A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (Paperback)

I have been reading books about the World War for nearly 50 years. This book is one of a kind. But it's not written for everyone. First I will point out some limitations of this book. Then I will list some of the strengths that make this book unique.

Limitations.

Weinberg is a clear writer, but not flashy. The material is carefully organized but it moves at a deliberate pace. Put simply, this is not exciting reading, especially at 900 pages!
If you loved Ambrose, McCullough, or D'Este, you may dislike Weinberg.

Weinberg believes in a form of historical writing that downplays the role of individuals. Roosevelt, Hitler, Stalin, Rommel, Churchill, Mussolini, Chang Kai Shek, Hirohito are all in attendance, but their personalities, their quirks, and their
habits , hardly enter into the story. Instead, these men represent movements, states, ideologies, etc.

Weinberg never uses direct, pithy quotes. That takes something out, compared to other popular history.

Weinberg doesn't say anything he can't back up. Many chapters contain 200 footnotes or more. Those footnotes
could drive you crazy.

Weinberg does not present the War as simply a clash of Good versus Evil. He sees a much more complex picture of motives and actions at play. Few parties to the conflict emerge with their honor wholly intact.

Weinberg does not write much about leaders, battles, etc.
Don't get me wrong. The leaders and battles are there, but
W is only interested in the big picture aspects of battles, not
in leaders, heroes, clever tactics, etc.

I don't see these limitations as very important. A reader can
get all that exciting stuff from popular books. Instead, Weinberg has produced a book that mainly appeals to World War addicts and scholars. I'm not sure I would recommend this book to readers who don't already have a good general grasp of the War.

Now the strengths:

Weinberg organized his material in such a way as to show the War in an integrated whole. He covers the whole World, Asia,
Europe, Mediterranean, even Africa and South America. In doing so he shows many interconnections that I had never previously considered. For instance, the book shows the close relationship between Japan and Germany.

His writing is very tight. He discusses his topics systematically, thoroughly, and logically. He likes to set out lists of considerations, or reasons that I find illuminating.
For example, why did Hitler consistently reject offers of additional collaboration from Vichy France?

Weinberg is realistic in his judgments. Although his overall viewpoint about the morality of the War is rather conventional, he's unafraid of making harsh judgments. For instance, W shows how the neutrals; Ireland, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, etc acted in greedy and self-interested ways, looking for war profits, wanting territorial gains, desparate to keep their independence.

W is not given to moralizing. As I stated, his own views are clear, not hidden. But he does NOT find many instances where moral or ethical considerations carried much weight with the combatants or occupied nations. He's a believer in "RealPolitik" like Kissinger.

W is not a military man, but he's writing about military operations. His grasp of those operations is satisfactory, although he must avoid details. He's excellent at showing how military operations relate to the larger war situation. For example, he shows how Germany sent 200,000 troops to Tunisia just when Germany needed them more at Stalingrad.

Weinberg reaches some controversial conclusions about perennial "hot" issues:

· Most Germans supported Hitler straight through. It's not
realistic to talk about a German resistance.
· Many adult Germans knew enough about the treatment of Jews, captives, and slave labor to understand the horrific nature of their government. They acquiesced.
· Hitler's overall plans for the future of Europe were much
more radical than most people understand -- even today.
· With a few exceptions, populations in the occupied countries did not mount serious resistance efforts. They willingly collaborated. (ex. Yugoslavia, Poland, USSR).
· The Wehrmacht knew fully about the Jews, the slave
labor, the crimes against occupied countries. It's no good
to argue that "we didn't know."
· The Western Allies knew about the Genocide by 1942. They did not act because there was little they could do, and, in the US especially, the government did not want to get into a political situation where the opposition could label it "A War to Save Jews." Anti-Semitism was still strong in US.

etc etc etc.

To sum up, this book represents a terrific achievement. It represents a huge body of research. He must have taken 10 years to write it, with the help of 10 assistants. None of the other books to take on the Whole Enchilada come close. It will probably stand as the "standard" treatment for 50 years, until many more closed archives are finally opened.

After I had begun the book, some confusion that arose from viewing a documentary about the battle of Leyte Gulf was promptly cleared up by reading Weinberg's account with the relevant maps. I have been waiting for this book for a long time and recommend it highly for those readers whose sophistication about these events demands references when they read that Douglas McArthur received a great deal of money from Filipino President Manuel Quezon when they departed for safety on 11 March 1942. This is not a book for those who want a quickly readable survey of American involvement in the conflict.

Details is what this book is about--stupendously documented details, mainly to do with shifting alliances within the Axis and Allied responses; there are, for example, eight indexed references to Sir John Dill, the man who more than any other was responsible for smoothing out the prickles in the Anglo-American alliance. Details, however, do not always make for easy reading. An academic historian whose expertise stems from his intimate knowledge of the relevant documentary archives, Weinberg writes academic prose. Few of his sentences would pass the Fleischman criteria for readibility. Even a reader used to this kind of prose will find that one sentence in ten requires re-reading. And sometimes we wish that the author had chosen a different way of putting his point. And the publisher could have seen to it that the maps in the appendix of such an important book were of a quality equal to the thought behind this great work. Nonetheless, any complaints here are mere quibbles; @ 3 cents per page this book is a bargain by any one's accounting. Thank you Dr. Weinberg and Cambridge University Press!