From Publishers Weekly
Opening with an account of the rise of Vietnamese communism and ending with the fall of Saigon, this encompassing study reveals how "one side's human, ideological, and organizational resources led it to victory under conditions of vast material inferiority." Kolko, a historian who now teaches in Canada, examines in depth issues such as land reform, the social system in South Vietnam, the ideological foundations of the Vietnamese Communist Party and the economic impact of the war on the United States. He contends that our policymakers ("with certain reservations and lapses") never considered an outright military victory possible, and he pointedly draws a connection between the Washington-Saigon alliance and the "current dilemma of the U.S.'s relationship to all of its Third World clients, on which it has become fatally dependent as instruments for applying its foreign policy." A notable aspect of the book is the author's admiration for the flexibility and inventiveness of the North Vietnamese, contrasted with his disdain for the doggedly unrealistic countermeasures of the Americans and South Vietnamese. January 20
Copyright 1985 Reed Business Information, Inc.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
From Library Journal
In this detailed and provocative study, Kolko analyzes the U.S.-Vietnamese war on two levels: first, as a protracted collision between two dynamic and changing social systems; and second, as a crisis in the U.S. attempt to extend its social and political order. Viewing the war as a violent social and political process, Kolko examines the several structural forces that shaped the behavior of the Vietnamese Communist revolutionaries, U.S. policymakers, and America's Saigon clients. He sees their conflict as a three-sided struggle, played out within a highly complex international arena and against the unexpected volatility of U.S. domestic politics. Essentially unconcerned with individuals, Kolko concentrates on the inherent dilemmas and contradictions that faced different collective actors, and his approach makes for stiff and stilted reading. Yet it is worth the effort, for this work should stand as the most sophisticated Marxist explication of the war and its significance for some time to come. Charles DeBenedetti, History Dept., Univ. of Toledo, Ohio
Copyright 1985 Reed Business Information, Inc.
--This text refers to an out of print or unavailable edition of this title.
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