Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism (Paperback)

This observation is important because it helps the reader understand the importance of nationalism in the revolution. The Algerians did not fight with a detailed governance plan in their back pocket. Rather, they fought for a chance to establish themselves as independent people.
After discussing the Revolution and its rhetorical emphasis on unity, Quandt moves into the Boumedience Era. He notes that Algeria's first president, Ben Bella, lacked an institutional base of support and spent much of his time in office manipulating factions against each other. Ben Bella quietly faded into the background and Boumediene arose as the stable and rather "faceless" leader. He downgraded the FLN (the party credited with winning independence) in importance and suppressed any emerging opposition to his regime. Indeed, after 1968, there was very little internal opposition. During the 1970s, his regime had an Islamic cultural orientation but functioned in a secular socialist manner. There was definitely not much emphasis on a transition to democracy, but "Boumedience, at least, had brought stability to a country that had known far too much political violence" (29).
In the next chapter, Quandt explains that there was inevitable pressure to change, and Boumediene, as an authoritarian ruler, was unable to enact it. Chadli Benjedid became president in 1979, and long-suppressed demands for change came with the Berber spring of 1980. This initial movement for the rights of Berber-speaking people gave rise to other political movements, the most significant being the Algerian Islamic Movement. Beginning in 1982, the Islamic Movement took up arms and gained momentum, though for the most part the stability of the existing order kept protestors at bay. This all changed in 1988, when "the bottom fell out of the oil market." The rentier state was in trouble.
Quandt writes, "the mass protests of October 1988 proved to be one of those turning points that define a country's political trajectory for years to come. It was a nationwide youth revolt, but Islamic activists soon took charge. The military was called in and violence ensued. Hundreds of young Algerians were killed in the first use of the Algerian military against its own people.
As disturbing as this scene was, Quandt notes that it could have been a dramatic turn toward political expression and eventually democracy. Indeed, in 1989 reform-minded allies of Chadli drafted a new constitution. At least on paper, it created three distinct branches of government and guaranteed individual liberties--including what was to soon become a very significant free press. The army was supposed to now be above politics, and a significant new political party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) challenged the government on a plethora of issues. Many young unemployed and disillusioned men joined this group. Through political mediums such as strikes and the 1991 elections (in which the FIS received about twice the number of votes as the FLN in the first round), the FIS established itself as the new power in Algeria. In June of 1991, however, the army stepped in yet again (it had stepped in during the strike and arrested FIS leaders) and showed itself to be right in the middle of politics-certainly not above it.
In 1991 the army cancelled the constitutionally mandated second round of elections and forcefully removed both Chadli and the FIS from power. Quandt explains the army's motives well:

Many in the military had fought for Algeria's independence and genuinely felt that they had a legitimate role to play in the political life of the country. The FIS was a threat to all that they had fought for and, like the Turkish military, they would not stand by and watch the principles of the state be trampled. (60-61).

Thus, the military took over the state and political violence and terrorism was the norm for most of the nineties. Within months, the FIS was declared illegal. The leader appointed by the military, Boudiaf, was assassinated, and thousands of ordinary Algerians lost their lives in the chaos. Quandt writes, "The inability-or unwillingess-of the state to provide basic security was shocking" (75). Many Algerians emigrated to other nations.
Thus, the political history of Algeria is a complex and sometimes sad one. Quandt's book covers it so well because he understands that there is hope for the country. It has experimented with liberalization and might just be able to make it work. After all, nobody really expected Algeria to rebel against France in the first place, much less win a war of independence. Quandt's book is good because it presents this history in a very detailed fashion (Part I), and then it presents various perspectives to clarify the events and give insight to the future (Part II). An alternate format, like an interwoven mixture of history and analysis, might be very confusing to the average reader.