Quantity:

Express Checkout with PayPhrase

What's this? | Create PayPhrase

More Buying Choices

30 used & new from $21.98

Have one to sell? Sell yours here

Share with Friends

Share your own customer images

Search inside this book

Tell the Publisher! I�d like to read this book on Kindle Don�t have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here.

The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers Volume I) (Paperback)

~ Imre Lakatos (Author), John Worrall (Editor), Gregory Currie (Editor) "For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge - proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses..." (more)
Key Phrases: quantum programme, revolutionary conventionalism, negative crucial experiments, Royal Society, Adam Smith, Alan Musgrave (more...)

5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (2 customer reviews)

List Price:	$53.00
Price:	$45.05 & this item ships for FREE with Super Saver Shipping. Details
You Save:	$7.95 (15%)
	o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

In Stock.
Ships from and sold by Amazon.com. Gift-wrap available.

17 new from $38.44 13 used from $21.98

Formats		Amazon Price	New from	Used from
Hardcover Available from these sellers. Published May 30, 1978	Hardcover, May 30, 1978	--	--	$128.23
Paperback $45.05 In Stock. Published November 27, 1980	Paperback, November 27, 1980	$45.05	$38.44	$21.98

Frequently Bought Together

Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

by Thomas S. Kuhn

4.1 out of 5 stars (131) $9.23

Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2

by Imre Lakatos

5.0 out of 5 stars (2) $49.45

Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (Routledge Classics)

by Karl Raimund Popper

4.6 out of 5 stars (10) $11.37

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965

by Imre Lakatos

5.0 out of 5 stars (4) $36.10

Against Method (Fourth Edition)

by Paul Feyerabend

4.6 out of 5 stars (16) $15.61

› Explore similar items

Editorial Reviews

Review

' ... there is an essential unity of theme and purpose running through all the papers collected in these volumes. Many of the papers, even though they have been previously published, are not fully self-contained and can be understood only by reference to others. Their collection and the editors' cross-referencing thus serves the useful purpose of facilitating an assessment of Lakatos' contribution to philosophy.' Philosophical Books

' ... a well-produced book that every philosopher of science or mathematics will wish to have.' Philosophy

Product Description

Imre Lakatos' philosophical and scientific papers are published here in two volumes. Volume I brings together his very influential but scattered papers on the philosophy of the physical sciences, and includes one important unpublished essay on the effect of Newton's scientific achievement. Volume II presents his work on the philosophy of mathematics (much of it unpublished), together with some critical essays on contemporary philosophers of science and some famous polemical writings on political and educational issues. Imre Lakatos had an influence out of all proportion to the length of his philosophical career. This collection exhibits and confirms the originality, range and the essential unity of his work. It demonstrates too the force and spirit he brought to every issue with which he engaged, from his most abstract mathematical work to his passionate 'Letter to the director of the LSE'. Lakatos' ideas are now the focus of widespread and increasing interest, and these volumes should make possible for the first time their study as a whole and their proper assessment.

See all Editorial Reviews

Product Details

Paperback: 260 pages
Publisher: Cambridge University Press (November 28, 1980)
Language: English
ISBN-10: 0521280311
ISBN-13: 978-0521280310
Product Dimensions: 9.1 x 6 x 0.7 inches
Shipping Weight: 14.4 ounces (View shipping rates and policies)

Average Customer Review: 5.0 out of 5 stars See all reviews (2 customer reviews)

Amazon.com Sales Rank: #484,004 in Books (See Bestsellers in Books)

Would you like to update product info or give feedback on images?

Inside This Book (learn more)

First Sentence:
For centuries knowledge meant proven knowledge - proven either by the power of the intellect or by the evidence of the senses. Read the first page

Key Phrases - Statistically Improbable Phrases (SIPs): (learn more)
quantum programme, revolutionary conventionalism, negative crucial experiments, methodological falsificationist, dogmatic falsificationist, historiographical research programme, naive falsification ism, dogmatic falsificationism, pigeonhole systems, methodological falsificationism, degenerating problemshifts, inconsistent foundations, progressive problemshift, hoc stratagems, unproblematic background knowledge, falsification ist, recalcitrant instances, naive falsificationism, rival research programmes, historiographical criticism, observational theories, sophisticated falsificationist, naive falsificationist, accepted basic statement, positive heuristic

Key Phrases - Capitalized Phrases (CAPs): (learn more)
Royal Society, Adam Smith, Alan Musgrave, Colin Howson, Paul Feyerabend, Tycho Brahe, Victor Kraft, The Logic of Scientific Discovery

New!
Books on Related Topics | Concordance | Text Stats

Citations (learn more)

This book cites 69 books:

The Copernican Revolution: Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought by Thomas S. Kuhn on 6 pages
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics) by Karl Popper on 5 pages
Philosophy of Karl Popper (Library of Living Philosophers) by Paul Arthur Schilpp in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton Science Library) by Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem on page 213, and Back Matter
Mathematics, Science and Epistemology: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2 by Imre Lakatos in Front Matter, and Back Matter

See all 69 books this book cites

51 books cite this book:

Explorations in Economic Methodology: From Lakatos to Empirical Philosophy of Science (Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy, 17) by R. Backhouse on page 37, page 54, and page 69
Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning (Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion) by Nancey Murphy on page 58, and page 102
Imre Lakatos and the Guises of Reason (Science and Cultural Theory) by John Kadvany in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science by Mr. Alan G. Padgett in Back Matter (1), and Back Matter (2)
Fifty Years In Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy (Ashgate Science and Religion Series) by Robert John Russell on page 107, and page 161

See all 51 books citing this book

Books on Related Topics (learn more)

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge by Imre Lakatos

Discusses:

The Strategic Management of Intellectual Capital and Organizational Knowledge by Chun Wei Choo

Discusses:

The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics by Daniel M. Hausman

Discusses:

New Directions in Economic Methodology by R. Backhouse

Discusses:

What Do Customers Ultimately Buy After Viewing This Item?

	68% buy the item featured on this page: The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Volume 1: Philosophical Papers (Philosophical Papers Volume I) 5.0 out of 5 stars (2) $45.05
	10% buy The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge Classics) 4.5 out of 5 stars (19) $14.93
	9% buy Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Volume 4: Proceedings of the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, London, 1965 5.0 out of 5 stars (4) $36.10
	8% buy For and Against Method: Including Lakatos's Lectures on Scientific Method and the Lakatos-Feyerabend Correspondence 4.0 out of 5 stars (6) $29.92

Explore similar items

Tags Customers Associate with This Product

(What's this?)

Click on a tag to find related items, discussions, and people.

philosophy of science(4)

Sell a Digital Version of This Book in the Kindle Store

If you are a publisher or author and hold the digital rights to a book, you can sell a digital version of it in our Kindle Store. Learn more

Customer Reviews

2 Reviews

5 star:		(2)
4 star:		(0)
3 star:		(0)
2 star:		(0)
1 star:		(0)

Average Customer Review

5.0 out of 5 stars (2 customer reviews)

Share your thoughts with other customers:

Create your own review

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

15 of 21 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Methods of Scientific Research, November 25, 2001

By A Customer

Philosophy of Science is a crucial subset of philosophy, since it directly affects scientific research. We need to know what constitutes a properly constructed theory, and more to the point, which claims are not theoretical, or perhaps not even scientific. With that goal established, we need to know how to empirically verify the theory in question. Theories are developed within axiomatic systems, are based on assumptions, and present us with a compact thesis, or a set of theses. A theory is scientific if we can falsify it with empirical data. If a theory is not testable, then it is not a good theory, since we cannot accept or reject its propositions. An obvious point is to be raised here - when and under which conditions shall we reject a theory?

Methodological studies flourished in the XX century with the works of Karl Popper, Milton Friedman, Imre Lakatos, Harold Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and other philosophers. The contribution of Imre Lakatos was significant. With his version of corroboration and refined fascificationism we were able to apply new standards towards the methods of rejection of scientific theories. A single rejection of the scientific theory is not likely to falsify it, unlike advocated previously. However, the main point is that while the absolute truth is always of importance, i.e. whether a given theory is considered "true" because we have not been able to negatively falsify that theory; it is more important that various theories can be compared to each other, even if they are all imperfect. To this end, we can specify a set of thresholds, and say that a research programme A is more empirically valid than a research programme B if it does withstand a larger number of empirical tests. Of course, as simple as it sounds, it is a useful method of evaluation of theories, and can be augmented as needed within a given science.

Philosophy of Science and methodology is of utmost importance to theorists, since more often than not, nonscientific methods of theory construction are used, and even worse, empirical data are inductively used to hypothesize about the causes for the pattern of these data. It's methodologically invalid and by construction, these theories are not falsifiable since they are derived from data. This is true especially within economic theory; labor economics and macroeconomics in particular.

The works of Lakatos are summarized and condensed in various descriptive volumes on the Philosophy of Science, however it is illuminating to read the original works of this ingenious philosopher, since by doing so you gain an additional layer of understanding.

I will not go as far as saying that it should have been a must reading for any scientist, since such proposition would be hardly realistic, but I will say that it is a treat for those who have already tasted methodology in a compact form, and would like to expand their knowledge.

Comment Comment | Permalink | Was this review helpful to you? Yes No (Report this)

0 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

5.0 out of 5 stars Popper redux, and then some, February 22, 2008

By	Viktor Blasjo - See all my reviews (REAL NAME)

"Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes." "A series of theories is theoretically progressive ... if each new theory has some excess empirical content over its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected fact. ... [It] is also empirically progressive ... if some of this excess empirical content is also corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads to the discovery of some new fact. Finally, let us call a problemshift progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not." (pp. 33-34). "Justificationists valued 'confirming' instances of a theory; naive falsificationists stressed the 'refuting' instances; for the methodological falsificationist [i.e. Lakatos] it is the---rather rare---corroborating instances of the excess information which are the crucial ones ... We are no longer interested in the thousands of trivial verifying instances nor in the hundreds of readily available anomalies." (p. 36). One implication is that it may be perfectly rational to work on a theory even if it rests on false assumptions. "Indeed, some of the most important research programmes in the history of science were grafted on to older programmes with which they were blatantly inconsistent." (p. 56). In quantum mechanics, for example, "the decision to go ahead with temporarily inconsistent foundations was taken by Einstein in 1905, but even he wavered in 1913, when Bohr forged forward again" (p. 59). Similarly, "Cartesian push-mechanics" was "inconsistent with Newton's theory of gravitation," but "Newton worked both on his positive heuristic (successfully) and on a reductionist programme (unsuccessfully), and disapproved both of Cartesians who, like Huyghens, thought that it was not worth wasting time on an 'unintelligible' programme and of some of his rash disciples who, like Cotes, thought that the inconsistency presented no problem" (p. 59). Another consequence is that "The history of science has been and should be a history of competing research programmes ..., but it has not been and must not become a succession of periods of normal science: the sooner competition starts, the better for progress. 'Theoretical pluralism' is better than 'theoretical monism'" (p. 69).

I think Lakatos makes too much of the Popper/Kuhn dichotomy. Lakatos points out again and again that he "followed, and tried to improve, Popperian tradition" (p. 95), and has copious quotations and precise footnotes pointing to Popper. By contrast, Kuhn's theory is brusquely misrepresented without proper referencing; e.g. "there is no particular rational cause for the appearance of a Kuhnian 'crisis' ... 'Crisis' is a psychological concept; it is a contagious panic" (p. 90), for which there is no reference other than an inconspicuous "Kuhn [1970]" elsewhere on the page. This is all the more unfortunate since "Popper never abandoned his earlier (naive) falsification rules. He has demanded, until this day, that 'criteria of refutation have to be laid down beforehand: it must be agreed, which observable situations, if actually observed, mean that a theory is refuted'" (p. 94), which Lakatos has just demonstrated to be utter folly (e.g., pp. 17, 65ff.).

"Why did Copernicus's research programme supersede Ptolemy's?" Ptolemy's "research programme" was clearly degenerate. "Every single move in the geostatic programme ran counter to the Platonic heuristic" (p. 181), e.g. equants, and "it always lagged behind the facts" (p. 182). "Copernicus's programme was certainly theoretically progressive. It anticipated novel facts never observed before" (p. 183), such as the phases of Venus. But none of these anticipated novel facts were corroborated until the phases of Venus were observed in 1616. "It seems then that the Copernican Revolution only became a fully fledged scientific revolution in 1616, when it was almost immediately abandoned for the new dynamics-oriented physics" (p. 184). Hardly very satisfying, but we are saved by "Elie Zahar's modified methodology of scientific research programmes" (p. 185). "Zahar's modification lies primarily in his new conception of 'novel fact'. ... Zahar's claim is that several important facts concerning planetary motions are straightforward consequences of the original Copernican assumptions and that, although these facts were previously known, they lend much more support to Copernicus than to Ptolemy within whose system they were dealt with only in an ad hoc manner, by parameter adjustment. From the Copernican model ... the following facts can be predicted prior to any observation: (i) Planets have stations and retrogressions. ... (ii) The periods of the superior planets, as seen from the Earth are not constant. ... (iv) The elongation of the inferior planets is bounded" (pp. 185-186). Furthermore, "the determination of planetary distances represents excess content of Copernicus's theory over Ptolemy's" (p. 187). "But it turned out that apart from his initial successes, Copernicus could save all the Ptolemaic phenomena only in an ad hoc and, in its dynamical aspects, very unsatisfactory, way. So Kepler and Galileo took off from the Commentariolus rather than from De revolutionibus. They took off from the point where the steam ran out of the Copernican programme." (p. 188). Here Lakatos seems to forget that Copernicus determination of the planetary distances was necessary for Kepler's cherished polyhedral theory.

"History of science and its rational reconstructions." A philosophy of science (or a "logic of scientific discovery") "can be criticized by criticizing the rational reconstructions to which they lead" (p. 122). For example, "the internal history of inductivists consists of alleged discoveries of hard facts and of so-called inductive generalizations. The internal history of conventionalists consists of factual discoveries and of the erection of pigeon hole systems and their replacement by allegedly simpler ones. The internal history of falsificationists dramatizes bold conjectures ... and, above all, triumphant 'negative crucial experiments'. The methodology, finally, emphasizes long-extended theoretical and empirical rivalry of major research programmes [and] progressive and degenerating problemshifts." (p. 118). History is the ultimate test for any philosophy of science in that "history may be seen as a 'test' of its rational reconstructions" (p. 123). "If a historian's methodology provides a poor rational reconstruction, he may either misread history in such a way that it coincides with his rational reconstruction, or he will find that the history of science is highly irrational." (p. 127).

Lakatos apparently felt that the last article, on Newton, was "in need of substantial revision" (p. 193) and one can only agree. For one thing, Lakatos claims that "Newton turns the negation of his theory into its own foundation" (p. 210) just because the law of gravitation is derived from Kepler's laws with which it is strictly speaking inconsistent. This is hardly a very balanced statement, especially not from someone who accuses Kuhn of feeding "the New Left" (p. 136).

Comment Comment | Permalink | Was this review helpful to you? Yes No (Report this)

Share your thoughts with other customers: Create your own review

› See all 2 customer reviews...

.jsOffDisplayBlock { display: block; } .jsOffDisplayInline { display: inline; } .jsOffVisibility { visibility: visible; } .jsOnDisplayBlock { display: none; } .jsOnDisplayNoneBlock { display: block; } .jsOnDisplayNoneInline { display: inline; } .jsOnDisplayInline { display: none; } .jsOnVisibility { visibility: hidden; } .jqOnDisplayBlock { display: none; } .jqOnDisplayInline { display: none; } .jqOnVisibility { visibility: hidden; } .jqOnDisplayNoneBlock { display: block; } .jqOnDisplayNoneInline { display: inline; }

Customer Discussions

This product's forum

Discussion	Replies	Latest Post
No discussions yet

Ask questions, Share opinions, Gain insight

Start a new discussion

Topic:

First post:

Receive e-mail when new posts are made

Prompts for sign-in

Guidelines

Active discussions in related forums

Discussion	Replies	Latest Post
science Global warming is nothing but a hoax and a scare tactic	4201	3 hours ago
philosophy Some Queries Concerning PRATITYA-SAMUTPADA, Time, and Eternity.	5	3 hours ago
science Behe digs himself to a hole	0	4 hours ago
science Why are people here so scientifically illiterate	1111	4 hours ago
science Rapid evolution in humans	7	5 hours ago
science America's new Brownshirts	6	5 hours ago
philosophy Examining assumptions	34	11 hours ago