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9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Interesting insights into the mind of a besieged dictator, January 15, 2007
Upfront disclosure - I'm a 33 year old Indian male living in the US, and I'm generally going to focus on the strengths of the book. And the 4 stars is for content and ability to hold interest, mine atleast.
Of all the dictators on the planet, surely Musharraf leads one of the most fascinating and dangerous lives. And how often does a ruling dictator write an accessible book? It makes for fascinating reading if only to gain a perspective not available on CNN or other news source. Musharraf is clearly an extremely talented, shrewd and for the most part cogent writer that understands his place in the delicate balance of American anti-terrorism efforts and escalating domestic and to some extent Islamic-world discontent at his handling of the war against terror and the aftermath of AQ Khan's misdeeds. The book illustrates the somewhat absolute influence of the Pakistan army over civilian lives and decisions as well as the alarming possibility that it may be difficult for even Musharraf to exert complete control over miscreant elements within it. Musharraf himself may be trying to curb the extent of the army's influence in domestic life now and probably because he realizes the very instrument that allowed him to get power may end up destroying him and any hope of a workable detente with India. It also highlights the flaws in simplistically poking holes in Pakistani domestic and foreign policy without gaining an understanding of the knife-edge on which Musharraf himself operates.
The book of course has its flaws. From the self-promotion, to the egregiously erroneous account of Kargil compared to neutral observers and journalists, to the obvious focus on events and details of events that establish a clearly biased position...
Regardless, it is a fun book to read for anyone that cares about the sub- continent and the people that shape it.
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26 of 32 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Gripping but with flaws and contradictions, October 8, 2006
Whether President Musharraf's book is full of lies or not, we'll never know for sure but I can say one thing for sure - it is one of the most gripping books I have read this year. He gives a very detailed account of all the critical things that have hapenned in Pakistan politics in the last 10 or so years starting with the Kargil conflict. It is as expected a very accessible reading, almost conversational in style. His writing has a distinct lack of guile and he is not afraid to discuss highly controversial issues such as his military coup or his decision to not give up his military powers in 2004 as he had earlier promised. His explanations though are not always convincing. If you like mystery novels, you would love the chapters where he explains in detail how Pakistan's intelligence services tracked down and then arrested a number of most wanted terrorists. It's literally a day-by-day and in some cases (like the chapter on his military coup) a minute-by-minute detail of events. Once you pick it up, you won't be able to put it down.
What I don't like about the book is its annoying and overdone bravado, numerous repititions (sometime ridiculous to the point that even the same page is pasted in multiple places to describe the same event multiple times leaving the reader turning the pages to make sure he is not reading the same chapter again) and sometimes just way too much self-promotion. The fact that it is gripping doesn't mean that it is flawless. In fact it has a few major flaws and contradictions. What I find quite amusing is that Mr. Musharraf contradicts himself in so many places without ever noticing it. In the chapter on Kargil conflict, for example, most of the evidence he lays out in painstaking detail actually implicates Pakistan as the instigator. But he being totally oblivious to that, keeps on browbeating about how brave his soldiers were and how India had forced them unwittingly into the conflict. In places, he criticizes somebody for doing something in one chapter and two chapters later he describes how he did essentially the samething at a later time.
I get a distinct feeling from reading this book that Mr. Musharraf has a deep disregard for bureaucracy, politicians and in general of any form of civilian administration. He hammers home this point at several occassions in the book not the least of which is the way he continuously refers to the 1990's decade as the "dreaded decade of democracy" in Pakistan. There is a general consensus among Pakistani intelligentsia that Zia's 11 years dictatorship caused more long-lasting harm to every institution and indeed the very social fabric of Pakistan than any other government in the history of the country with the excpetion of Yahya Khan's short-lived regime. Yet while Mr. Musharraf spends a lot of ink vilifying each democratically elected prime minister all the way from Mr. Bhutto to the last government of Nawaz Sharif, he is unduly reserved in his criticism of Zia's regime and of Zia-ul-Haq himself. You get a sense of military brotherhood when he talks about Zia and even about Yahya Khan - I find that most disconcerting. Also I find it propagandistic given the simple and undisputable fact that Pakistan for most of its tumultous political history has been under one military rule or another and democracy has never been given sufficient time to flourish in the country.
The numbers Mr. Musharraf quotes to prove how his government has turned around the economy are very impressive. Mr. Musharraf's government is currently in the midst of major economic scandals and some of the statistics he so proudly quotes in his book have been disputed by non-partisan institutions and experts. However, overall you do get a sense and I think quite rightly so that his government is doing a better job than any other government in the last decacde or so in Pakistan especially when it comes to economy and freedom of the press. He also discusses at length his plans to strengthen democratic institutions in Pakistan and to provide women means to prosper politically, socially and economically in a male-dominated Pakistani society. Whether he is sincere in his plans or not, he is certainly the first head of government in Pakistan post-Bhutto who at least has identified the true causes of failure of democracy in Pakistan and has a pragmatic plan of action to correct those failures. I get the feeling that some of his ideas in this regard have been inspired by Farid Zakaria's writings on democrarcy and freedom. In any case, his plans seem practical and I hope he remains sincere to his words and actually succeeds in implementing them hopefully by taking a more inclusive approach.
I especially enjoyed reading Mr. Musharraf's views on the so-called clash of civilizations. His thoughts though not original are insightful and expressed in a logical fashion. He goes on to present his personal ideas on how to resolve the Israeli-Palestine problem. He does the same for the Kashmir conflict. In both cases, I was struck by the pragmatic nature of his ideas. It would have been more comfortable for him to take extreme positions on both of these issues. Such extreme rhetoric would have resonated well with the majority of Muslim masses all over the world. Instead by his candor and logical stance, he shows that he is indeed sincere about resolving these issues and is actually pursuing a viable plan of action. Like most Pakistanis, I have no illusions that Mr. Musharraf would be able to resolve any of the two issues. I do think, however, that he might be able to institute a new way of thinking and perhaps even a process in place that might help resolve these issues several years down the road.
The secular intelligentsia in Pakistan may be divided into three broad groups as far as their views on Musharraf's regime are cocerned. First is group of intellectuals who will oppose his regime regardless of whatever it does. This is the group of individuals who believe that democracy is not just a means but an end in itself and thus a dictatorship benign or otherwise must cease to exist. They have some very valid points and most of their views cannot be discounted. The other extreme is the group that believes that democrarcy is a foreign idea and can never flourish in the socio-cultural environment in Pakistan. This group has some valid points too though theirs are based more on how democratic regimes have fared so far in Pakistan. As such at times they sound too short-sighted. There is fortunately a steadily growing third group of intellectuals in Pakistan who are willing to give Musharraf's regime a chance. This is largely a breakaway from the first group. This is the group of individuals who were very skeptical of Musharraf's regime early on but were refreshingly surprised to see that his regime is not marred by the same ills that had characterized prior military governments. For example, his is the first dictatorship in Pakistan's history that has not only tolerated but actively encouraged freedom of speech and expression. Even Pakistan's democratically elected governments have a shameful record in this regard. Mr. Bhutto, for example, was known to use sometimes brutal and humiliating means to quiesce leaders of the media, Mr. Sharif's government would stop all government advertisements (a major source of a newspaper revenue) for those newspapers that openly criticized his regime. Both had a tight control on television and radio and never allowed any difference of opinion to surface there. No point discussing the prior military regimes as they were just outright savage when it came to even a slight difference of opinion. Similarly, Mr. Musharraf is doing a lot more for the rights of women and minorities in Pakistan than the prior regimes. In this and many other regards, Musharraf's is a more democratic regime than Pakistan has seen in its history i.e. if you subscribe to the point of view that the foremost objective of democracy is to provide social, political and economic justice to the people regardless of their race, gender or ethnic background. Mr. Musharraf's record is mixed when it comes to ethnic minorities, the Bughti crisis being the case in point. However, in my opinion the jury is still out on this one. Mr. Musharraf's regime just like his book is not perfect, in fact it's full of flaws but at least there seems to be a genuine attempt to correct the damage done by the successive regimes before him. Nevertheless, this group is running out of patience. Everytime Mr. Musharraf twists the constitution to suit his needs, he loses support among the people in the third group and that support is vital to his government's survival. Pakistanis have a lot to be pessimistic about, what the poeple need is an optimistic piture of the future and tangible progress towards it. This optimistic future doesn't just have justice and economic prosperity but also provides the Pakistanis the ability to elect their own representatives including the head of the state. Mr. Musharraf needs to do a lot more in this regard and he needs to do it fast as many of his supporters are turning back into cynics.
The book is written mainly for international readers and mystery and suspense fans of all backgrounds and I think both groups will enjoy it immensely. The main objective of the book seems to be three-folds - (a) promote Mr. Musharraf as the great secular leader of the Muslim world essentially the 21st century Attaturk and prove that he is the best thing that could happen to not only Pakistan but to the world at large (b) improve Pakistan's image in the eyes of the international public and prove that Pakistan is doing its very best in fighting terrorism and last but not least to emphatically counter the views that India's lobby routinely spreads against the country. I think Mr. Musharraf succeeds in achieving these objectives with varying degrees of success.
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6 of 6 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Insight into pakistan-though factually tailored, November 13, 2006
A Prime Minister orchestrating the hijacking of his military chief, a President's cavalcade being rocked by blasts which throw his car into the air which is then driven on rims for miles to safety, manhunts of al-qaeda's top leadership in Pakistan's fashionable urban centers as well as its desolate deserts and mountains, often using cell phone monitoring and DNA evidence from mutilated bodies, tense negotiations between the world's newest nuclear powers and instituting moderation, democratic reform and economic revival in a Muslim state veering towards extremism. All these elements, rightly choreographed, could be woven into a best-selling novel. However, we are not discussing fiction-this is the story of Pakistan's sitting President, Pervez Musharraf, whose real life memoir, "In the Line of Fire," is selling like hot a best seller.
The book must be read because it opens a window into Pakistan-a frontline country in the global war on terror. Pakistan stands poised on a fork-one prong leading to democracy, moderate Islam and economic revival and the other venturing into the uncertainty of reactionary Islamic extremism and economic uncertainty. It is also important because very little independent accounts of the country's contemporary affairs are available, and this one comes from the sitting head of government, who is likely to steer Pakistan's ship for some time to come.
The downside is that the account is biased-as Musharraf targets the West as the primary audience for his work- and ends up portraying himself as the indispensable saviour of the sinking state of Pakistan. The reality is that Pakistan is not sinking and he is not indispensable.
For a student of the complex state that is Pakistan, this book offers valuable insights into Pakistan's "collective mindset," which permeates the narrative. Unlike India, which inherited the infrastructure of British India, Pakistan could barely survive after the partition holocaust of 1947, which saw millions killed. When the nascent state perceived it was deprived of Kashmir due to a nonexistent military in 1947-48, it assumed a "Pakistan-under-siege" mindset, which still prevails even if has lessened in intensity. The quest for security strengthened the military disproportionately against other institutions of the state and has led to the khaki shadow engulfing all aspects of Pakistan, infact choking civilian growth. The desire to "liberate" Kashmir is so strong, that it has led to two military misadventures, one in 1965 and the other in 1999, ie, Kargil. The "Pakistan-under-siege" mindset was further reinforced, rather permanently etched into Pakistan's "establishment," after its dismemberment in 1971. After the 1974 India test, Pakistan went all out to get a nuclear deterrent, which explains the kind of autonomy AQ Khan enjoyed till his infamous exploits in exporting nuclear technology were discovered in 2003. The mindset also explains Pakistan's aversion to taking strong action against the Taliban because of the need to secure its western frontier.
The fascinating parts of the book relate to the hunt for the elusive leaders of al-qaeda, especially Abu Zubaida, Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, and Al-Libbi. Abu Zubaida was arrested as a result of 13 simultaneous raids in urban Punjab. Khalid Sheikh Mohammad had chosen a safe house in Rawalpindi, akin to the Pentagon in the US, a few minutes from Pakistan army's headquarters. A low level al-qaeda courier had squeaked about the general area and not the specific houses. On intuition, Pakistan's intelligence raided two houses to arrest him. Al-Libbi was missed thrice in Pakistan's rugged Frontier province before he was surrounded by burqa (black veil) wielding Pakistani agents. The tools used to arrest these "high value" targets were cell phone tracing done indigenously by using the SIMs (subscriber identification modules) in the first generation mobile phones used by al-qaeda operatives, half burnt id cards and of course, intelligence provided by CIA which has constantly worked with Pakistan's agencies. These encounters in chapter 20-25 run like a James Hadley Chase thriller.
Written in a simple and personal style, there is a lot of "I" in the book. In the beginning, it doesn't irk, because Musharraf describes his formative years. However, one starts to realize soon that there is a lot of smugness and self-applause in the book, mostly at the expense of others. Parts of the narrative appear vain and childishly self-praising. Witness his description of his relations with his subordinates when he commanded a unit. "I have always been loved by those under my command and therefore I could move them to achieve anything I desired. ----------I ran with them (normally in the lead)." However, such parts also lend an honesty to the narrative-he is writing what he believes-and has not tampered his account to suit his readership.
The facts in the book have been factually tailored to suit Musharraf, and herein lies its greatest weakness. Kargil- described by Musharraf as a victory- was actually an embarrassing misadventure. Musharraf counts the Indian losses, but not the loss of life on the Pakistani side, as well as the diplomatic disaster that ensued. His account of the 2001 Agra summit with Prime Minister Vajpayee puts the blame of failure on India's extremist BJP leadership, conveniently forgetting his ill-timed, show stealing, Kashmir centric televised press conference which actually the chances of a compromise. The blame for sharing nuclear technology is put solely on AQ Khan's shoulders, although it is implausible to imagine that the then military leadership, which included Musharraf, was in the dark. His remarks about some of his military colleagues leave a bad taste, as do his remarks about some of his Indian and Afghan interlocutors. On the domestic front, he highlights one of Pakistan's human rights heroines, Mukhtaran Mai, but conveniently forgets another equally courageous woman, Dr Shazia Khalid, who was allegedly raped by a military officer and later whisked away to London. This case also reveals Musharraf's blind spot-the overarching and debilitating shadow of Pakistan's military on the state, which had choked civil society institutions.
Musharraf also disappoints as far as his reform agenda for Pakistan is concerned. His theory of enlightened moderation is admirable, but his plans for poverty alleviation in Pakistan seem amateurish and inadequate. By ousting Pakistan's two popular, though discredited civilian leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's democracy can at best be described as controlled. In seven years, he has done nothing to improve social services at the peoples level; nothing to improve the judiciary and law enforcement and civil service reform is non-existent. His dishing out of all top civilian jobs to retired and serving military officers has led to resentment and demoralization in the civil service. One can easily see that he cannot think beyond himself, and beyond the army. Therefore he seems incapable of ushering in real democracy and real reform of Pakistan's civil society and social sectors. Real democracy would be a threat to his remaining in office and real reform would only be possible if the exorbitant defence expenditure and dominance of military is rolled back-something he is incapable of doing.
Disappointments aside, the book is valuable because it opens up to the world the mind of Pakistan's ruler, and of Pakistan's collective decision making mindset. Musharraf's pomposity, tailoring of facts and the use of the "I," though irritating, also mean that the narrative comes from his heart, and is an honest rendition of his feelings and policies, past, present and future. As a Pakistani, one cannot help but wishing that he would turn out to be a Pakistani De Gualle, someone who ushers in real reform in Pakistan and fades away. But for that to happen-Musharraf would have to metamorphose before he can endeavor to change Pakistan.
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