Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Paperback)

by Scott Snyder (Author)

Editorial Reviews

Review
"Snyder focuses a clear and steady light on the little understood topic of North Korean negotiating behavior." -- Donald Oberdorfer, author of The Two Koreas and former Washington Post correspondent

"The best, and perhaps the only full fledged, analysis of North Korean negotiating behavior and . . . an indispensable manual for those who have the tough luck of negotiating with the North Koreans or others, if any, who are like them." -- Han Sung-Joo, Former South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs

Product Description
Scott Snyder traces the historical and cultural roots of North Koreas negotiating behavior and explains why North Koreans behave as they do. He argues that there is in fact an internal logic to what often seems to be outrageous conduct.

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Product Details

• Paperback: 236 pages
• Publisher: United States Institute of Peace Press (November 30, 1999)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 1878379941
• ISBN-13: 978-1878379948
• Product Dimensions: 8.9 x 6 x 0.7 inches
• Shipping Weight: 12 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)
• Average Customer Review: 4.6 out of 5 stars See all reviews (7 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #359,259 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

13 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent study of all levels of NK negotiating behavior, December 1, 2001

By	Nichomachus - See all my reviews

This review is from: Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Hardcover)

A balanced and pragmatic analysis of North Korean negotiating perceptions and behavior, Snyder's book will be one of the most significant and useful studies of North Korea for years. His study ranges at all levels, thus we see analyses of both negotiating tactics as well as the cultural and psychological perceptions that inform those tactics. This book is highly recommended for anyone who wants a glimpse into North Korean decision making and thought, not just how they negotiate. The quasi-self-contained world of North Korea has generated a psychological perspective and mindframe that has its own internal rules of logic and acceptibility. An understanding of that world, and taking advantage of its contradictions and absurdities, is what makes this book all the more valuable.

Policymakers, diplomats, media, scholars, and students will all find this a useful and informative tool. Snyder's well-written presentation of the unique mindset of North Korean actors helps us understand their motivations and behaviors beyond the "irrational and reclusive" mantra of years gone by.

8 of 8 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars not so wild and crazy guys, October 23, 2000

By	Mina Park (Arlington, VA) - See all my reviews

Many commentators fall back on North Korean irrationality, craziness, insanity etc. This book shows that North Korean behavior can be understood in an entirely rational framework. The North Koreans do have their moments, though. The anecdote about the negotiator trying to storm out of his own embassy was pretty funny.

4 of 4 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Negotiaing Behavior, March 26, 2000

By	Bae, Jongchan (Seoul, Korea) - See all my reviews

Snyder analysed the actual patterns when both koreas negotiated. According to him, the nature of the competition and level of distrust among north and south Korea is such that toughness and brinkmanship have been the preferred strategy, even in a bargaining situation where benefits may accrue to both sides. The communist tactics were attempts to load the agenda in order to create an environment for one-sided concessions. They dishonored commitments already made and applied a different interpretations to its content or significance. Negotiation was primarily used to as another form of competition. But when it comes to the Basic Agreement, there are bifurcated opinions about the real intention of the north. Anyway, it is clear that North Korea came to negotiation table only when there were any structural changes external to the Korean peninsula. And South Korea usually feel that only power can change the basic attitude of the North Korean style of negotiation. So they didn't like the way that U.S. showed when Americans directly negotiate with north Korea on the nuclear issues.