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A genius for war: The German army and general staff, 1807-1945

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The impetus for writing this book came while Trevor Depuy was constructing a mathematical model for a World War II wargame based on the records of actual engagements between the Germans and Allies. Much to his surprise, he learned that even after several years of total war, homeland bombardment and facing numerically superior enemies, the Germans still retained a 30% edge in combat effectiveness. That is, on the battlefields of Europe in 1944, 100 German troops were the equivalent 130 US or British troops. He wanted to know how and why these "defeated" German armies could fight so well?

The answer to the riddle of superior German combat effectiveness, Depuy says, has nothing to do with genetic or cultural traits of aggressiveness or obedience to authority, as others have suggested. Rather, he argues that the superiority was a deliberate product of the German General Staff, which was incredibly successful in its mission of institutionalizing military excellence through extremely competitive officer selection processes, advanced training, an emphasis on military history and individual initiative in combat, and a commitment to objectivity in planning and analysis. Indeed, Depuy says the General Staff was able to institutionalize military genius, usually found only in rare individuals such as Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Napoleon and others in the pantheon of military greats. As abhorrent as Nazi policies may have been - and as culpable as the officer corps may have been in the atrocities of the Nazi regime by either direct collaboration or failure to intervene - Depuy argues that nothing can take away from the fact that the German army consistently out-planned, out-manuevered, and out-fought the Allies. Moreover, they often accomplished these feats against incredible odds, including significantly smaller forces, lack of air superiority, and the complete compromise of their operational plans through successful Allied code-breaking efforts.

It should be noted that while Depuy's work is highly readable and sound on facts, it is far from original. His citations - which are few and far between - come almost exclusively from secondary sources. Depuy doesn't make any significant contribution to our understanding of the General Staff, its genesis, development and accomplishments beyond what Ritter ("The Sword and Scepter"), Craig ("The Politics of the Prussian Army"), Goerlitz ("A History of the German General Staff") and others have already made. These three sources, in particular, clearly were the foundation of Depuy's work, although he does, at times, take issue with some of their conclusions.

Its lack of originality doesn't mean the book is without value or virtue. Indeed, for those looking for a concise review of the history of the German General Staff with a distinct focus on how it influenced combat effectiveness, and not wishing to delve into a book long on details and thoroughly academic in nature, Depuy's "A Genius for War" may be the right book for you. If, however, you are interested in a more complete study of the General Staff, including the critical issues of civil-military relations and one that puts German military developments in the context of the European state system of the times, this reviewer would strongly suggest that you stick with Craig, Ritter and Goerlitz.

Right at the very beginning, and at the conclusion, Dupuy corrected some of the most common stereotypes in our minds: the Prussia/German armed force has no monopoly on discipline nor soldierly quality; historically speaking, German people has no obvious warlike nor militaristic tendency, compared with Romans, Celts, Vikings, Mongols, Turks; from the outstanding performance of the current Bundeswehr, a democratic and constitutional government can go hand in hand with military effectiveness; from the expansionist colonial policy of Britain, France, and US in 19th century, and that of Rome and Athens in ancient time, democracy does not necessarily prevent military aggression; military genius like Napoleon, Hannibal etc are not free from making bad mistakes, we call them genius partly because their opponents outblundered them.

This book gives very thorough and insightful analysis of how military genius and effectiveness are systemmatically institutionalized ever since General Scharnhorst proposed this concept in late 18th century. General Scharnhorst, after the Prussian defeat at Jena, together with Gneisenau, Boyen, Grolman and Clausewitz (the 5 "Reformers") pioneered in theories of General Staff as a self-perpetuating institution in maintaining an armed force at the highest readiness for war, and transforming theories into doctrine and organization.
The unmatchable military excellence of the Prusso-German General Staff and Army were demonstrated throughout the 19th-20th century, and chronologically illustrated in the book . Its influence endures up to now and future.
Ever since 1807, Prussia-Germany no longer has to count on the rise of genius like Napoleon or Frederick the Great to win battles; the General Staff respond and adapt to changes, continuously update and upgrade itself, study military experience and history with seriousness and objectiveness, produce intellectual and intelligent officers to direct, plan, coordinate and prepare for wars, and even defeat opposing armies that were led by genius!
Dupuy has written such a splendid book of wisdom, I highly recommend this book for anyone who is interested in modern European military history, probably one of the best of its kind.

This is an interesting and well written book that purports to address the question of why the German military was superior to all other armies, in victory and defeat, for more than 125 years. Dupuy claims that it was the result of the institutionalization of military excellence in the General Staff. In the end, Dupuy's claims are not well supported by his text. It is not at all clear why the German General Staff was superior to the French (or that of any other country's) military leadership. The relationship between the German General Staff and the average foot soldier is also unexplored. If the Staff was the key element, why couldn't they lead the Turkish and/or Austria-Hungarian armies to victory in WWI? The idea of making the General Staff a scientific instrument from which men of ability and energy would naturally rise to the top was clearly a great strength of the German military, but it doesn't tell the whole story of German military successes during this period.

I would argue that this book is not so much about the General Staff as about the relationship between the Staff and the political leadership of Germany/Prussia from 1815 to 1945. There are short vignettes of most of the General Staff leadership, and much of the book is taken up describing the political machinations between the military and political leadership. The strongest parts of the this book are the discussion (and consequences) of the loss of civilian control of the German military after the Franco-Prussion War, and the confused political and military maneuverings after the defeat of Germany in WWI. If one is truly interested in learning about the General Staff, this is not the best choice. This book does not describe the General Staff as an institution (i.e. the details of how it functioned). Better references are listed by some of the other reviewers. Overall, an interesting and easy read, but it misses it's stated mark.

My strongest impression after reading this book is that English language biographies of Scharnhorst and Halder need to be written.

I found this book to be very readable and thoughtful. However, the most fascinating point was the data on combat effectiveness that led TN Dupuy to write the book. The primary conclusion is that the German General Staff was "the" reason for the effectiveness of the German army. In fact, the Germans had a very unbalanced army, and their biggest failing may have been in logistics, the quintessential staff activity.
One of the data points that Dupuy discusses is that after roughly August of 1944 the Americans were the equal of the Germans in combat effectiveness when they had tactical air cover. I think this tells us two things, first that experience counts a LOT in running a war. Remember, the Germans had been fighting hard since 1939. German accounts tell us that their takeover of Austria - the Anschluss - was a mess. Because this was unopposed it amounted to their first large scale maneuvers after WWI, and they weren't very good. They effectively got their training in Czeschoslovakia, Austria, and Poland. The Americans got their training in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. They started out terrible, but got better over time. By August 1944 their army (and I emphasize army, not infantry) was as good as the Germans. The second thing Dupuy's statistics tell us is that the Americans organized their army differently. For some reason, there is a tendency to credit the German army with better fighting capabilities because their infantry was better than the Americans (it probably was) and their tanks were better on a one-for-one basis (they were MUCH better). One of the biggest reasons for diminished American infantry effectiveness was their incredibly bad replacement system, whereby new recruits were sent up to units engaged in combat without time to be trained in local conditions or incorporated into their units. As Martin Creveld has documented, these soldiers were slaughtered. They frequently died or were wounded before the rest of the men in their new unit knew who they were. On the other hand, from the beginning, American artillery was much better than the German, and the American tactical air support was infinitely superior. Similarly, while American tanks were individually inferior to German tanks, there were a lot of them. Although many accounts of tank warfare would have you believe that tank warfare is about individual duels of tank on tank, like two knights jousting, this is not the case. It is about bringing firepower to bear in critical and dangerous places. If you lose two tanks to their one, but you have three tanks, you get to apply firepower where it matters, not the other guy. Similar things can be said about tactical air cover. If you can bring in a fighter bomber, and they can't, you "win". The last scene in Finding Private Ryan where the fighter bomber takes out the tank may have been exaggerated, but in an operational sense it was very accurate. Critics seem to think it isn't fair if you have more of a weapon than the other side does. I wonder if these same people would be willing to evaluate the excellent Polish cavalry which was decimated in 1939 fighting against German tanks and conclude that therefore the Polish army was better. The Americans utilized different weapons systems differently from the Germans, but were in fact VERY effective once they learned. I think the Americans AND the Germans learned not in staff school, but by doing on the battlefield - an incredibly difficult and dangerous job.
In short I think the book is a very good read, but I think you can disagree with the conclusions.

Trevor N. Dupuy's work, "A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945" is a first rate look at German military theory and practice over roughly a century and a half. Dupuy's central thesis is that Germany's General Staff created a institution of military excellence designed to produce officers with exceptional strategic abilities. Dupuy's research is exhaustive and lends credence to his argument. For instance, the fact that both Erich Ludendorff and Max Hoffman independently came up with the same strategy to counter the Russian attack before Tannenberg is attributed by Dupuy to Germany's General Staff system. This book is filled with keen insight that will delight military historians and casual readers both.

This is ultimately a book with a highly questionable thesis that suffers from the same narrow military myopia that afflicted it's subject matter i.e. the Prussian/German General Staff 1807-1945. Dupuy argues that the US, and other nations should adopt the principals and doctrine of the German General Staff in our own military if we want to perform at the same level of military excellence that the Germany army supposedly demonstrated in the wars between 1807-1945.

What the author neglects in his analysis is to realize that the German general staff, its doctrine and philosophy were inextricably linked to the very unique and unusual historical developments that shaped the Prussian (but not the German) state: namely, a nation with a small, well-educated population and highly ambitious rulers, but with no natural defensive barriers, easily invaded and surrounded by larger and more powerful neighbours all with greater natural and human resources. The near-disastrous consequences of the Thirty Years and the Seven Years Wars and later the Napoleonic Wars for that nation all contributed to the formation of the core elements of the general staff and its philosophy. The centrepiece of this was the almost dogmatic emphasis on an offensive military doctrine in which Prussia must achieve quick, decisive and overwhelming victories against its numerically superior opponents. Hence the need to assiduously study war, draw up detailed plans for all manner of possible future conflicts with any number of diplomatic and strategic permutations, exploit the latest technical advances, encourage excellence and professionalism in its officer corps etc. All very well.

The success of this doctrine in the German Wars of reunification: 1864-1871, appeared to vindicate the philosophy but in fact contained the seeds of its own downfall and the destruction of the nation it created, Imperial Germany, a totally different animal from the Prussia that gave birth to it. The failure to adapt military, political and diplomatic doctrine policy to the reality of the new Germany - a mighty industrial power with an exploding population at the centre of Europe - would have disastrous consequences for Germany in the 20th Century.

My main objection to the book is that Dupuy does not take sufficient account of this geopolitical and geostrategic context in understanding how the Prussian-German general staff was formed and why it is a unique product of Prussian history that cannot and should not be applied to other countries, least of all to the US, or even to Russia or say China today. US doctrine is based on the philosophy of 'overwhelming force' because in most wars it could bring that to bear with great success, with the exception of Vietnam. That may change in the future if China emerges as a great power. Equally, Great Britain's power rested on its navy and the control of the seas, also very successful. Why should Britain, the US or France need to adopt the principals of the German General Staff and develop an offensive military doctrine on land? It's a nonsense. Israel is arguably a nation that has faced similar strategic and geopolitical choices and challenges to 18-19th Century Prussia which is why it developed a highly successful offensive military doctrine, but which in the last decades has led it into a diplomatic and strategic cul de sac from which it appears psychologically unable to extricate itself, just as Imperial Germany found it difficult to escape its Prussian military legacy.

What the author fails to understand is that there is a great danger in being overconfident in relying on the success of your arms on the battlefield, in that it often closes you off to other strategic and diplomatic options, normally with disastrous consequences. For example,
*the offensive nature of the Schlieffen Plan in WWI that violated Belgian neutrality brought Britain's declaration of war;
*the German decision in the First World War to begin unrestricted submarine warfare that brought the US into the war, sealing Germany's fate.
*Ditto Hitler's decision to attack Russia in 1941 in the unshakeable conviction that the Wehrmacht after its successes 1940-41 was invincible. There are plenty of other examples.

One should therefore treat the book's thesis with a fair degree of scepticism and maintain a critical distance when evaluating the author's conclusions.

I would like to add these points to the comments of the Texas reviewer:

This is more than military history - it's a rigorous and convincing demonstration that organization matters, and the correct approach to organization development can affect the course of history.

The book had its beginning in Dupuy's discovery that his standard simulation did not match the facts. Rather than ignore the discrepancy, he set out to find out what was wrong with the simulation, and the result is this admirable book.

Counter-historians can ask what would have happened if the king of Prussia had not been able to have Gerhard von Scharnhorst head his Military Reorganization Commission after the disastrous defeat of 1806.

Authors between projects can ask themselves why there is no biography in English of Scharnhorst.