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2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
2.0 out of 5 stars
Marine Corps Spin, October 8, 2005
Peleliu was a fiasco. 1st Marine Division Commander William Rupertus beleived his division would take the island in 3 to 4 days. The Japanese garrisson, rather than meet the Marines on the Beaches, occupied prepared positions in a rugged, easily defended area called the Umurbrogol, positions which were impregnable to direct frontal attack. Rupertus tried to break Japanese resistance via the tactic of direct frontal attack. The result was thousands of killed and wounded for the Marines in return for no gain.
The Headquarters charged with taking Peleliu was III Amphibious Corps, commanded by Marine MG Roy Geiger. MG Geiger had two divisions, 1st Marine Division and 81st Infantry Division. III Amphibious Corps also had additional objectives, Angaur, Yap, Ulithi. 81stID's mission was to be the floating reserve, to provide reinforcements for 1st Marine Division should 1st Marine DIvision need reinforcing. 81st Infantry Division was not to be released for other missions unless Rupertus reported the 1st Marine Division did not need reinforcing.
Although he was taking heavy casualties and making no progress, Rupertus was reporting to Geiger that his situation was favorable and he did not need reinforcing. On September 17, 1944, 81st Infantry Division was released to go after the other objectives, Anguaur,Yap, Ulithi. Consequently, at a time when 1st Marine Division needed reinforcing, III Amphibious Corps had no reserve.
Gayle seems to place blame on 81st ID Commander MG Paul Mueller and upon Rear Admiral William H. P. Blandy, who commanded the task group carrying 81st ID, his argument seeming to be that MG Mueller and RADM Blandy insisted on carrying out the Angaur operation although the Army troops were needed on Peleliu. The real situation was, Rupertus did not like the Army, Rupertus did not want Army troops on Peleliu, and the 81st ID was not released until after Rupertus assured Geiger that Army reinforcements were not needed on Peleliu.
In World War II, in spite of their status as an elite force, the Marine Corps was not a very effective tactical organization. They were not very good at winning battles, and it was not uncommon that a "Marine" victory happened because of intervention of Army troops, and Peleliu was a prime example. It was not uncommon for Marines to blame Marine ineffectiveness on Army troops, and this book seem to be an example.
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