Tried by War: Abraham Lincoln as Commander in Chief (Hardcover)

by James M. McPherson (Author)
Key Phrases: confiscation act, Army of the Potomac, East Tennessee, United States (more...)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. Given the importance of Lincoln's role as commander-in-chief to the nation's very survival, says McPherson, this role has been underexamined. McPherson (Battle Cry of Freedom), the doyen of Civil War historians, offers firm evidence of Lincoln's military effectiveness in this typically well-reasoned, well-presented analysis. Lincoln exercised the right to take any necessary measures to preserve the union and majority rule, including violating longstanding civil liberties (though McPherson considers the infringements milder than those adopted by later presidents). As McPherson shows, Lincoln understood the synergy of political and military decision-making; the Emancipation Proclamation, for instance, harmonized the principles of union and freedom with a strategy of attacking the crucial Confederate resource of slave labor. Lincoln's commitment to linking policy and strategy made him the most hands-on American commander-in-chief; he oversaw strategy and offered operational advice, much of it shrewd and perceptive. Lincoln may have been an amateur of war, but McPherson successfully establishes him as America's greatest war leader. (Oct. 7)
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From Bookmarks Magazine
Reviewers indicated that they would have embraced any new book by James McPherson on any aspect of the Civil War period. But current events likely compelled them to recommend this highly readable, informative book with special enthusiasm. The nature of the president's war powers, particularly the precedent set by Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus, has been a central question of the Bush presidency. And as the highest office in the land is passed to Barack Obama, who is both a great admirer of Lincoln and who will become the only other president to hail from Illinois, McPherson's analysis should be particularly timely. Critics agreed we could have no better guide; as Timothy Rutten wrote in the Los Angeles Times, McPherson is "one of those scholars whose ingrained integrity simply precludes him from stacking the historical deck."
Copyright 2008 Bookmarks Publishing LLC

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 384 pages
• Publisher: Penguin Press HC, The; 1 edition (October 7, 2008)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1594201919
• ISBN-13: 978-1594201912
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.1 x 1.4 inches
• Shipping Weight: 1.6 pounds (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.2 out of 5 stars See all reviews (54 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #11,491 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

71 of 76 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars A perceptive and persuasive volume by a superior Civil War historian, October 11, 2008

By	Roy E. Perry "amateur philosopher" (Nolensville, Tennessee) - See all my reviews (TOP 1000 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

Many scholars have described Abraham Lincoln's legacy, but surprisingly few have chronicled his role as Commander-in-Chief. Arguably our premier Civil War historian, James McPherson, whose Battle Cry of Freedom won the Pulitzer Prize in 1998, brilliantly remedies this neglect.

"In his conception of military strategy," writes McPherson, "Lincoln was Clausewitzian. The Prussian theorist of war had written that 'the destruction of the enemy's military force is the leading principle of war,' and it "is principally effected only by means of the engagement' that is, by 'hard, tough fighting.'"

Lincoln was often frustrated by his generals' lethargy, especially by George McClellan, a pompous prima donna with a messianic complex who preened himself as being "The Young Napoleon." Strutting about like a bantam rooster, McClellan boasted that he, and he alone, was destined to save the Union. True, by means of seemingly endless formation drills, he whipped the Union army into a formidable fighting force, but then stubbornly refused to budge against the enemy. Whining and complaining, inaccurately, that the Confederate forces arrayed against him were at least twice the size of his Army of the Potomac, he postponed, time and again, an offensive campaign, to which cowardly inactivity Lincoln tartly retorted, "If you don't plan to use the army, may I borrow it for a while?"

Only in the last year of the war did Ulysses S. Grant, William Tecumseh Sherman, George Henry Thomas, and Philip Henry Sheridan grasp Lincoln's insight that the Union's concentration in time (simultaneous coordinated attacks) trumped the Confederate superiority in space (by using interior lines).

Tried by War is a fascinating narrative not only of Lincoln's prescient military leadership but also a bird's-eye view of the major military encounters of the Civil War. McPherson has written a perceptive and persuasive volume.

About the author: James M. McPherson is the George Henry Davis `86 Professor of History Emeritus at Princeton University, where he taught for three decades. He is the bestselling author of numerous books on the Civil War, including Battle Cry of Freedom (which won the Pulitzer Prize in 1998), For Cause and Comrades, which won the prestigious Lincoln Prize, and Crossroads of Freedom. He lives in Princeton, New Jersey.

36 of 37 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars Disappointingly Superficial and Unoriginal, November 12, 2008

By	CJA "CJA" (Minneapolis, MN) - See all my reviews

I admire McPherson's wonderful "Battle Cry of Freedom" and looked forward to this book as well as its emphasis on Lincoln's role as commander in chief. While the topic is not as "neglected" as claimed by McPherson, given that every study of Lincoln inevitably spends a good deal of time on the topic, it is a good subject for a full length work. But in the end, McPherson adds very little to the Lincoln literature. While well written, and while constituting a good introduction to the subject, the book is superficial.

McPherson had two basic choices in approach. He could have focused on the details of specific military decisions and relationships with generals and drawn broader conclusions therefrom. Or he could tell the narrative and fit it into his broader interpretations and analysis of the basic controversies fought over this subject. McPherson chooses the latter, but he short-changes the reader on the interpretation and analysis.

His best contribution is the notion that Lincoln grasped the advantage the Union had in "concentration in time" -- the ability to overwhelm the South by attacking on mulitple fronts at once. This trumped the South's advantage in "concentration is space." That is, Lee had the advantage of familiarity of terrain and interior lines of supply and communication. He seemed able to concentrate more men at focused points. In McPherson's estimation, Lincoln's generals (except for Grant) did not sufficiently appreciate this lesson and Lincoln was a better strategist than his generals.

McPherson is also effective in characterizing Lincoln as better grasping Clausewitz's principle that war was "politics by other means" and the need to appreciate war not as set piece battles but as a struggle to suppress the political movement in the South. He draws the familiar conclusions, which do seem supported: (1) McClellan was a poor commander who did not see the larger strategic issues; (2) the objective was Lee's army not Richmond; (3) Halleck was a huge disappointment; (4) Lincoln had to fire a lot of generals who deserved to be fired; and (5) Grant was a magnificent general who was appreciated and nurtured by Lincoln.

In the end, though, much of this was already argued, in some ways far more effectively and in more detail, by T. Harry Williams 50 years ago in "Lincoln and His Generals" -- which I highly recommend. Also, McPherson does not grapple with some of the most interesting controversies. Why is it that Lincoln had to fire so many generals -- why were they so bad? McPherson has some superficial stuff about the generals being disproportionately Democratic. And what did Lincoln do to define the role of Commander in Chief? McPherson's thesis is that Lincoln was the first to define the role in modern terms. But how and why? McPherson is so busy giving his narrative he loses sight of the primary reason for his book.

Some of the answers can be found in David Donald's brilliant essay in his book "Lincoln Reconsidered." This was, like Williams book, written 50 years ago, which proves that in Lincoln literature old books are not necessarily inferior books. Donald argues that the Generals were trained in Jomini's texts that were based on the Napoleonic experience. Jomini's tactical and strategic wisdom became obsolete with the technology that existed by 1861. Artillery and trenching favored defensive war; railroads sometimes allowed exterior lines of movement to be faster; repeating rifles could give the North the advantage in concentration in space; the objective was not the enemy's capitol, but the enemy's industrial/agricultural capacity and the enemy's army supplied by same. Lincoln and Grant were quicker to appreciate this than McClellan and his ilk.

This failure to move with the times explains why Lincoln had so many bad generals. And I suppose that Jefferson Davis had so many good ones because the Jomini training they all had tended to fit well with what the South had to do to win the war. But another reason for all the bad generals is that we did not yet have the experience of a nation fighting a major modern-style war. It's only because of what happened during the war that modern generals (except for MacArthur) appreciate the need to defer to civilian authority and the need to have the civilians direct the all important, overall political strategy.

If you can find Donald's and Williams' books, I highly recommend them. McPherson's book was a big disappointment.

57 of 64 people found the following review helpful:

3.0 out of 5 stars "Stunningly Original"?, October 27, 2008

By	Richardson J. Kovar (Prague, Czech Republic) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

Doris Kearns Goodwin's review claims that McPherson's new book, "Tried by War" is "stunningly orignal" but I fail to see how unless one takes into consideration McPherson's claim in his introduction that his latest book is the first, which is debatable, to exclusively deal with the subject of Lincoln as a war president.
I'd purchased "Tried by War" because of my long held admiration for Mr. McPherson writings - particularly his book,"Battlecry of Freedom", which is perhaps the finest one-volume history of the American civil war ever written - and to feed my continual hunger for orignal scholarship. Unfortunately,there is not a fact, story or theory in McPherson's latest work that has not been mentioned, rehashed or retold by any number of prominent Civil War historians, including Foote, Catton, Donald, Oates or even Kearns in her wonderful, "Team of Rivals".
Now having said that I will say "Tried by War" for a first time reader or someone who's just discovered the allure of American Civil War history is an excellent introduction to the subject.