|
|
9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
An important introduction to Hegel as epistemologist for those trained in analytic epistemology, January 12, 2008
The primary value of this book is in its demonstration, against a number of prejudices that have been around for a long time especially among analytically trained philosophers (going at least as far back as Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore), that Hegel offers a serious and compelling contribution to epistemological themes that can speak even to recent work in contemporary analytic epistemology. Most notably, Westphal shows that Hegel is both a realist and a coherentist (more on this below) and that these are not incompatible as they might seem; additionally, that Hegel's epistemology can be read as a response to Sextus Empiricus's problem of the criterion, and shows that the solution to the problem hinges on the demonstration of the possibility of a rigorous and systematic epistemological self-criticism, which is on Westphal's account at least part of what Hegelian absolute knowing amounts to.
The organization of the book is a bit patchy -- and feels more like a loosely connected series of independent introductory essays on a range of themes than like a coherent introductory work. An essay on the literary antecedents of Hegel's method (that reads Sophocles' Antigone as presenting Creon's position as a kind of "shape of consciousness" that undergoes a kind of dialectical series of challenges) is nice, but seems a bit out of place here, where most of the other essays aim to show that Hegel's problems and arguments can be profitably redescribed in vocabularies familiar to analytic philosophers, and when they are so redescribed they turn out to be saying novel and important things that analytic epistemologists shouldn't dismiss out of hand.
This business of characterizing Hegel's philosophy in terms that would be palatable and familiar to contemporary mainstream epistemologists is, on the one hand, refreshing, but on the other hand can lead to some misunderstandings. I can understand, for example, why Westphal wants to insist that Hegel is a realist and he certainly is in some sense of the term: tables and chairs and people and bacteria are very real for Hegel -- and so are things like freedom and justice -- they are not merely terms of convenience, and are certainly more than mere concepts. On the other hand, realism as it tends to be used and in the way Westphal tends to use it is a decidedly undialectical term: the thrust of saying you are a "realist" is to say both that the concepts we employ when we are rigorous in our thinking and experimenting get at something real, more than merely convenient fictions, and also to say that this reality they get at (whether they get at it or not) exists independently of the concepts we may or may not employ in describing it. To insist on "realism" in this sense is to set up a dichotomy that Hegel would not be very happy with: there is, on the one hand, reality as the way things are independently of us, and, on the other hand, there is us and our concepts as these are formulated and refined in the course of history -- and to insist that it is reasonable to expect that these will converge or cohere in the long run. That Westphal falls prey to this dichotomy is indicated in his regular description of Hegelian "spirit" as, roughly, the human community. But Spirit, for Hegel, encompasses what Spinoza would have called substance. That is to say that Hegelian spirit, the absolute, is an all encompassing reality, reality as a whole as we come to know it. The reality that we come to know throughout human history is not a reality that exists independently and apart from us but is the reality within which we are active participants and collaborators -- it is, then, reality itself (spirit) that comes to know itself through us, and to formulate it this way is to make clear that neither "idealism" nor "realism" are really adequate to characterize what is going on here. Still, this is a quibble (and of course there are many similar quibbles I might raise) regarding what is on the whole a very valuable and intriguing work that has played an important part in the process of once again turning serious attention within the philosophical community to the indispensible philosophical work of Hegel. Indispensable for serious study of Hegel's philosophy.
|