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20 of 23 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Lots of useful information; unconvincing analysis, April 6, 1999
By A Customer
I suppose any new book on the Waterloo campaign needs an angle. For Hamilton-Williams, of course, it was the (now discredited) accusation against the Sibornes of a "crime against history". For Hofschroer it is the perceived slighting of the German (Prussian, really) contribution in the campaign by English-speaking authors, and of course various charges against the Duke of Wellington, primarily that that he intentionally misled the Prussians regarding his ability to support them at Ligny; that this contributed to their defeat there; and that he and his admirers subsequently tried to cover this deceit by doctoring the official record. I am all for correcting misconceptions, and I hardly see the Duke as "an infallible, totally virtuous near-deity", but I just didn't find these claims that compelling.Hofschroer's strategy is basically to interpret every ambiguous piece of evidence in such a way that it supports his case against the Duke. Thus the book reads like a courtroom transcript with the case for the defense deleted. To take one example, consider Hofschroer's treatment of the allied wrangling over how the various minor German contingents would be divided between Wellington and Bluecher. The Prussians try to claim all of these troops for themselves (except the Hanoverians, who have long been part of the British army and are never at issue), but in the end they are outmaneuvered by the wily Wellington with the result that the minor Germans are split roughly 50-50. Hofschroer inflates this to a 2-1 edge for the Brits by including the Hanoverians in the final calculation, and then portrays Wellington's motive in fighting for these German troops at all as merely an effort to gain some future (postwar) advantage. Of course, any decent defense lawyer would note the disingenuousness of the arithmetic, and point out that while postwar advantage may indeed have been a secondary consideration, Wellington's primary concern was most likely simply to field a viable army. Indeed, before this was resolved he was so short of troops that he actually considered importing Portuguese. Hofschroer mentions this, and later notes in passing that Wellington's army would have been painfully small without the Germans, but he doesn't state the obvious conclusion: that the Duke actually needed these troops. Instead, this is just the first in a series of tricks and swindles perpetrated by Wellington on the simple, trusting Prussians. Perfidious Albion! Overall the one-sidedness of the discussion and the author's wounded tone did a lot to spoil this book for me. It's a shame, too, because it does contains a lot of very useful information on the various German armies and contingents, much of which was not previously available in English. I can recommend this book as a very valuable resource on these grounds.
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15 of 17 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Vorwarts, Deutschland!, July 5, 2000
All authors, historians, and enthusiasts have their bias, prejudices, and favorite subjects. This is no secret, but it does not stop the conscientious researcher/historian from printing both 'good' and 'bad' information in a study, paper, or book.Let me pause here to say, in all fairness, that the author and I have corresponded obliquely on different Napoleonic topics, and we neither agree nor do we get along. That, however, has nothing to do with the merits of this volume. This book does concentrate on the Prussians, and other Germans, but it does so warts and all. Perhaps it is high time somebody does, for if the Prussians hadn't arrived on the field, Wellington would have been beaten, he as much as admitted it later. The author has no problem discussing unpleasant topics, such as the Saxon mutiny against the Prussians before the 1815 campaign began. His research is meticulous, he presents his subject very well, and he is enthusiastic about it, shcih to me is very important. I was somewhat disturbed by the vehemence and prejudice that some of the reviews here have expressed. This book, and its sequel, have much to say, have been well-researched, and belong in every Napoleonic enthusiast's bookcase. This isn't 'revisionist history' in the sense that it is trying to change results or that it is making something up. It is a valiant attempt at deeper research that has succeeded, and succeeded quite well. This book, and its companion, have set a benchmark that all subsequent works on the subject will have to meet.
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4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
German victory at Waterloo, March 16, 2007
Peter Hofschroer is by no means alone in his effort to set the historical record straight about Waterloo. Alessandro Barbero, professor at Piedmont University, makes it very clear in his book "The Battle, a New History of Waterloo," that Wellington was at the brink of being trounced by Napoleon when Bluecher came to his rescue and defeated the French. The British version of this historical battle misrepresents these facts. It celebrates Wellington as the great field marshal who saved Europe, when in fact it was Bluecher's forces that put an end to Napoleon's ambitions of a French dominated continent.
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