Product Description
Iterative combinatorial auctions (ICAs) are IT-basedeconomic mechanisms in which bidders submit bundlebids iteratively and the auctioneer computesallocations and ask prices in each auction round. Inaddition to strategic problems, the design of suchauction formats exhibits hard computational problems.More recently, researchers have focused on thepricing and information feedback in ICAs. This bookpresents the results of 5 years research in thisfield, whereas the emphasis was put on the practicalapplicability of considered auction designs andpricing mechanisms in these auctions. The main topicof this book is a comprehensive comparison of themost important auction designs proposed in theliterature by means of computational and laboratoryexperiments. Additionally, the book presents a newauction design ALPS, which has been shown veryefficient and robust in many settings. In laboratoryexperiments all considered auction designs weretested for practical applicability and robustnessagainst diverse bidding strategies.
About the Author
Alexander Pikovsky received his diploma in Financial and EconomicMathematics (Dipl.-Math. Oec. Univ.) and then his Ph.D. inComputer Science at the Technical University of Munich (Germany).He is involved in research and development in the areas ofmulti-dimensional auctions, combinatorial optimization andmathematical finance.
