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39 of 52 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
A timely book about the struggle to understand the constitution, September 12, 2005
No more timely book concerning the American judicial system could have appeared at this time. As I write this review we are awaiting the confirmation of two new supreme court justices, a change that could transform the nation for decades to come, especially given the recent penchant for appointing young judges. Like many Americans, I'm extremely concerned about trends in the supreme and appeals courts of recent decades. Even many Republican legislators have grown increasingly concerned about a growing tendency of many Federalist Society justices on all levels to overturn federal legislation, in effect expanding the power of the courts and decreasing the power of our elected officials. With increasing talk of a Constitution in Exile and a willingness of very conservative judges to overturn well-established legal precedent and bipartisan legislation, this truly is a critical point in American legal history.
Cass Sunstein takes head on the predominant activist judicial philosophy in this clearly written study and tries to explain the reason why on legal grounds it is both highly suspect as an interpretative method and undesirable in its potential effects. He begins by insisting that "liberal" versus "conservative" is an extremely unhelpful distinction. He instead defines four methods of judicial interpretation: 1) Perfectionism, which attempts to make the constitution as good as it can be, 2) Majoritarianism, which attempts to reduce the role of the court and overwhelmingly favor legislation by elected officials, 3) Minimalism, which abjures making decisions about large principles and issues, and instead seeks to make small incremental changes in the constitution by making very narrow judicial decisions, and 4) Fundamentalism, which holds that the constitution must be interpreted according to the intent of the ratifiers (not the framers) of the constitution. Sunstein points out that while Perfectionism has played a significant role in the past (indeed, the greatest American Justice ever, John Marshall, could be described as a Perfectionist, while many of the major decisions, such as Brown v. Board of Education, can be described as Perfectionistic in nature), no one currently on the supreme court can be so labeled. Likewise, though one of the most famous of all Supreme Court justices, Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., could be described as a Majoritarian, no one today either on the Supreme Court or the Appeals courts holds that position. Most justices, according to Sunstein, take a Minimalist position, which is the approach he defends. But he believes that the stability and integrity of the American legal system is being threatened by a growing number of Fundamentalist judges, and the book is largely a defense of Minimalism and a critique of Fundamentalism.
For the most part Sunstein restricts himself to purely legal considerations, though he hints at a truth that most journalists would point out rather more strongly than he does: that Fundamentalism is primarily a way of getting a political agenda instituted by circumventing the electoral process. He points out that it is distressing to see how constantly Fundamentalists, who allegedly argue for a nonpartisan reading of the Constitution, actually hew rather closely to the most radical ideas of the far right of the Republican party. Though he acknowledges this to be the case, for the most part he concentrates on more purely considerations. For instance, the Fundamentalists insist that every decision must be based on the text of the Constitution as understood by the ratifiers, which means that decisions much be based on the best possible historical understanding of the words of the constitution. The bulk of the book consists of Sunstein looking at a number of the most pressing constitutional issues-e.g., the right to privacy, the right to marry, race and affirmative action, national security, the separation of powers, the establishment clause, free speech, and second amendment issues-and analyzing what the effect of adjudicating them from a fundamentalist position would be. He finds that Fundamentalism is often inconsistent with the best historical understanding-in fact, often formulating positions in direct opposition to the historical record, such as in free speech issues or affirmative action-and almost always undesirable or imprudent.
One example of the historical side of his argument will suffice. Fundamentalists insist that the Second Amendment establishes the right for individuals to own guns. But an examination of the history reveals much that contradicts this. For instance, it is the lone amendment that is directed at providing the individual states a right against the federal government, namely, the right to form state militias. Moreover, the only major Supreme Court decision ever undertaken (United States v. Miller) affirmed the right of Congress to limit the kinds of weapons that could be sold and owned. Perhaps most telling of all, the Supreme Court ruled in 1886 that the Second Amendment was the only one of the Bill of Rights that was not incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, the Court has always treated the amendment as treating the relationship between the states and the federal, and did not involve individuals at all. (Obviously, gun ownership can still easily be legal: there is simply no clear constitutional proof that it is a right guaranteed by the Bill of Rights as the NRA so vigorously asserts.) But in looking at this issue, Fundamentalists completely ignore the historical record which they state is of such crucial importance.
Much of Sunstein's argument hinges on the potential chaos that could result if Fundamentalists had their understanding of the constitution become normative. In essence, he is arguing that Fundamentalism could produce results that are undesirable, imprudent, and destructive. Do we really want a nation in which the federal government could discriminate on the basis of race or gender? Do we want any restrictions on campaign financing to be made illegal? Do we want the right to privacy eliminated? Do we want it possible for states to establish an official state religion (e.g., Mormonism in Utah, probably the only state where there is a single dominant church)? Do we want advertisements to be completely unregulated? Do we want the Clean Water Act to be stricken down? All of these things could take place on Fundamentalist grounds. Obviously, very, very few Americans would like to see much or any of this take place. In other words, Fundamentalism could lead to a nation that few would desire. And surely the point of a constitution is providing a stable, fair government that promotes the general welfare. On this test, fundamentalism would obviously fail.
My lone criticism of the book lies with a fact that Sunstein only lightly touches upon. This concerns the likelihood that we could all come up with an agreed upon historical understanding of the phrases of the constitution. If one reads a great deal of early history of the United States, one of the first things that one is struck by is how the first generation argued about what was and was not permitted by the constitution. Remember, these were debates among the framers and ratifiers of the constitution. Washington, Hamilton, Adams, and Madison (I leave out Jefferson because he was neither a framer nor a ratifier) had sharp disagreements about what the constitution did or did not allow. If these men had no ready agreement about the Constitution, how could we possibly today come to any agreement? I think Sunstein could and should have made much more of this. Even if Fundamentalism were desirable, it would be impossible. I heartily agree with Sunstein on many other points. He asks why we should desire to set in granite the understanding of men from a couple of centuries ago who had very, very different beliefs about women, race, economics (indeed, most of the founders could be better understood as mercantilists than capitalists), religion, and voting (most felt only property owners should be able to vote) than we do. Sunstein doesn't make this point, but clearly tying ourselves stringently to a late 18th century understanding of the constitution would be to tie ourselves to something that would grow increasingly irrelevant. We have a great constitution, but it must provide the framework for our changing understanding of privacy, race, and gender, not dictate the primacy of their outmoded views.
I recommend this in the strongest possible terms, especially now when we will see the Senate closely examine the judicial philosophy of two new members of the Supreme Court.
Addendum: As I write this on 9/13/05 I am listening to the confirmation hearings of John Roberts to become the new chief justice of the United States Supreme Court. Interestingly, Sen. Orrin Hatch explicitly mentioned Sunstein's book and his distinction between the four types of judicial philosophy, asking Roberts which of the four would best apply towards him. Roberts declined to subscribe to any label, though all of his answers so far and his insistence on being a "modest" judge would seem to lean heavily towards Sunstein's "minimalist" label. One can hope that this is correct, though one is reminded that Clarence Thomas, the most activist justice in memory, came across as a "modest" judge in his hearings just over a decade ago.
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29 of 41 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Actually not a bad book, September 12, 2005
Professor Sunstein's book provides an easy-to-understand description of the major theories of constitutional interpretation at play in the Supreme Court. Although identifying four streams of thought, he focuses on the two most predomiate on today's court, describing the two as "fundamentalism" and "minimalism."
There are two things this book does particalarly well. First, it points out the absudities that would result from truly following a fundamentalist apporach to constitutional interpretation. Second, it demonstrates that the fundamentalists currently on the bench are often "false fundamentalists," abandoning fundamentalism when the result is contrary to what those on the polical right wing desire. Sunstein shows, for instance, that a fundamentalist (or originalist, or traditionalist) reading of the 14th Amendment would favor affirmative action programs, while those justices claiming loyalty to original intent ignore this to acheive the result the Republican party requires. Indeed, it appears that fundamentalists are "perfectionists" of the right: activist judges who are result-oriented under the guise of constitutional interpretation.
This book argues for minimalism. But its defense of minimalism is not especially strong. It comes down to this : The only real choice today is between fundamentalism and minimalism and fundamentalism is awful; thus, minimalism is the way to go. While there is no doubt that fundamentalism is disastrous, not much is offered proactively in support of minimalism or to give strong reasons why majoritarionism or perfectionism should be rejected in its favor. To his credit, Sunstein is upfront that this book primarly argues in favor of minimalism as opposed to fundamentalism, but there is still a lot left out of the discussion. Certainly, minimalism appears sane when the only other choice is fundamentalism; however, these are not the only two choices.
I subtracted a star because the book is not completely trustworthy. Page 93's reference to "Justice William Kennedy" caused me to re-read many passages carefully to make certain I was properly understanding what Sunstein was attempting to convey and that he had not erroneously left out an important word or two. Other minor errors leave the reader to wonder if what is printed is exactly what is intended. In addition, the book as a whole, but particulary the introduction, suffers from abundant over-use of "of course" and "actually." The introduction reads as if it was dictated but never proof read in this respect.
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1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Thought-provoking but not entirely persuasive, April 21, 2009
I found this book to be thought-provoking, although it tries to cover too much ground to be entirely persuasive. The most convincing sections describe how the so-called "fundamentalist" approach will often result in legal interpretations that run counter to the opinions and values held by a majority of Americans, although Sunstein is sometimes too quick to assume that everyone else holds the same opinions that he seems to hold. More importantly, regardless of the possible merits of a sincere originalist approach, he demonstrates that "fundamentalism" is distinct from "originalism," since the positions typically held by self-described originalists generally serve a right-wing political agenda, and original understandings are often downplayed or ignored completely when they don't support that agenda (for example, regarding affirmative action, regulatory takings, and presidential war powers). However, Sunstein's treatment of "fundamentalism" is incomplete in some ways, as other reviewers here have pointed out. And, as someone sympathetic to "perfectionism," I found his facile rejection of "Liberty Perfectionism" (as well as other forms of perfectionism) to be unconvincing. To his credit, Sunstein often points out criticisms that followers of one of the legal approaches he describes might level against the assumptions or arguments used by followers of another approach. And his general point that judges should never be too sure that they are right is well taken, and valid across the political spectrum. So read this book for its relatively non-ideological discussion of the role of judicial review, and prepare to have some of your views supported and others challenged.
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