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32 of 36 people found the following review helpful:
4.0 out of 5 stars
Detailed insight into both a hedge fund and a loan company's abuse of the system, May 12, 2008
The book is really close to being 2 or 3 books in one. Initially heard about the book in the WSJ, I pre-ordered it on Amazon and took a few weeks to read.
In the first part Mr. Einhorn writes several chapters aimed at a non-professional investor to build the background of how a hedge fund invests, building the reader's knowledge from zero to fluent enough to understand the book. There's a glossary in the back of the book to refer to if you forget any of the terms. In fact, later on Mr. Einhorn's open and full disclosure of his investing philosophy, technique, and results contrast with those of Allied Capital and its collection of LLCs.
The second part of the book builds from a small trickle to a river of fraud, and frankly this is the hardest part to get through. You're directed to watch Mr. Einhorn's speech on the web in order to understand a dissection of reactions that follow, and I admit that I felt as if I was reading a story from somebody who was picked on too much in the schoolyard and is taking revenge by writing a book. As I kept reading the chapters the story suddenly took me by surprise (around P.200 or so).
It then becomes a story of how, if you were to implement a business poorly and needed to keep it going no matter what, you would do whatever it took to keep paying a dividend to keep your stock from tanking. You might start by fibbing on the health of the business one year, sell healthy companies to hide your true results a few years later, and start directing campaign donations to the right parties a few years later. In for a penny, in for a pound. Mr. Einhorn didn't mention, but in years past I have read, that Enron kept going for so long because they did a good job spreading their money around to both the politicians and the local community. Mr. Einhorn does mention how much many parts of the US (Wall Street, the various parts of government, and mom-and-pop investors) want to continue the company so as not to lose whatever interest they have vested into the company or system.
In the end I feel educated about his hedge fund, I feel in over my head on how to value a company's investments if the company is similar to Allied Capital, I feel a bit angry on how narrow the scope and small the punishment delivered (but not surprised - I've seen how narrow the scope of investigations of companies are before), and I feel that Mr. Einhorn has, for lack of a more subtle way of putting it, wasted enough of his life worrying about this company. You're not going to get back the years you've spent. You should go on to enjoy something else in life (but I appreciate the sacrifice you made so I could read about this in a book).
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48 of 57 people found the following review helpful:
3.0 out of 5 stars
David Einhorn isn't fooling anyone but himself, July 7, 2008
Overview:
David Einhorn, founder of a successful Wall Street hedge fund, has written a book which describes the controversy surrounding David's hedge fund selling short Allied Capital. While David makes some very damning points about Allied's management, he does not prove his central thesis, namely that Allied engaged in fraud. Despite this flaw, the book is still a worthwhile read.
Background
David's conclusion about ALD were based on his previous experience shorting Sirrom, a company that *was* a fraud and subsequently went bankrupt. Sirrom was in the same industry as Allied, namely loans to small businesses. David concluded that ALD must be a fruad since they, like Sirrom, did not write down the value of troubled assets in a timely manner and management was less than truthful when confronted with this fact (pg. 52). Referring to ALD's managers, David writes "people who are willing to lie about small things have no problem lying about big things" (pg. 64). The rest of the book, almost 300 pages, is David's attempt, unsuccessful in my estimation, to substantiate this claim.
Why "Fooling..." is Worth Reading
Despite the fundamental flaw of stating a thesis that he then fails to substantiate, "Fooling..." is still a worthwhile read for four reasons:
1) David has made a lot of money, and his investment methodology is explained in detail. This is unique, and worthy of serious study.
2) The book documents the inability of regulatory authorities to protect investors from dishonest management practices. Very sobering. Allied did engage in a number of unauthorized accounting practices that victimized it's investors, and none of it's managers were ever punished. In fact, they got rich at their investors expense.
3) It shows that even superstar investors are human. On display is how a very rich man's obsession with proving he is right drove him to stick with a losing position, pouring time and resources into what became a personal crusade. I have made this mistake on a much smaller scale, and I imagine most investors have. Obviously, the book did not intend to teach this lesson, but there it is.
4) Allieds is a "Business Development Corporations" (BDC), and the book explains how BDCs operate and make their money. David opines that BDCs are similar to junk bond funds, but are riskier (pg. 48). BDCs in general are very lucrative and pay high distributions when the USA economy is doing well, and tend to lose a lot of money during a recession. There is a lot of info here that investors can put to work.
Synopsis of Events:
David Einhorn, who is about as successful as a man can be on Wall Street without being Warren Buffet, concluded that Allied Capital is a fraud. He invested almost 8% of his hedge fund selling ALD short (he profits if ALD goes down, loses if it goes up). He then proceeded to try to get regulatory authorities, including the SEC and Eliot Spitzer (at the time the NY Attorney General) to investigate improper practices at Allied. For his efforts, he got investigated himself by these authorities. He recently published "Fooling Some of the People All of the Time" to prove he is right, and the rest of the world (SEC, financial press, investors, the stock market) are all wrong. David calls ALD a "ponzi scheme" (pg. 330), continually raising new capital to pay the dividend. While this claim should be easy to substantiate, no evidence or proof of any kind is offered. David predicts that eventually, ALD's fraudulent practices will cause the demise of the company. When the book was published, despite 6 years of intense effort on David's part to expose ALD, he lost money on his position (when you factor in dividends which he had to pay having shorted the stock).
Epilogue
Today, 8 years after his accusation were first made, ALD is still in business. While it's stock price has under-performed the market, when you factor in the dividends (actually tax distributions) it has been a pretty decent investment. It is hard to imagine how a company that systematically defrauded it's investors could survive 8 years of constant hostile scrutiny from a smart and rich hedge fund, paying hefty dividends the whole time. If it was a ponzy scheme, it should have imploded years ago. As far as I am concerned, this fact, combined with David's lack of hard evidence, disproves his thesis.
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17 of 19 people found the following review helpful:
5.0 out of 5 stars
An important work, May 18, 2008
It would suffice that this book is well-written, engaging and informative, but it is more than that. It is an important book, for two reasons. First, it shows how much of an investment edge it can be to employ deep research and critical thought. The fact that many other investors continued to be fooled by the company even after Einhorn published his analysis may seem frustrating to the reader, but as an investor I view that reaction as confirmatory that there will always be lots of ways for independent, meticulous thinkers to make money. Second, the book demonstrates how difficult and lonely it can be to engage in activist investing, especially from the short side. Consistent with the story in this book, I have almost invariably found that the more correct the activist's views are, the more likely s/he will be subjected to ad hominem attacks; and that, when presented with cogent evidence of a serious problem, government officials either do nothing or protect the malefactor. Indeed, the business news of the last nine months is replete with examples of this. I am unaware of another book on investing that captures this second element. It is all the more commendable that Einhorn can tell this incredibly frustrating tale calmly, resisting the temptation to engage in histrionics or self-righteousness.
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