Target Is Destroyed (2870) (Paperback)

~ Seymour Hersh (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Library Journal

The Soviet destruction in September 1983 of 269 people aboard Korean Air Lines Flight 007 was one of the most upsetting crises of the Cold War era. The U.S. and Soviet regimes immediately blamed one another for the disaster; but, as Hersh powerfully argues, responsibility went far beyond ordinary governmental decision making and into the murky sphere of superpower intelligence calculations and confusion. He asserts that the catastrophe followed more from Soviet ignorance than viciousness, and that the whole episode demonstrates how the superpowers are more interested in gaining political advantage than the truest understanding of events. Hersh cannot provide a final recounting of this complex crisis. But he does show how one critical thinker can provide a more believable reconstruction of events than can any self-interested governmental regime.Charles DeBenedetti, History Dept., Univ of Toledo, Ohio
Copyright 1986 Reed Business Information, Inc. --This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.

Product Details

• Paperback
• Publisher: Pub Overstock Unlimited Inc (September 1986)
• ISBN-10: 9990274525
• ISBN-13: 978-9990274523
• Shipping Information: View shipping rates and policies
• Average Customer Review: 3.5 out of 5 stars  See all reviews (11 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #3,926,651 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Customer Reviews

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

17 of 20 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Who knew what, when about the Korean airliner shootdown:, October 17, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: Target Is Destroyed (Hardcover)

This is a book about the selective use - and misuse - of intelligence information.

On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.

This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.

Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.

The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.

Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.

The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.

Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.

7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Readable, and right on, May 1, 1999

By A Customer

Hersh's book is an excellent primer on the U.S. intelligence community. (In fact, I recently read it for an intelligence class at American University taught by the genial and wise Professor John Macartney.) Hersh, through hundreds of interviews with people involved with the U.S. response to the KAL007 shootdown, pieces together a workable theory about why the Soviets would shoot down the plane. And most of his thesis was redeemed when the Russians finally handed over the black box from the plane after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. The book presents complex ideas clearly, and no matter what else you think of Hersh's writing or his politics, you will find this book valuable.

6 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Who knew what when about the Korean airliner shootdown, October 17, 2001

By A Customer

This review is from: The Target is Destroyed (Paperback)

This is a book about the selective use - and misuse - of intelligence information.

On Sept. 1 1983, a Soviet fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down Korean Airlines Flight 007, even though the pilot argued with his superiors and repeatedly identified the plane as a civilian plane. Breaking with usual intelligence policies, the Reagan administration released the recorded conversation between the fighter pilot and ground control to news media and the world.

This breach was made for political reasons. The impression this was intended to create was that it was standard Soviet policy to shoot down civilian airliners. This jeopardized our future intelligence-gathering capabilities, because it gave away to the Soviets just how sophisticated our intelligence-gathering was, and the extent to which Norway was providing us with info.

Many U.S. intelligence officers were dismayed by the way this was done, because the Reagan administration also withheld all information about the intense U.S. military activity that was being conducted in the area with reconfigured civilian aircraft. For the past several years, the U.S. had been routinely flying specially-configured Boeing 707s equipped with electronic communications surveillance equipment over the Barents sea and other areas that KAL flew over. In fact, a Cobra Ball surveillance plane was in the air to the south of the KAL flight path the same day. George Schultz made sure Cobra Ball was safely in its hangar before they made any announcements about the shootdown of a civilian plane.

The U.S. had also performed massive military maneuvers with three carriers and 23,000 personnell just off Soviet Far Eastern waters six months earlier (in March of 1983), and six U.S. fighter jets overflew Soviet airspace during these exercises. While officially the U.S. claimed the overflight by the six fighters was a mistake, this was widely believed among the U.S. intelligence community to be a deliberate provocation by the U.S. military.

Soviets often put civilian markings on military transports, and given all the increased U.S. military and surveillance activity just off Soviet territorial waters in 1981-83, it becomes far more plausible that the commanding Soviet officers on the ground suspected that Americans had done the same thing with one of our electronic surveillance planes.

The U.S. and Canada shared intelligence information, and the Reagan administration was very unhappy with Canada because Prime Minister Trudeau (based on the same intelligence information provided to the U.S.) said he was sure the Soviets made a tragic mistake, and believed they were shooting down a U.S. intelligence plane that, like the six fighters earlier that year, was testing their defenses and their response times.

Want to know more? You'll have to read the book.