Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 [BARGAIN PRICE] (Hardcover)

by Max Hastings (Author)

Editorial Reviews

From Publishers Weekly
Starred Review. This huge and splendid volume tells the grim tale of the final collapse of the Third Reich. It does so from the viewpoints of the upper millstone (the Western Allies), the lower millstone (the Russians) and the grain being ground in between (the Germans). The research includes previously untapped Russian archives (particularly in the accounts of Soviet veterans) and leads to a gripping and horrifying story that serious students of military history will find almost impossible to put down. The blunders recounted are numerous, from the Allied failure to open Antwerp in the fall of 1944 to the Russian frontal assault on Berlin, and the Wehrmacht is depicted as the best army of the war and also the most atrocious in its treatment of civilians. Indeed, the treatment of civilians is a major theme, since they were slaughtered on a scale unheard of since the Thirty Years' War, and not only the Nazi camp inmates but also the inhabitants of Poland and East Prussia were numbered among the victims. The author hands out praise and blame with his usual edged aplomb (Anglophile readers may be happy to see a partial rehabilitation of Montgomery) and willingness to engender controversy, and also with his usual thorough research and clear writing (along with 24 pages of photos) to sustain every case he makes. His book ranks among the very best military history volumes of the year.
Copyright © Reed Business Information, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

From The Washington Post
With an end to the war in Iraq more elusive than ever, it's a fascinating moment to remember the cataclysm that ended World War II. Some would argue that the fate of Hitler's Reich was sealed as early as the Red Army's counteroffensive in December 1941; others would point to the Battle of Stalingrad the following winter. But by the time the Western Allies had successfully stormed through France and the Soviets had made their way to the outskirts of Warsaw, it was clear to everyone but the most fanatic Nazis that the end was only months, or even weeks, away.

And yet, as Max Hastings's magisterial new book demonstrates in meticulous detail, the months between September 1944 and May 1945 were among the cruelest and most destructive Europe had ever seen. The end was known, but the path leading there passed through an ocean of blood and terror. Because victory was unavoidable and defeat unthinkable, every loss seemed all the more wasteful. But precisely for this reason, hatred, vengeance and despair propelled the exhausted and brutalized combatants to resort to increasingly ruthless measures so as to finally bring -- as many Germans said at the time -- "an end full of horror to the horror without end." While this is hardly an untold story, Hastings's gripping narrative blends individual accounts, sweeping reconstructions of battles and devastating criticisms of military and political leaders.

Armageddon is a classic war history in the style of such masters as Alexander Werth, John Ericksen and, more recently, Antony Beevor. Like them, Hastings has much empathy for the little cogs and victims of war -- and far less sympathy for those who orchestrate it. Consequently, his harsh judgment of the leaders does not always reflect sufficient detachment from the testimonies of his protagonists on the ground. This approach makes for lively reading, but it may provide a somewhat skewed picture of the event as a whole.

Hastings, a former editor of the Daily Telegraph, has a low opinion of the U.S. and British strategy and conduct of the war. He concedes that not much could have been done to prevent Stalin's takeover of Eastern Europe but laments the lack of energy displayed by American and British soldiers. Hastings argues that the Anglo-Americans -- with a few outstanding exceptions, including some elite units -- were poorly trained, lacking in motivation and led by generals who were mediocre or, at best, competent but unimaginative. Better leadership from such generals as Montgomery and Eisenhower and less cautious troops would have prevented the disasters of the Battle of Arnhem (where Montgomery launched an extraordinarily badly planned attempt to end the war by grabbing bridges on the Rhine) and the Battle of the Bulge (where Eisenhower failed to destroy the reeling Wehrmacht before it had time to regroup); it also might have spared many lives by ending the war in 1944.

Indeed, without the Soviets' immense sacrifices, the Americans and the British would have never defeated Nazi Germany. But the Red Army's far superior fighting power and generalship went hand-in-hand with extraordinary brutality toward its own troops, as well as against enemy soldiers and civilians. Hence Hastings's admiration for the Soviets' military accomplishments is tinged with his contempt for Stalin's policies and for his soldiers' innumerable crimes.

Hastings has no doubt that the best army of World War II was the Wehrmacht, which displayed outstanding professionalism and determination even in the final weeks. Awareness of the atrocities committed by Hitler's soldiers has hardly diminished the admiration of many military historians, professional soldiers and military history buffs for this seemingly perfect tool of war. This fascination with the Wehrmacht has a long tradition, going back to the influential British military historian and theorist Basil Liddell Hart's flattering 1948 portrait of Hitler's generals, which conveniently left out their crucial role as instruments of conquest, enslavement and genocide. This view is rooted in a depoliticized understanding of German soldiers that dismisses their ideological motivations and seeks to attribute their performance to skills or organization that could also be acquired by the armies of the democracies.

Hastings does acknowledge the fanatic resistance of hopeless foreign SS men and deeply indoctrinated Hitler Youth teenagers. He concludes that the democracies' less effective armies (and heavy reliance on industrial might) was the flip side of their soldiers' greater humanity, despite the unavoidable excesses by some men and the unnecessary destruction of German cities toward the end of the war. But such humanism was, of course, facilitated by what Hastings sees as a pact with the devil; the Anglo-Americans could fight a relatively moral war only thanks to the Soviet Union's terrible sacrifice and subsequent vengeance. This is, at best, qualified morality.

Between June 1944 and May 1945, 152,000 Allied soldiers were killed fighting in the west; the Red Army lost well over 500,000 in the same period. Some 400,000 German soldiers and civilians died in ground fighting and aerial bombardment in 1945 alone. Such figures can be understood only by referring to personal accounts, which Hastings uses splendidly. But partly because Armageddon focuses on the war's horrific endgame and partly because Hastings wishes to undermine conventional accounts of the war that gloss over the punishment inflicted on the Reich, the author lingers longest on the suffering of German civilians.

Germany now hosts a minor cottage industry on the victimhood of the Reich's civilians. And while Hastings stresses Hitler's particular focus on murdering Jews and dedicates even more space to the Nazi regime's other non-Aryan victims, he too is especially concerned with the fate of the German victims of Allied bombings, the mass expulsions from Eastern Europe and the eastern parts of Germany (where he cites highly inflated fatality figures), and the mass rapes by the Red Army.

The genocide of the European Jews has only belatedly come to be seen as part of World War II, and its inclusion often calls for a listing of all other victims. This tends to obfuscate the singular nature of the Holocaust: the Nazis' determination to exterminate the Jews. The mélange of victims includes even the German soldiers who, the late German historian Andreas Hillgruber asserted 20 years ago, sacrificed themselves to protect Germany against the "Asiatic hordes" and the "red flood" from the east. He also maintained that the loss of Germany's eastern provinces was the greatest tragedy of the war.

Yet as long as these Wehrmacht troops were protecting "civilization" from the Bolsheviks, the mass murder could continue. Between May 15 and July 18, 1944, a total of 434,351 Jews were deported from Hungary; most of them were gassed in Birkenau. The suffering of the individual needs to be recorded, and it may tell us a great deal about the nature of an historical event. But we must remember the context. The sacrifice of the German soldier was made in the cause of genocide and fascism. The struggle of so many Germans to maintain their Reich kept Hitler in power. It was because Hitler's soldiers fought to the bitter end that their country had to be destroyed. Only then could the reconstruction begin.

Reviewed by Omer Bartov
Copyright 2004, The Washington Post Co. All Rights Reserved. --This text refers to the Hardcover edition.

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Product Details

• Hardcover: 640 pages
• Publisher: Knopf (November 16, 2004)
• Language: English
• ISBN-10: 0375414339
• ASIN: B000W0IGQ8
• Product Dimensions: 9.3 x 6.2 x 1.8 inches
• Shipping Weight: 2.2 pounds
• Average Customer Review: 4.5 out of 5 stars See all reviews (90 customer reviews)
• Amazon.com Sales Rank: #82,133 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

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Most Helpful Customer Reviews

216 of 224 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Excellent assessment of the battle for Germany, December 17, 2004

By	Michael Licari (Cedar Falls, IA United States) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (Hardcover)

Max Hastings has written a masterpiece on the battle for Germany in 1944-1945. The book is remarkable because Hastings is able to cover many different things simultaneously, while weaving everything together in a narrative that is well-written and engaging. Indeed, topics that are typically researched as independent issues (the Holocaust; the plight of civilians; the quality of the various armies; issues of military command; issues of politics) are all treated together to give, finally, the reader "the big picture". The meaning of all of this is driven home with personal accounts, which makes the book pointed and poignant. Quite simply, this book must rank highly on anyone's list of "best WWII books of 2004."

There are several issues that I think are worthy of special attention.

First, Hastings argues that Allied armies (UK and US) fought under conditions that forced caution and an attention to casualties. Being democracies, their militaries operated under different constraints than the German and Red armies which instead relied upon fanaticism and ruthless disregard for the value of an individual's life. That the allies produced no commanders of German or Soviet caliber is explained by the fact that they could not engage in East-front style operations, where a butcher's bill of hundreds of thousands of casualties was "normal." Hastings even states that a general like Zhukov would have been decidedly ordinary had he been forced to adopt the constraints the US and the UK operated under.

Second, Hastings does not use these constraints to excuse poor performance by the UK and US. He instead points out several failures of operations and command, as well as pointing out missed opportunities to move more quickly. Hastings blasts Montgomery and the British Army for failing to secure the approaches to Antwerp. He is correct in identifying this as perhaps the single most important hindrance to moving further in 1944. Without the port, supplies had to come over the D-Day beaches or up from the Mediterranean coast of France. This was wasteful and slow. Hastings further blasts Montgomery for his insistence on a narrow northern thrust. Hastings clearly and convincingly shows that it would not have worked. Concurrently, Hastings shows that the British failures in Market-Garden offer further evidence of (a) Montgomery's inabilities and of (b) the British army's poor quality. Finally, regarding the British, Hastings is quite scathing in his assessment of Montgomery's elaborate and basically pointless battle to cross the Rhine, which moved slowly and painfully, even as American units were already across elsewhere. Nor does Hastings spare American commanders, although they come out looking a bit better. Hastings is critical of Eisenhower's military command decisions, particularly in terms of passing up an opportunity to encircle the Germans in the "Bulge" and in terms of moving very slowly once across the Rhine. Even in 1945, when meeting fleeting resistance, Eisenhower seemed overly concerned with the possibility of German counter-attacks and wanted a tidy front line. Hastings criticizes Soviet decisions regarding the pointless attacks in Prussia and Silesia, which served, he argues, only to divert attention away from the Berlin axis of attack. What Hastings fails to recognize is that Red Army commanders were operating like Eisenhower: they were still afraid of the potential for German counter-attacks. The Red Army, like Eisenhower, continued to over-estimate the strength of the German army until the very end.

Third, the author reminds us that the slowness of the Allied armies had very real consequences. To those who study World War II from a purely military perspective, there is typically not much concern about how quickly the end of the war was brought about. After all, by the fall of 1944 it was obvious that Germany would lose the war, even if when it would lose was not known. Hastings points out, however, that the failure to end the war more quickly caused a tremendous amount of suffering. Dutch civilians starved to death in the winter of 44-45. The Nazis had more time to carry out their brutal Holocaust. Slave laborers continued to toil. Hastings' point is that if the US and UK were fighting for democratic and moral ideals, then they had an obligation to move more quickly.

Fourth, Hastings points out that the Red Army, fighting for revenge, exacted it in terrible ways on German civilians. Much like Beevor, Hastings documents the rape and pillage perpetrated by the Red Army. However, Hastings, unlike Beevor, is quick to remind the reader that the Germans, despite their complaints about "honor" behaved in exactly the same way, and worse, in the occupied region of the Soviet Union. In the absence of any other justice system, an "eye for an eye" is perhaps an understandable, although not morally perfect, result.

Finally, Hastings address a variety of political issues. He exposes Churchill's naivety in, well, everything from the UK's declining position in global politics, to the UK's declining importance in the alliance, to the lack of any influence in Eastern Europe (considering the Red Army was firmly in charge). Eisenhower, criticized for operational decisions, is credited for wise political decisions. Hastings gives him credit for holding the alliance together, especially in the face of downright unprofessional conduct of Montgomery and the petty sniping between other commanders. Eisenhower is also given credit for his correct decision to abandon a drive on Berlin. Hastings assesses Stalin's behavior and concludes that although it was brutal, it was very effective in securing his goals. Stalin knew he owed very little to either Churchill or Roosevelt and he had his armies covering the eastern half of Europe. He knew he could do as he pleased, and did so. The western allies did not "lose" eastern Europe because that assumes they had it in the first place.

Hastings has written a very perceptive book. Finally, an author has tackled simultaneously the military, moral, and political element of the end of the war in Europe, and has done so brilliantly.

93 of 106 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Chronicling the perils intrinsic to war's endgame., November 18, 2004

By	David J. Gannon (San Antonio, TX USA) - See all my reviews (TOP 500 REVIEWER)    (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (Hardcover)

In Armageddon Mark Hastings has provided an in depth and wide ranging history of the last months of World War II in Europe. This massive tome provides an organized and intimate window into the appalling toll of war, a toll exacerbated by errors overconfidence contributed particularly among the Western allies on the one hand and the incalculable atrocities the vengeance of the Russians contributed on the other.

Hastings effectively shows how overconfidence born from the success of the western invasion on D-day led the western allies into a series of questionable decisions of both tactical and psychological nature. The failure to secure the deep water port at Antwerp and the miscalculation as to the willingness and capabilities of the retreating Germans to continue to battle led to unnecessary disaster at Arnheim and the Ardennes.

Hastings also provides what may be the first authoritative overview of the raping and pillaging of Prussia by Russian troops, a saga of atrocities unparallel in 20th century history and possibly the most savage actions in Europe sine the days of the Mongol invasions.

Although great in scope the book has curious omissions. There is virtually nothing here relating to the war in southern Europe. Although some major characters get the full historical overview, others are given relatively short shrift. And there is a definite element of personal commentary as to certain players (Monty in particular) that are less than objective in my view.

However, on the whole this is an awesome historical review of a major historical event with lessons for today. The perils of the end game in Europe may well have implications as to the possible end game in Iraq. If so, the lessons are not heartening.

So, in the end, this book has value not only as a historical reference but as a warning about the perils that sill face those who wage war today.

18 of 19 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars An excellent overview of the last year of the war, August 26, 2005

By	A. Courie "Treb" (Freedom's Fortress) - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

This review is from: Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (Hardcover)

Max Hastings' "Armagaddon" is a fantastic book about the last year of World War II in Europe. In ways, it is a follow-up to his book "Overlord," although Hastings does also devote considerable attention to the fighting on the East Front. Hastings seamlessly shifts his narrative from the big picture to analysis to individual viewpoints, and in doing so gives the reader an accurate and informed history of the last year of WWII in Europe.

Much of Hasting's focus is on the "big picture," the campaigns and battles from August 1944 until May 1945. Hastings describes all of the major battles of the last year of the war - Market-Garden, the Ardennes, the Allied Spring Offensive, the Vistula Offensive, and the Battle for Berlin - while also devoting more print than others to Operation Varsity, the Soviet offensives in the Balkans, and other lesser-known actions. He describes at length the Warsaw Uprising. Sometimes, though, the details of these battles are lost or get confusing because Hastings' narratives of these battles often jump between the "big picture" and the individual accounts of the battles. .

Hastings also analyzes the conduct of the battle and the military leaders of each side. As in "Overlord," Hastings is critical of the American and British leaders who lacked the initiative, vision, and experience to end the war as quickly as they could. He is also critical of the fighting abilities of the American and British soldiers. Hastings contrasts these commanders and soldiers with those of the Germans and Soviet Russians, all of whom he believe were superior to the American and British. Reading Hastings' opinions serve as a counterpoint to those such as Stephen Ambrose, and certainly the truth lies somewhere between the two. Still, Hastings does differentiate between the individual leaders; for example, he is extremely critical of Montgomery while seeming to hold Patton in fairly high regard.

Hastings peppers his narrative individual stories in the war, telling the experiences of the soldiers and civilians caught up in the war. These stories are based on recently-conducted interviews with the participants. He uses these stories to support his larger theses and to color his battle accounts. These personal stories are most telling during "Armageddon's" chapters about the aerial bombing of Germany, POWs, and the Soviet pillaging of East Prussia.

"Armageddon" gives the reader a great overview of the last year of WWII in Europe. Hastings weaves his history with analysis of the campaigns and with the personal stories of those who were there. He has written an excellent work that should be read by anyone with an interest in WWII. It's just a shame that he couldn't find a better title for his book.