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20 of 21 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
Compulsory reading for philosophers of science, February 27, 1998
By A Customer
"The Aim and Structure" is a very influential book in the history of philosophy of science. Duhem rejects the methodology of crucial experiment and inductivism. He emphasizes that scientific experiments are not observations of raw empirical data, but they are highly dependent on theory (theory-ladenness of observation). But the most famous thesis of this book is epistemological holism; according to W.V.O. Quine it is a "milestone of empiricism". I consider "The Aim and Structure" an excellent introduction to some philosophical problems of science, a compulsory reading for a philosopher of science.
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0 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Philosophy of science with a cheap history-facade, April 19, 2008
"A physical theory is not an explanation. It is a system mathematical propositions, deduced from a small number of principles, which aim to represent as simply, as completely, and as exactly as possible a set of experimental laws." (p. 19). "[W]e recognize in a theory a natural classification, if we feel that its principles express profound and real relations among things," and thus "we shall not be surprised to see its consequences anticipating experience and stimulating the discovery of new laws." (p. 28).
"It is not to [the] explanatory part that a theory owes its power and fertility; far from it. Everything good in the theory, by virtue of which it appears as a natural classification and confers on it the power to anticipate experience, is found in the representative part; all of that was discovered by the physicist while he forgot about the search for explanation. On the other hand, whatever is false in the theory and contradicted by facts is found above all in the explanatory part; the physicist has brought error into it, led by his desire to take hold of realities." (p. 32). An illustrative example is Descartes' work on optics. The "representative" part is quite flawless, while the explanatory part contains many silly things, e.g.: "Light is only an appearance; the reality is a pressure engendered by the rapid motions of incandescent bodies within a 'subtle matter' penetrating all bodies. This subtle matter is incompressible, so that the pressure which constitutes light is transmitted in it instantaneously to any distance" (p. 33). Indeed, Descartes was "the one who contributed most to break down the barrier between physical method and metaphysical method, and to confound their domains, so clearly distinguished in Aristotelian philosophy" (p. 43). He used the same principle in his physics, where he tried to prove that "all natural phenomena may be derived completely from this single proposition: 'The essence of matter is extension' ... He investigated the question of constructing the world with shape and motion by starting with this definition. And when he reached the end of his work, he stopped to contemplate it, and declared that nothing was missing in it: 'That there is no phenomenon in nature not included in what has been explained in this treatise'---so runs the title of one of the last paragraphs of the Principia Philosophiae." (p. 44). Newton used the right scientific approach (pp. 47-48), but his work was rejected by the Cartesians because of their garbling of science and metaphysics (pp. 15-16, 46-49). Newton won but "toward the end of the nineteenth century, hypothetical theories which were offered as more or less probable explanations of phenomena were extraordinarily multiplied. The noise of their battles and the fracas of their collapse have wearied physicists and led them gradually back to the sound doctrines Newton had expressed do forcefully." (p. 53).
Theory-ladenness of experiment. "An experiment in physics is the precise observation of phenomena accompanied by an interpretation of these phenomena; this interpretation substitutes for the concrete data really gathered by observation abstract and symbolic representations which correspond to them by virtue of the theories admitted by the observer." (p. 147). This implies, for example, that no one hypothesis can be tested in isolation (p. 187). Duhem attributes great philosophical importance to the theory-ladenness of experiment, speculating about incommensurability issues, etc. But this is pure philosophical speculation with no historical examples to back it up. In fact, the only historical examples Duhem does mention in these sections are examples showing that, on the contrary, "theory-ladenness" can often be quite easily disentangled from experiments, allowing reinterpretation in a new theory (p. 160).
Against models. "Physical theory ... is not to be resolved into a mass of disparate and incompatible models" (p. 220), says Duhem, mocking "the English," who do things like try to explain atomic phenomena in terms of springs and jelly and whatnot (p. 82). Again Duhem has no historical evidence that models are bad. On the contrary, one must "admit frankly that the use of mechanical models has been able to guide certain physicists on the road to discovery" (p. 99). Even so Duhem simply proclaims with no evidence that "the share of booty it has poured into the bulk of our knowledge seems quite meager when we compare it with the opulent conquests of abstract theories." (p. 99). Duhem is also upset that the method of models in many cases "appears as the instrument of discovery whereas it has only been a means of exposition" (p. 94). But why "only"? Did not Duhem himself just argue that science is "only" representation, i.e. exposition?
Similarly, Duhem dislikes, on philosophical grounds, the idea that physical hypotheses should be drawn from experiment, without being able to offer any historical examples of this method being counterproductive, and while recognising the fruits of this method in the works of, e.g., Newton and Ampère (pp. 219, 190-200).
Duhem compensates for being unable to offer historical support for his main theses by throwing in a trivially true decoy thesis---"hypotheses are not the product of sudden creation, but the result of progressive evolution" (p. 220)---which he then goes on to support by giving a ridiculously elaborate 30-page account of the prehistory of the law of gravitation.
Finally, a great Napoleon quotation: "I take greater pleasure in reading this material than a girl does in reading a novel." (p. 59)
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