|
18 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Reagan's Special Envoy: Blueprint for Middle East Peace, November 28, 2002
Here is a true and engaging story that goes to the heart of a bloody feud unresolved since 1947. "Cursed is the Peacemaker" is the go-to book for the historical drama of what it took to negotiate that brief shining moment when there was-- as close as it gets-- to a cease-fire between Israelis vs. Palestinians and others in the Arab world.Author John Boykin (a former editor at Stanford Magazine) recounts the gripping story through the eyes and viewpoint of Philip Habib, Reagan's Special Envoy charged with the enormous task of staunching the bloodshed and destruction in Beirut in 1982...in 1947 and left with an unfulfilled United Nations mandate that was to have been, like Israel, the provision for their homeland, some Palestinians relocated to West Beirut where Palestinian leaders carried on the battle against Israel, which retaliated. In June 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and laid siege to Beirut to destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) once and for all. The PLO is the umbrella of organizations that leads the Palestinian diaspora. President Reagan gave Habib, the Brooklyn-born son of Lebanese immigrants, the task of talking to the warring sides and persuading them to make some changes. Everything from vitally important matters down to the price of Israeli pickles was thrown on the table and it was up to Habib to sort it out. He convinced the Israelis to stop shooting long enough for thousands of Palestinian guerrillas to sail from the Mediterranean port city under the watchful eyes of a multi-national force of 800 U.S. Marines, 900 French and 500 Italian soldiers. This was no easy feat. Habib persuaded the Palestinians to leave their families behind in the West Beirut refugee areas of Sabra and Shatila with their safety guaranteed by the multi-national force and the word of Ariel Sharon. This very readable story explains how imperfectly Habib accomplished his task and yet how Habib's work stands as the blueprint for the diplomacy that a person of iron will and stature will need if ever there is to be a negotiated end to this war that rips at the heartland of Christian, Jewish and Muslim civilizations. Boykin recounts the history in an engaging way and he's careful not to assert his own opinions. The viewpoints he presses are those that he documents were those of Habib, the talented, hard- working, often gruff U.S. negotiator. The book's completeness is a tribute to Boykin's persistence in using, among other resources, the Freedom Of Information Act, archives at Georgetown University's Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, and extensive interviews with Habib's peers, his bosses and underlings to piece together this important story about a critical juncture in the life of an historical figure who steadfastly refused to talk to reporters during negotiations. Boykin provides the listening post for readers to "overhear" the blunt conversations between Habib and the Marine Colonel James Mead whom Habib came to rely upon to keep warring parties apart. But Mead was no patsy. While he came to grudgingly respect Habib, he was protective of those in his command. Boykin lays out the negotiating positions of the various sides, noting that the intransigence, the absolutist positions by Israel and Syria were non starters. Boykin conducted interviews with dozens of well-known diplomatic players who knew Habib well-- everyone from Nobel Laureate Oscar Sanchez Arias to Henry Kissinger (who knew Habib from his days negotiating an end to the U.S. war in Viet Nam). It can safely be said that there can be no peace in the Middle East until there is a measure of justice for the massacre at Sabra and Shatila, refugee camps that resemble acres of the crowded tenement buildings that dot working class areas of New York City. In these camps, Christian Phalangists went door to door wantonly murdering more than 800 Palestinians while Israeli soldiers stood guard seeing to it that no Palestinian could escape. Details of what led to the massacre, for which even the Israelis hold Ariel Sharon culpable, are of historical importance. Boykin describes what went on behind the scenes just before the massacre of Palestinians on September 16-18, 1982. It was the tragedy Habib had labored all summer to prevent and in the end, he didn't, in part because Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger withdrew the Marines who were charged with keeping the warring parties apart. When the Marines left, the French and Italians also left Beirut. That their families would be protected was the key to persuading the Palestinians to lay down their guns and leave Beirut. That Ariel Sharon broke his word and allowed his soldiers to stand guard while mass murder was committed can not be glossed over, especially since two decades later, Sharon became Israel's elected leader. This story is a microcosm for what has gone wrong in the Middle East. If peace is to come to the region, this story may contain kernels of the reconstructed blueprint for what, along with iron will, is needed to find a peaceful solution.
|