the rebel (anti-pre-CR officials) red guards and worker rebel groups, an often ignored fact. (The latter were the primary victims of the CR, at the hands of the anti-CR army). However, there was also a lot of unprincipled horizontal factional warfare (Andrew Walder has recently challenged the class-based "social interpretation" for Beijing). And more crucially, Mao was apparently no great friend of the rebels, double crossing them repeatedly and doing nothing to prevent their large scale repression and massacre. (For more on this, see Anita Chan "Dispelling Misconceptions About the Red Guard Movement", Journal of Contemporary China, Fall 1992; and Peter Moody Jr.'s follow-up, Fall 1993, and the classic volume on the CR by Hong Yung Lee). Further, exactly how anti-bureaucratic was Mao? The post-1969 reconstructed bureaucracy remained as enormous, intrusive, and arbitrary as ever (though particular rural micro examples can be found to support the argument, e.g. Han Dongping's village study, which Feigon cites extensively).

Should Mao get at least a little credit for planting the seeds of populist anti-Stalinist outlooks, even if he betrayed them, because others took them much further in 1974, 1976, 1979-80, 1989 and 2002, or was it all just a Legalist power play? This is an interesting question debated by scholars on Mao and the CR. Feigon's book is a contribution, though one-sided.

5 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Provides a different view of the leader, January 11, 2003

By	Midwest Book Review (Oregon, WI USA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Mao: A Reinterpretation (Hardcover)

Mao: A Reinterpretation is a new political biography of Mao which provides a different view of the leader as a committed revolutionary who contributed to China's history and culture. The real Mao wasn't a genius, nor the evil leader later biographies have portrayed. This reinterpretation examines both his life and the lasting effects of his ideals.

3.0 out of 5 stars Mao was not evil?, June 13, 2009

By	Kevin M Quigg (Carol Stream, Illinois United States) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)

There are always those out there that state things like "At least Hitler kept Germany from turning Communist or Stalin turned a backward society to the future". What these apologists are staying is that it was alright to murder and kill to turn society around. In this respect, it is the ends justify the means. Well, Mao may have done some things right, but he was a cold blooded killer who eliminated 30 million people in his great leap backward. Mao was a leader who was responsible for the deaths of millions. If he was not aware of what his policies did to his nation, that does not alleviate the guilt. I respect the authors opinions, although I don't fully believe them. Mao has blood on his hands. I saw Mao (or at least his body) in 2008, so the fascination with this leader's rule is as great as ever. We should just remember how many people died as a result of his rule.

This is an interesting intrepretation of Mao. Although Feigon may be right on some points, he ultimate summary of Mao is wrong. An interesting read.