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49 of 55 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Essential guide to the changed face of terrorism, November 10, 2002
Benjamin and Simon headed the National Security Council's antiterrorism team during the nineties, and they began this book in 99, hoping to convince a skeptical country that Al-Qaeda was the most serious threat facing the West. They wanted to explain why it represented a new *kind* of terrorism, and a far more dangerous kind. We no longer need convincing that the threat is real; we need information and perspective. The book they wound up writing is a fountain of both. Still central to its theme and its value is their analysis of what makes Al-Qaeda different. For this new breed of terrorist, strategic considerations will never limit the level of destruction they mete out, because violence is not their tactic to gain some other end. Destruction of the infidel *is* their strategy. The first half is a crisp, brisk read jammed with vital detail on the history behind radical Islamism. That history, from the Crusades to the Balfour declaration, is ever present before the minds' eye of the terrorists, so it behooves us to know it. These are guys who know how to put together an executive summary. Without a word wasted on horrified emotion, partisan sentiment, or political correctness, they give us the names, the dates, the theologies, the actions that led to the current confrontation. You are unlikely to find a precis of Al-Qaeda's motivations and makeup anywhere as complete, concise, and pertinent. In particular, Benjamin and Simon give the definitive answer to "why they hate us." Many social, economic, and political factors go into the level of tacit support for Al Qaeda on "the street." But the operatives themselves are motivated entirely by religion, and nothing short of the death of all Jews and the destruction of the West will satisfy them. In one sense it is true that what they peddle is a perversion of Islam. Even the virulently anti-American head of Iran's clergy, Ali Khamenei, condemned the WTC attacks, because the Quran clearly forbids targeting civilians. But at the same time, Al-Qaeda's theological line has very deep historical roots in Islam, tracing back to Wahabbi in the seventeenth century (a version of Islam which Saudi money has recently made dominant through much of Asia), to ibn Taymiyya in the thirteenth century (who held that jihad in the sense of killing unbelievers was more important than any of the traditional five pillars of Islam). And ibn Taymiyya was a kind of Reformation figure; in his exaltation of jihad, he was rejecting all of the Islamic scholarship of the preceding five centuries, and trying to return to a kind of 'sola scriptura' depending only on the Quran and the hadith, in which with one ill attested exception there was no concept of a "greater" or "inner" jihad. It is difficult for moderate Muslims to mount a theological response to the jihaddists, especially when the "ulemas", the scholarly establishment within each Muslim country, are so closely identified with governments that are repressive, or dismissive of sharia law, or both. The second part talks about the developing awareness of the problem in the U.S. through the nineties, and all of the obstacles that prevented sufficient mobilization. This is less important for most of us to know than the preceding material, but the authors' position as insiders, especially in the light of partisan blame tactics sometimes used on both sides, more or less obligated them to assess that history. The two most important obstacles were: (1) a mindset that saw terrorism as a tactical tool used by rogue states or liberation movements, and smugly imagined that Al-Qaeda was just more of the same. At its top levels, the Clinton administration got over this hump by 1995; and the Bush administration, initially convinced that Al-Qaeda was a minor annoyance that Clinton had blown out of proportion, climbed a steep learning curve and changed its mind by the summer of 2001. (2) The difficulty of making the sense of urgency in either administration trickle down through the federal bureaucracy, in the absence of any media appreciation of the seriousness of the threat. The only way to overcome the enormous inertia of Treasury, State, and FBI would have been to share the information that, to avoid compromising intelligence, the cabinet and NSC level people had to keep close to their chests. September 11 did a great deal to put both problems to rest, but the book warns that institutional inertia and counterproductive turf wars, especially at the FBI, still pose significant risk. A third short section assesses the current state of play, and considers short and long term strategies for dealing with terrorism when it springs from a "virtual state" like Al-Qaeda. The outlook is both grim (terrorists *will* sometimes succeed, and civil liberties will be compromised) and hopeful (we have a lot of natural allies, Bush has restored the funding he originally cut for dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, and Al-Qaeda's attempts to groom operatives who are ethnically western offers a potential handhold for better human intel.) One warning worth noting: Clearly radical Islamists are the primary threat we face. But the nineties saw the emergence of apocalyptic, religiously motivated terrorists from the fringes of a variety of faiths: Judaism (Gush Emunim's assassinations and plot to dynamite the Al Aqsa mosque), Buddhism (Aum Shunrikyo's nerve gas attacks), and Christianity (Christian Identity, which nurtured Tim McVeigh and a phalanx of imitators, so far less successful.) We will have to keep our eyes open.
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