The Literary Mind (Hardcover)

The book attempts a very difficult project, investigating the cognitive aspects of story telling. It seems simple enough on the surface, but quickly gets enmeshed in stories about stories. It gets very confusing.

Turner holds that stories are based on the combination of cognitive elements called 'schemas' and a cognitive process called 'projection'. An image schema might be a 'ball flying through the air' or 'a boy talking to his mother.' Schemas have their own intrisic value and emotional content. Via 'projection', schemas transfer their 'content' and 'emotion' onto entirely different schemas such as 'a baby horse talking to its mother.'

Turner's examples are excellent, particularly his parables. For a somewhat more complete study of cognitive aspects, look at Lakoff and Johnson's 'Philosophy in the Flesh'. Lakoff and Johnson avoid the technical term 'image schema' and use the more familiar term 'metaphor.'

Here is a quote from the introduction that gives a good outline of the book's project: "Story is a basic principle of mind. Most of our experience, our knowledge, and our thinking is organized as stories. The mental scope of story is magnified by projection - one story helps us make sense of another. The projection of one story onto another is parable, a basic cognitive principle that shows up everywhere, from simple actions like telling time to complex literaray creations like Proust's 'A la recherche du temps perdu.'...

To summarise the whole business:

1. Chomsky says that we can only explain grammar by assuming the existence of a mental organ which no-one has identified or located and wich, according to Chomsky, sprang into existence without the benefit of precursor or the influence of natural selection, just "appeared".

2. Pinker and Bloom have modified the gross unlikelihood of any such event by invoking natural selection as the "father" of grammar.

3. Both views of both incredibly unlikely (though not impossible), says Turner, and "trades Occam's razor for God's magic hat".

4. The mythical grammar organ is not needed because understanding how parable works can explain the rise of both language and grammar.

The rest of the book rambles on, and on, AND ON, about not much more than the idea that we can understand why parables are comprehensible by understanding that meaning does not transfer directly from the source (the parable) to the target ("real" life) but goes through an intermediate "blending" process.

This conflicts, somewhat, with the sweeping claims in the Preface:

"In this book, I investigate the mechanisms of parable. I explore technical details of the brain sciences and the mind sciences that cast light on our use of parable as we think, invent, plan, decide, reason, imagine and persuade. I analyze the activity of parable, inquire into its origin, speculate about its biological and developmental bases, and demonstrate its range. In the final chapter, I explore the possibility that language is not the source of parable but instead its complex product."

Well, I came to the book prepared to agree with Professor Turner's proposition, and I still do - but NOT on the basis of this thin volume.

Not surprisingly, despite the small font, in only 166 pages (plus notes), the book tends to skim its subject in all areas. And the fact that the author keeps going back to describe the source -> blending space -> target model - without a single diagram! (how "literary" can you get) - serves to minimise the space available for any other discussion.

It would also help if the writer had a better grasp of the English language. Numerous expressions which he seems to think are every day language read as though they were invented to fit the discussion, such as "he had almost arrived at the point of having the job in hand".
His translation of Proust produces the phrase "I must have overslept myself" - perfect Hercule Poirot, but not regular English, I think.
And he has begun to rewrite the English language so as to use phrases like "When we see someone startle as he looks in some direction ...". Now a person can BE startled, and a person can startle someone or something else, such as the proverbial horses; but I must confess that I was not aware that someone could startle.

My point, pedantic as these criticisms may appear, is that I got the *impression* that the book was written in a hurry and never properly edited by the author. Should that last quotation have actually read "When we see someone start as ..." for example?

In practise, the book itself, short though it is, might have benefitted considerably from the use of Occam's razor.

So, an interesting thesis, *some* good supporting material, but seriously undermined as a whole by poor presentation.

Definitely one for the academics.

It's a shame, because I think he sells himself short. I think he has a plausible thesis that is potentially very significant; not at all trivial. But he plays to his own strength and glosses over the difficult. His theory of language origins is fascinating, but it needs further support and clarification. His anti-Chomskyan argument is quite likely correct, but he spends pages disposing of a Darwinian gradualism that is rapidly being displaced by complexity theory, with which he seems unfamiliar, or at least chooses not to address.

Can he really believe his own theory trivial? His exposition on tense belies the possibility. His book raises important questions; promises new understandings. His modesty does not serve. This modest contribution could have been much more.

Five stars for originality and potential significance of his ideas, minus two for the awkward and bulky attempt at induction and for what is left out.