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51 of 57 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A Classic War Memoir, September 14, 2001
Captain Charles B. MacDonald first commanded I Company, 3-23rd IN, 2nd ID from October 1944 to January 1945 and later G Company, 2-23rd IN from March to May 1945. This memoir was written a few years after the war when recollections were still sharp and resulted in a very detailed account of what it was like to take command of a line infantry company and lead it into battle. This book is a must-read for all army officers who seek to command at company-level and it is also informative for military historians as well. In comparison to the more recent Band of Brothers, ostensibly a company-level account of E Company, 506th PIR's actions during the same period, Charles MacDonald's book is clearly superior. In fact, Company Commander is everything Band of Brothers is not: accurate, objective and informative. Unlike BOB, MacDonald does not claim that the companies he commanded were anything special or that he demonstrated heroic leadership (he did win the silver star in the Battle of the Bulge). Instead, the author is very honest, admitting his apprehension and anxiety about commanding infantry on the front line. Although there is some tension with battalion and regimental headquarters, mostly about ill-considered orders and creature comforts, there is not the character assassination that is so prevalent in BOB; Macdonald was career army and he wasn't going to make points by ridiculing superiors. MacDonald arrived as a replacement and took command of I Company just as the unit was conducting a relief-in-place of another US unit in some captured positions in the Siegfried Line in the Ardennes. While civilian readers may find the first 100 pages devoted to this "quiet time" to be dull, military readers will not. MacDonald does a superb job describing the nuts-and-bolts of a relief-in-place in a difficult position that is under enemy observation and then the daily grind to improve the position. Readers who believe that US units in the Ardennes in the fall of 1944 had it easy should reconsider. MacDonald's unit was under constant mortar and sniper fire, poor weather caused much sickness among the troops and supplies were limited. On 17 December 1944, MacDonald's battalion was hastily shifted to blunt the massive German Ardennes offensive but the 12th SS Panzer Division overran his company. Fortunately, losses in MacDonald's company were relatively light and when the unit was reformed it helped to stop the northern German pincer on the Elsenborn Ridge. In January 1945, the author was wounded while participating in the counterattack to retake St. Vith and spent two months recovering. Returning to the 23rd Infantry in March 1945, MacDonald was given G Company and he led this unit in the final dash across Germany to Leipzig. MacDonald ended the war in Czechoslovakia. The final three weeks of the war seem a bit blurry here, compared to the earlier slow pace in the defense, and this is the only aspect of the author's narrative which is a bit choppy. There is a tremendous amount of combat wisdom in this account, although the author admits mistakes. During the first day of the Bulge, MacDonald's unit - which had very little ammunition, limited fire support and no information on the friendly or enemy situation - was ordered to launch a hasty attack to relieve a trapped US unit. MacDonald's account of his briefing to his lieutenants in the dark with a wet map is striking: "I wondered if I could have drawn any worse conditions under which to issue my first attack order." The attack was cancelled, but then MacDonald's company was ordered to hold off the advance guard of the 12th SS Panzer with only 3 bazooka rounds and no mines. The result was inevitable. This account offers some tactical points about US ground operations in 1944-5 of interest to historians. First, US units often seemed to move to contact the enemy with minimal regard for reconnaissance and US commanders seemed to prefer hasty over deliberate assaults. Many US losses seemed directly attributable to this tendency to launch hasty, poorly coordinated attacks with inadequate forces. Second, US units often did not make good use of terrain. In the defense, MacDonald's company often had to occupy non-key terrain that lacked cover and concealment. Occupying such exposed positions merely to maintain contact with the enemy resulted in unnecessary casualties. US units would have been better off to occupy key terrain further back from the line of contact and leave only small covering units in direct contact. Interestingly, MacDonald's unit did not use LP/OPs at night. Finally, the decimation of US infantry units in the Second World War as portrayed by modern author's such as Stephen Ambrose is demonstrably false. Although MacDonald's company suffered many wounded and sick during the fall of 1944, he did not have one soldier killed in action in his first two months on the front line. Even in the Battle of the Bulge, the number of infantrymen actually killed in combat was relatively small. Soldiers were far more likely to be wounded or evacuated for pneumonia than to be killed outright, and those men usually returned in weeks or months. American infantry units were never "bled white" by combat losses as some accounts imply by exaggerating the body count. Overall, Company Commander is a class of its own as a memoir, since a capable historian who actually experienced the events described wrote it.
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