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21 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Behrman does it again..., August 14, 2007
It is difficult to follow-up on a definitive book such as the Invisible People, Greg Behrman's factual yet deeply poignant book about AIDS in Africa which has inspired many Americans to take action to help alleviate the tragic pandemic effecting the African people. Yet, I can conclusively write that Behrman has done it again with his recently published book, The Most Noble Adventure. Behrman has taken the Marshall Plan and brought it to life with his description of all the key players such as Paul Hoffman, Averell Harriman, Richard Bissell, Will Clayton and Arthur Vandenberg. Behrman describes a George Marshall who is beholden to none except the interests of his country. The author describes how Marshall viewed the economic conditions in Europe as not only a huge humanitarian issue but also a potentially dangerous bridge to communism. Behrman also introduces Arthur Vandenberg, a major figure in The Noble Adventure, as an inspirational Republican U.S. senator who transcended party politics to "do the right thing". Without Vandenberg, an ex-isolationist, the Marshall Plan would never have passed through congress.Finally, Behrman's narrative takes the reader through the enactment of The Plan and all of its benefits to Europe and the United States as well as the unwinding of The Plan and the surrounding global political climate.
Behrman does an excellent job in educating the reader on what it takes to implement a program as complex as the Marshall Plan. He also describes the necessary bi-partisan support needed to capture the American public as well as the Congress. Behrman introduces us to players that remind us that while Marshall was a key player in The Plan, he was only one player in ensuring its acceptance and implementation. We also get a close view of the flawed Soviet thinking and strategy that eventually led to a Europe beyond its reach. Behrman reminds us that there are many applications of the Marshall Plan in today's world such as in Iraq, the Middle East and Africa. History repeats itself and as Behrman implies, repetition is not always negative but can actually be very positive if all parties come together to choose a noble adventure that, in today's world, can yield very important and life saving results that can also inch us towards world peace.
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5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
"Freedom [can] not be maintained by bullets alone" , June 23, 2008
Detailed history of the plan that helped Europe get back on it's feet after WWII and kept Stalin and the communists from spreading their influence into Western Europe. Greg Behrman gives the account of how Secretary of State George Marshall's speech went from an idea to such an ambitious plan.
Following the War, Europe was in shambles. Germany had been the major manufacturing power but industry and distribution channels had been disrupted and destroyed. The people were discouraged and pessimistic about recovery, and the weather was worse than usual. The US had already given a lot of "relief aid" with nothing to show for it. Marshall envisioned a much more ambitious goal of helping to rebuild those systems that would allow Europe to pull itself out of it's problems, but he wanted to keep it under the Congressional radar long enough to prevent them from changing the essential humanitarian (and expensive) nature of the plan. Even then, it was a tough sell and only through some unlikely allies such as Michigan Senator and ex-isolationist Arthur Vandenburg was it passed. Many continued to try to cut the funding, but extensive propaganda efforts saved it. Other important figures such as Paul Hoffman, Richard Bissell, Will Clayton, Averell Harriman, etc., and their enormous contributions are discussed, as well as some of the mechanics of how it made Europeans a partner in their rebuilding. Also prominent are the essential contributions of important Europeans, such as Bevine (UK) and Bidault (France).
A key point about the Marshall Plan was it's focus on preventing communist influence from spreading and containing Stalin's power. Behrman explains the efforts communists employed to sabotage the plan, everything from Molotov's delay tactics in early negotiations to the strikes and riots by Italian and French communists, and the influence the US had in Italian elections in 1948. But Behrman makes it very clear where the communists overplayed their hand, and instead brought home the necessity of the plan to those in Congress who were more inclined toward an isolationist policy. He explains the reasons for reluctance to offer aid, the efforts that had already been made, the difficulties faced by the starved European countries and the "dollar gap" that prevented them from importing what they needed. US efforts at European economic integration (50 years before the EU!) are also discussed extensively, as well as French fears over a rebuilt Germany.
Interesting and definitely worth reading but not always a very "rousing" or compelling history of what was perhaps America's greatest moment. But the greater story here is entirely relevant to our current situation in and policy toward the Middle-East. The Marshall Plan worked because it made Europeans responsible for rebuilding their economy, and then gave them the help needed to get started. It was administered mostly by selfless men who had the brains to make it work, and corruption was very minimal. It was not heavy-handed and forceful, seeking to dictate all the conditions attached to the aid given, but wasn't simple charity either. And it had true leadership at all levels, something we seem to be missing today.
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7 of 8 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
Very Good Narrative Story - With Agenda, January 11, 2009
This is a useful work on the Marshall plan that achieves its stated purpose of providing a comprehensive single volume narrative history profiling the personalities involved and the main themes of the initiative. There are many problems with this story, however, and the author has stressed two themes, the American initiative to deter Europe from falling totally into the Communist orbit and the simultaneous push for Western Europe's economic and eventual political consolidation into a single entity. As we now know, both efforts were successful (eventually) although the political unification has not been fully implemented.
The myth of the Marshall Plan that is learned in every American high school is that the plan was formulated and used to assist Europe in rebuilding from the destruction of World War II. Typically one hears that the Marshall Plan provided the funds for Germany to rebuild its cities and industry destroyed by British and American bombing. The truth, of course, is somewhat different and author Behrman doesn't even bother to confront the myth.
Unfortunately the author does not provide the single table that would show where the Marshall Plan money went -- a table that would be at odds with his themes. Of the money that went to the 16 European nations (Trieste was added as a separate entity), 40% of the money went to just two countries, Britain and France. Britain was not in danger of going communist (however, France and Italy were), and when the Marshall Plan money is combined with the direct aid during 1946-1952, Britain and France's percentage of American aid to Europe doubles. And, of course, the State Department could not fail to expand a program that ultimately received public approval, and the ECA distributed several hundred million dollars to India, Spain, and Asia that are normally included in ECA disbursements.
The author's canonization of Marshall is a little over the top. He never led troops in battle, and was much more an administrator than the "military genius" painted by Behrman. Nor was he without flaws. His adherence to a rigid personal schedule and lack of command oversight and direction exacerbated the Pearl Harbor defeat, although the author infers that Marshall's involvement was saluatory. His personnel appointments tended to be based more on personalities than performance, and when he flew to Moscow in March, 1947, he still lived in the fantasy land that, as the author puts it, "...cooperation with Stalin was possible. And perhaps he was the one man who could achieve it."
Marshall's speech was drafted by Charles Bohlen which Behrman mentions but then dismisses in favor of Marshall's self-serving rendition of how the speech was constructed. At any rate, speed was indicated to ward off the collapse of Western Europe and its fall under communist domination, and it only took 11 months before the relief portion (food, etc) of the plan began to arrive in Europe. Mass starvation was averted and the Socialist governments who were unable to solve their own problems through increasing government programs were propped up by the products of American free enterprise.
The author shows a curious sympathy for both the socialist governments and Stalin's communist regime, stating, "The 1930s were a time of remarkable growth (in the Soviet Union). The economy was planned to precision, industry flourished and much of the citizenry benefited." No doubt the Kulaks and those who starved due to the disasterous agricultural planning would agree. He also goes easy on France, whose irrational focus on the glory of France and its "premier" cultural position would not allow it to accept anything but the dominant role in post-war Europe. The fear of "Americanization" by dollars provided by cultural cowboys (described in European eyes by the author as "a giant with the limbs of an undergraduate, the emotions of a spinster, and the brain of a pea-hen," was more potent than their fear of Stalin and communism. And as A.J. Taylor noted, "Nobody in Europe believes in the American way of life -- that is private enterprise." Gee, it doesn't sound like European opinion has changed much in the last 60 years. And the author repeatedly used "The Economist", a leftist magazine produced in Great Britain, to support his contentions.
On the other hand the author inadvertantly mentions the gross arrogance by American functionaries in Europe, most notably Harriman and his staff of 2,000 in Paris and other European capitals. They were deciding (for example) on how much wheat a country could produce but then figuring on how much irrigation was needed, then on how much machinery would be needed for the irrigation, then how much the railroads needed to improve to transport the wheat, and how many tractors and ploughs would be necessary, etc., etc. A European country would submit its requests, but then Americans would decide what was best for that country and work out the details. Rather sounds like centralized planning by a group of foreigners, doesn't it?
So why did France require two (or four) times the aid of Germany when the destruction of Germany was so much more extensive? The author attempts to answer this question by stating that the German industrial plant was much less damaged that had been previous assumed. That's a pretty wild answer, particularly in light of the vast numbers of homeless Germans. Nonetheless by 1965, there was more wartime destruction still evident in London than in Hamburg although Hamburg had endured more than twice the weight of bombs than London and lost over 100,000 people in the fire storms of July 1943.
Also I must point out some of the more obvious mistakes in this work. On page 217 he states that Bruce was a "gourmand" when I believe he means "gourmet." He also implies that Bruce, Rockefeller, Schlesinger and Bruce were in Paris before the liberation. In addition I was amused that Wisner recruited those he knew from his own social and professional circles, Ivy Leaguers, lawyers and Wall Street bankers into the CIA. Yep, that's true, but not something normally exposed to the public. And speaking of not exposing something to the public, Behrman is to be congratulated for exposing the fact that Truman did not make the Clifford-Elsey Report public in order not to enflame American public opinion against the Soviet Union. As always, the Federal Government does not trust the American people. On page 274 Behrman blandly asserts that "Communists had been all but weeded out of government" (by 1950). Wow! Evidently Behrman is unaware of the Venona transcripts which showed that Soviet penetration of the Federal Government was endemic during the 40s, with over 200 agents alone in the State Department. By 1950, few had been "weeded out." McCarthy actually understated the situation, and there are still legions of Americans fearing exposure as Soviet archives become more open to the West.
Even with its flaws I recommend this book. However the book is to be read carefully and the reader must understand that the author is a writer at the Aspen Institute, almost a subsidiary of the Bilderberg Group and an institution that supports the formation of a Supra-National Socialist World Government run by the monied and intellectual elites of Europe, America, and other advanced states. It heavily supports the EU and eventual political federalization of Europe as well as the formation of a North American Union replacing the sovereign states of Canada, the US and Mexico with an amero replacing the dollar. As such, the Marshall Plan and subsequent Schuman Plan are important forerunners of their agenda. A note on the political correctness of the author -- malaria causes more deaths in Africa than AIDS, but one does not see the author supporting the resumed use of DDT.
Other works for those interested in the Marshall Plan:
"Labor Under The Marshall Plan" by Anthony Carew, 1987 -- this work discusses the development of a new labor-capital relationship in the MP nations.
"America's Feeble Weapon: Funding The Marshall Plan in France and Italy" by Chiarella Esposito, 1994 -- shows the Marshall Plan was only incidental to those nations.
"The Origins of the Marshall Plan" by John Gimbel, 1976 -- shows that the MP came from efforts to stop French, not Soviet efforts to prevent the reconstruction of Germany.
"The Marshall Plan" by Michael Hogan, 1987 -- probably the best book on the Marshall Plan and European resistance to Americanization.
"The Wise Men, Six Friends and the World They Made" by Walter and Thomas Isaacson, 1986 -- covers Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, Kennan, Lovett and McCloy.
"The Marshall Plan Revisited" by Imanuel Wexler -- very useful book, heavy on economic statistics.
"40th Report for the Public Advisory Board of the Economic Cooperation Administration" by Richard Bissell (of Bay of Pigs Fame), 1951 -- gives data as of 9/30/1951.
Again allow me to state that there is much good history here with the story of the Marshall Plan and the contributions made by the individuals involved. Some of the author's characterizations of the individuals are a little too heroic, and the demonization of the MP's opponents has to be moderated. In addition, the push towards political consolidation and an eventual one-world government must be filtered somewhat to keep the narrative from becoming polemical. For details, the reader is advised to look at some of the above references.
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