Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (Paperback)

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Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly

In this vivid, authoritative account of being CIA station chief in Congo during the height of the Cold War, Devlin brings to life a harrowing tale of postcolonial political intrigue, covert violence and the day-to-day reality of being a key player in a global chess match between superpowers. Posted to Congo in 1960, Devlin quickly found himself at the swirling center of conflict— the Belgian colonial rulers had pulled out, the local strongmen had begun what would be a decades-long struggle for power and the Soviet Union was sending agents to influence events. Arriving on the scene with his wife and young daughter in tow, Devlin finds "central authority had broken down; there was no one in control who could prevent random acts of barbarity." As the country begins to fall apart and Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba starts flirting with the Soviets, orders come from Washington for "his removal." Within weeks Lumumba is not only out of power but dead. While the rest of the book is full of exciting cloak-and-dagger derring-do and scrapes with death, it is this incident that haunts Devlin. He devotes the last chapter of the book to a point-by-point refutation of his or the agency's involvement in Lumumba's death. That alleged assassination is often used to illustrate the hypocrisy in U.S. foreign policy. Devlin's straightforward, plainly written approach to the task lends credence to his assertion of innocence. (Mar.)
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From Booklist

When Belgium ceded independence to the Congo in 1960, one of the cold war's most acute crises erupted. The French-speaking Devlin was there as the CIA's man in Leopoldville (today, Kinshasa) with a charge to defeat a Soviet and Chinese Communist surge into the country. This memoir shows the author in best light as a station chief with personal courage and cultural astuteness, a quick thinker in sticky situations, many potentially lethal. The hair-raising incidents, often at roadblocks, once with burglars in his house, so common in Devlin's narrative will instill those interested in operational intelligence careers with the 24/7 risks of a posting in the field, while his involvement with political developments in chaotic, post-independence Congo contributes primary testimony to the history of the period. Devlin acknowledges, for example, receiving an order to assassinate leftist premier Patrice Lumumba, but says he opposed it as immoral and did not carry it out. Including his personal impressions of Mobutu, the eventual victor in Congo's early 1960s turmoil, Devlin's retrospective will rivet the espionage set. Gilbert Taylor
Copyright © American Library Association. All rights reserved --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 320 pages
• Publisher: PublicAffairs (March 31, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1586485644
• ISBN-13: 978-1586485641
• Product Dimensions: 8.1 x 5.5 x 0.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 7.2 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.3 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (29 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #368,137 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

17 of 20 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars History Lessons, June 7, 2007

By	Retired Reader (New Mexico) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)

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This review is from: Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (Hardcover)

This book rewards its readers with good deal of information on a variety of subjects. It undoubtedly provides a very accurate account of the struggle of the former Belgium Congo to become a variable nation state. In the course of doing this, its author provides a plausible description of the chaotic condition of an imploding nation state and its leading political players of the period, including the controversial Patrice Lumumba and the man who turned out to be his chief rival Sese Seko Mobutu. Finally the book opens a window on how the U.S -Soviet Union Clod War rivalry played out in an newly independent African state like the Congo.

On a rather different level, Larry Devlin provides a good explanation of what a pro-active CIA Station Chief (COS) of 1960 did to earn his keep. One can carry away a good deal of information about good `tradecraft', the use of non-official cover (NOC) agents, and the vital need for a close relationship between the COS and the U.S. Ambassador. For a long period Devlin was not only COS Kinshasa (Leopoldville), but also the only CIA representative in the Congo. As a result, he discloses quite a bit about the art and craft of recruiting and maintaining `agents' in the field. Although virtually all memoirs written by former intelligence folks tend to be somewhat self-serving, from this book it is clear that Devlin really was good at his job and did his best to protect the national security interests of U.S. and equally important to help the Congolese build a viable and independent nation state. That in the end the Congo continues to be a near failed state was due to factors well beyond Devlin's control.

The problem then as now of course is that a really good CIA operative like Devlin and a really poor operatives are treated pretty much the same way by CIA. The system is really designed to homogenize everyone into the same bland blend. Also it is clear that CIA of 2007 would never allow a COS the kind of freedom of action that Devlin had in 1960.

Anyone with an interest in Africa or the CIA or both ought to find this well written and informative book fascinating.

7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Fantastic, April 12, 2007

By	Rob (VA) - See all my reviews

This review is from: Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (Hardcover)

This is an absolutly fantastic account of a Chief of Station's duties during the Cold War. Devlin's experiences and accounts show just how important Africa was to the Soviets and the West beginning in the 1960s. While certainly not excusing Mobutu's atrocities, Devlin provides the reader with a portrait of the man during his early years, when the Great Leopard was not quite as ruthless or dishonest. All in all, a great read and a great addition to the growing genre of Cold War texts.

12 of 15 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars The Way It Was -- Honest & Unvarnished, September 11, 2008

By	David M. Dougherty (Arkansas) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)

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This review is from: Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone (Hardcover)

This is a great book of how one man can could make a difference in the Cold War. Author Devlin chose to concentrate on his time as the CIA Station Chief in the Congo (now Zaire) in the early and mid 1960s but one suspects that his earlier time as a case officer (in an unstated country) and later as station chief in Laos might be equally enlightening.

Devlin did his job to the best of his ability, acting always in the interest of the United States, and sometimes taking enormous risks with his career in the Agency and even his and his family's personal safety. Unfortunately this is an example of a bygone era, probably never to be repeated since the Agency has become increasingly bureaucratic and bureaupathic over the years. Devlin enjoyed a great deal of latitude and authority, much more than is allowed today, recommending to Langley what should be done (and doing it either before or after approval) rather than to sit and wait on directives. Such behavior is unthinkable today, and as a result the CIA's HUMINT is currently almost non-existent.

Having read the other reviews I was struck by several who criticized Devlin on political grounds, but it was Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson and other various people above him who made policy rather than Devlin himself. He was simply extremely effective in carrying out their policies, and for that he should be commended rather than criticized. In addition, the times were much different in the 60s, and the Cold War was threatening to become hot in many locations. The UN was its usual ineffective self, and this book clearly points up the problems of attempting to depend on a toothless tiger to maintain order. Even worse, the UN frequently acts in opposition to American wishes as it did in this book.

American politicians, such as G. Mennon Williams, unknowledgable and dabbling in foreign affairs come off less than effective in Devlin's work, as do many State Department officials.

Devlin's main effort was to forestall Soviet expansion into Africa and the Congo rather than create a democracy in Zaire, and that must be kept in mind. He dealt with the Congolese as they were, not as how he would like them to be (ala Jimmy Carter.) His depictions of personalities, both favorable and unfavorable may offend many, but inconvenient truths are still truths.

Devlin recounts the problems with Patrice Lumumba and the various successor governments until the Mobutu coup and the civil war in the mid 1960s. The CIA was in the thick of it, advising but not controlling the Congolese politicians, and always attempting to keep the Sov Bloc nations out. How Devlin did this, and his successes and failures, make fascinating reading.

His motivation (as he states it) was to keep the cold war from becoming hot by frustrating communist expansionism and influence in non-communist countries.

This is a period piece illuminating the operational CIA at its best working to further American interests and safeguard the US from its enemies. During this period the Agency actively combatted Soviet thrusts on all fronts rather than merely supplying intelligence for actions by others. In many respects the Agency was the US's first line of defense, often acting to make up for ineffective diplomatic initiatives, unknown and unappreciated by the American political establishment and the public. Read how it was done, and they ask yourself if you are willing to do what Devlin did in the future. It will take many Devlins to keep the US secure for our children. A whole lot more action than talk is necessary. Also note that Devlin was on duty 24-7 most of the time rather than 9-5. Like I said, it was a different age.

Buy and read this very well-written and interesting memoir by one who was there. It may be self-serving to some degree, but certainly less than most memoirs, and is worth a read by anyone interested in the CIA or US intelligence. John Le Carre could not have done better.