Customer Reviews

On the psychology of military incompetence

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As an active duty officer, I found this book to be not only highly entertaining but highly enlightening as well. Dixon could have ground an axe here, but he didn't. His writing is clear, concise, logical, eminently readable, and very accurate in a depiction of what actually goes on in the minds of some officers. While his emphasis is on character development, there is some discussion of unit character as well. A great book for those interested in why we think the way we do, and we can only hope someday, somewhere, someone will publish a second, updated version which includes organizational behavior which reinforces incompetence. His allusions to "The General" by C. Forester are quite appropriate. Definitely a book to be read by active duty as well as civilians.

Dixon is a former artillery officer, Sandhurst graduate, and self-described authoritarian personality, who left the Army and became a clinical psychologist. He uses both sets of experiences to analyze why officers in armies throughout history--mostly British, but the principles are generally applicable--have fallen into a stereotypical pattern of incompetence specific to senior military leaders. Much of the reason, he believes, derives from personality development, but the book is refreshingly devoid of psychobabble and is written in an astonishingly clear style. A real eye-opener, after which military history will not be quite the same to the reader again.

I first heard of this book in the Oxford Companion of the Mind. I managed to find a copy and was impressed with the work that Dixon had done on the subject.

Dixon analyses various military campaigns and provides his conclusion to why these ventures failed. various different reasons are cited in each case but there are certain common factors that Dixon isolates. From the Crimea to the blood baths at Somme and Arnhem. Dixon asks how competent officers and soldiers be let down by an inflexible militery guidelines of the period.

For example, Dixon is critical of the class selection of military 'leaders'. "Natural leaders may well have made good captains of a first XV," writes Dixon, "But being good at rugger in no way ensures the best quality of military leadership... Napoleon, Nelson, Wolfe for instance-were men of brain and character, not of huge bodies with dazzling records in the field of sport".

Dixon explains his findings in a clear and lucid manner that is understandable to anyone with a basic knowledge of psychology. The best recomendation I could have for Dixon's book is that his findings do not apply to military campaigns alone. I would reccomend this book to anyone who has ever worked on a film set. Frankly, I would shove this book to any future wannabe producer/director. it could save people a lot of hassle if they applied most of Dixon's findings.

For most people, including most of today's amateur theorists on the events of the day, war is something akin to moving toy soldiers around. What they know of military matters is all too akin to cheering for a sports team. They want someone with a can do spirit and the willingness to charge into stiff resistance. Take that hill no matter what the cost. Fight to the death. A lot of horse manure.

War is a deadly business and there is probably no war in which incompetence was not afoot, whether in losing or in winning. Mix incompetence and a failure to understand the technology of war and you have WWI. The reality is that incompetence is as pervasive in the military as it is in the corporate world. And if we must fight wars, we should have a reasonable expectation tht the people who direct that effort have some idea of waht they are about. Dixon is concerned primarily with generalship.

I first read this when it was first published in the UK at least a couple of decades ago. It filled an important gap in the range of serious reading on both the military and organization behavior. As another reader notes, this is just organization behavior mil101.Most corporations are still organazing along military lines and that cuts through titles like team leader and associate. It is hard business to make it work right and too many times in the military, there is a failure of competence.

The fields o fhte world are littled with the remains of those who died through bad generals. Dixon reflects some of his own military experience in the British Army, including WWII, before he entered the Psychology field. There is a British emphasis, but the approach is generally and applies broadly to any military. And the examples he cites are among those that are studied deeply for implicatins. He covers the field from the intellectual capability of generals to a chapter that for the sake of review rules must be labeled as Bull droppings.

How do we deal with incompetent leadership? That is one of the questions Dixon addresses. It probably should be extended to political leaders given their power over warmaking.

In our day, we are assaulted wtih people who accuse their opponents of micromanaging wr in Iraq. A decade or two from now, it may be somewhere else. But what we began doing in Vietnam was executive branch micromanaging and that was greatly expanded during the Iraq fiasco to the point that many left senior ranks. We look closely at our generals, but can we afford to go to war without understanding the competence gap taht we might have in political leadership..

`On the psychology of military incompetence' is officially on the list of books that Army personnel aren't allowed to read, but since I was given this was a retired general, reading it seemed like the thing to do. I'm pleased I did.

To be frank, non-military personnel might not admire its sheer brilliant powers of deductive observation. As soon as I had read it I started to panic as I saw the caricatures played out around me. I then started to spot them in myself, and began to panic harder. I suspect this book is designed to give oneself (if you happen to be in the military) a bit of a fright, and to encourage introspection.

Anyway, it's a brilliant book that's simply chock-full of theories, explanations and uncomfortable questions. I think the uncomfortable questions are the most valuable, but you have to read for yourself to discover if you think the same. And you should read it - it should be required reading for Officer Cadets right up to Generals, and civilians should read it as well - after all, you're the ones ultimately in charge of us gun-slinging types, yes?

Dixon presents the historical facts for each general he considers, and he advances his theory tentatively. Thus, he suggests an interpretation, but allows you to make your own. The general's disregard of the lives of the soldiers he commands seems a telltale characteristic of the less competent. I do wish Dixon had considered also naval and air force officers. I would have appreciated more examples of the competent as well. I have to wonder whether a victory forgives incompetence we would condemn had the general lost. For example, though Dixon lauds Wolfe, and though Wolfe's victory over Montcalm at Quebec won Canada for Britain, Fred Anderson in "Crucible of War" informs us that Wolfe was delerious with fever at the time of the battle, and he owed his success in part to subordinates countermanding his orders. Each of us has but limited time on the planet. I pose some additional questions Dixon might have addressed. You should understand that leaves undiminished the great achievement this book represents. What Dixon did, he did very well. Anyone interested in the topic of leadership in battle will enjoy this book.

I am so very glad to see this book at least available from some sellers in second-hand form. I still have my orginal hard cover from 1976 and took it down from my military shelf to appreciate it once more. I urge the publisher to re-print this book, and I would be deeply honored to be asked to write a foreword to the next edition. Norman Dixon has made a signal contribution that will long out-live all of us.

Although I despise Amazon for pre-emptorily deleting over 350 of my shared images to get rid of 12 copies of Bush-Obama sharing a face, I think so highly of this book that I have taken the time to scan and load my own original book cover. You can find all of my uncensored work at the Public Intelligence Blog.

This is nothing less than an essential reference in the leadership arena, and particularly in the national security arena. The author is a deeply original speaker of truth to power, and his work on the characteristics of incompetence, his chart on the role of "bull," his discussions of the reactions to criticisms, the concept of "efficiency" in the armed forces, and his examination of both the kinds of relationships and the interplay among the authoritarian personality and "group-think" are all very very important.

Most of our military officers (in the USA) have for decades forgotten that they swear an Oath to defend the Constitution against all enemies foreign and domestic, and instead they translate that oath into blind obedience to the chian of command, no matter how illegal, idiotic, or illogical those orders might be.

See also:
The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command
Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers
None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam
Who the Hell Are We Fighting?: The Story of Sam Adams and the Vietnam Intelligence Wars
War is a Racket: The Antiwar Classic by America's Most Decorated Soldier
The Fifty-Year Wound: How America's Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World
Wilson's Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century
Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq
DVD: The Fog of War: Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
DVD: Why We Fight

Very interesting and it must have application to incompetent leadership outside the military as well. Let down a little by some not entirely convincing arguments.

Inspite it's title, this book is interesting not only to those studying the military, but to anyone involved with large organizations where incompetance my "flourish". Instead of being offensive to military, this book will make many, many readers, military or not, nod their heads and think "I've been in a situation like this.." or "this happened to me..." or even "Hey! I know a guy just like this!". Everyone can benefit from reading this instructive as well as amusing book.

Part I was enjoyable as it discussed people, but Part II was bogged down in psychological theory. It picked up again in Part III but needs a Part IV - "How to prevent these loonies from having power"!