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27 of 27 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Excellent Navy Book, Good History book in general, July 31, 2000
Mahan uses some detail and technical language to demonstrate particular naval engagements from 1660-1783, but apart from being just a lecturer on naval warfare and an analyst on tactics, he demonstrates how the use of the general navies, or the strategy of using a strong navy to protect the fleet of an aggressive merchant marine, is the single most important root cause of advancing economic and therefore military prosperity in any nation. Using Great Britain as his main example, he also details the Dutch fleets to demonstrate their reason for becoming a European superpower in their own right. Later he identifies the presence of the French navy, apart from any material success in its engagements, as one of the determining reasons why America had a chance to win its independence. Finally, as he hints of the supreme commercial and military importance of the proposed (Panama) canal, against the declining state of the American navy and the paltry condition of its merchant fleet, he urges that America's prosperity if not survival depends on the powerful revival of its sea power.An excellent read, a great general history book, and very lucid explanations, easy for the layman. If you enjoy history you'll enjoy this.
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30 of 31 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
von Clausewitz of the Sea, June 3, 2002
In this book, U.S. Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan presents what he considers the six key elements of sea power and shows the impact their application or misapplication has had on history. Citing numerous historical examples, he shows how nations have prospered or suffered through use or misuse of their naval assets. His book is rightfully considered essential reading for any historian of naval warfare. However, its impact does not stop there. Mahan shows how nations thrived or declined during the 17th and 18th centuries through prudent or imprudent application of naval power. He contends France, Holland, Spain, et al. prospered until they allowed their naval power to dissipate. Meanwhile, Britain became mistress of the seas. British colonies provided raw materials for her industries, while her armed fleet insured uninterrupted commerce. He equates Britain's loss of her American colonies with inappropriate deployment of her fleet, contrasted with France's skilled strategic use of her own. This section will interest readers of American history schooled only on Washington's land campaign at Yorktown. Mahan's book has had a tremendous impact on history. It unquestionably shaped the imperialistic policies of pre-World War I and pre-World War II Germany and Japan respectively. Students trying to ascertain why leaders of those nations acted as they did should read this work. The elements of sea power are the same today as in 1900 when this book was first published. With a world economy as interdependent as today's, Mahan's principles are as valid as they were in the 1600's and 1700's, perhaps even more so. German war philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz's classic treatise, "On War," is considered a must read for every Army officer. Mahan's work is to the sea-battle as von Clausewitz's is to the land. Historians, military strategists, and architects of America's foreign, economic and national security policies should read this important work to gain insights on the necessity of protecting vital and vulnerable sea lines of communications worldwide.
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16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A classic of Naval thought, required reading to understand, April 28, 1999
Despite the other reviews of this book offered above, with which I must disagree, for the serious student of naval history and tactics, this is a classic, and required reading if for no other reason than to understand the influential thinking of the naval tacticians and strategists of the early 20th century. Mahan was to naval warfare as Von Clauswitz was to land warfare. While the reading is not easy for a late 20th century casual reader expecting thrilling tales of Hornblower, it is true grist for the mill of the serious student of naval history. I disagree that the work is outdated because it deals with pre-steam naval warfare. The fundamental concepts are as applicable as Sun Tzu to land warfare. Mahan is not the end of the analysis, but was a tremendously important influence.
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